THE BOOK WAS DRENCHED

UNIVERSAL LIBRARY OU_164786 AWWAINN

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 301/M97S	Accession No. /4003
Author Muschison.	last.
Title Social psyc	hology. 1929
This book should be remined on	or before the date last marked below

THE INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY SERIES IN PSYCHOLOGY

Edited by CARL MURCHISON, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratories in Clark University

THE INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY SERIES IN PSYCHOLOGY

PSYCHOLOGIES OF 1925

By Madison Bentley, Knight Dunlap, Walter S. Hunter, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Kohler, William McDougall, Morton Prince, John B. Watson, and Robert S. Woodworth.

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

By Carl Murchison, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratories in Clark University.

THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST PSYCHICAL BELIEF

By Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Frederick Bligh Bond, L. R. G. Crandon, Mary Austin, Margaret Deland, William McDougall, Hans Driesch, Walter Franklin Prince, F. C. S. Schiller, John E. Coover, Gardner Murphy, Joseph Jastrow, and Harry Houdini.

FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS: THE WITTENBERG SYMPOSIUM

By A. Adler, F. Aveling, V. M. Bekhterev, M. Bentley, G. S. Brett, K. Buhler, W. B. Cannon, H. A. Carr, Ed. Claparède, K. Dunlap, R. H. Gault, D. W. Gruehn, L. B. Hoisington, D. T. Howard, E. Jaensch, P. Janet, J. Jastrow, C. Jorgensen, D. Katz, F. Kiesow, F. Krueger, H. S. Langfeld, W. McDougall, H. Piéron, W. B. Pillsbury, M. Prince, C. E. Seashore, C. E. Spearman, W. Stern, G. M. Stratton, J. S. Terry, M. F. Washburn, A. P. Weiss, and R. S. Woodworth.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL DOMINATION

By Carl Murchison, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratories in Clark University.

IN PRESS

THE COMMON SENSE OF DREAMS

By Henry J. Watt, Ph.D., Late Lecturer in Psychology in the University of Glasgow, and Consulting Psychologist to the Glasgow Royal Asylum. Author of "The Psychology of Sound."

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL DOMINATION

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL DOMINATION

by

CARL MURCHISON, Ph.D.

Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratories in Clark University

WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS CLARK UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1929

COPYRIGHT, 1929, BY CLARK UNIVERSITY

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE

For some years I have felt that the field of social psychology was not only in a condition of chaotic discussion, but that it was also almost entirely untouched by the masses of data gathered by educational psychologists, mental testers, and others primarily interested in the problems of measurement and analysis of distributions. This book is an attempt to give expression to that idea.

Political domination is so obvious a phenomenon in every walk of daily life and on every page of history that it must have a biological and psychological basis. Social institutions and particular forms of social behavior are but trivial and incidental consequences brought about by the ever present and irresistible influence of those persons or communities that dominate others.

This book is not intended to be used as an elementary textbook, though it may be so used by those who like to play with ideas and who are not forced by mental or economic restrictions to lead the life of formal quizmasters.

The field of social psychology will cease to exist even by the end of this generation unless its subject-matter can consist of more important things than hypotheses concerning natural behavior or of mere verbal definitions. If the psychologist is unable to keep possession of this field, it will rapidly become occupied by the historian, the sociologist, the economist, and the educationalist. In accordance with the principles of

this book, the field of social psychology will eventually be occupied by those most competent to survive under the conditions of that subject-matter. It is my hope that these more competent individuals will be psychologists, though there is no guarantee that such will be the case. Psychology in this field is poverty-stricken and has escaped a death notice chiefly because no one has called in the coroner. This need not continue to be the case.

In the field of social psychology, as in psychology in general, we need ideas more than we need anything else. There are hundreds of men who are either brilliantly equipped or fairly well equipped to do experimental work if they only knew what to work at. The greatest comedian in science is that person who periodically breaks out in print or speech to the effect that experimental work is all-important and that the discussion of ideas and of theories is largely of secondary importance. The individual whose professional life is built up on that kind of philosophy is merely deceiving himself in the most difficult way possible, when some simple way would be just as effective.

CARL MURCHISON

CLARK UNIVERSITY WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS September 26, 1928

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Preface	•	•	VII
	PART I. INTRODUCTORY			
	What is Social Psychology?	•	•	3
]	PART II. THE FUGITIVE NATURE O	s sc	CIA	L
	BEHAVIOR-PATTERNS			
2.	Control over the Labor of Others			13
3.	Birth Control		•	22
4.	International Relations	•	•	28
5.	Community Justice			36
6.	The Admirable Life-Achievement	•	•	43
7.	Moral Life-Achievement			51
8.	Human Rights	•	•	60
	PART III. SOME HISTORICAL THE	ODI	TC.	
	OF POLITICAL LIFE	OKI	ES	
9.	The Platonic Dream and Disillusionment .			79
9. 10.	The Christian Interpretation of Political Life			89
10.	Machiavelli and Human Nature			95
2.	The Theory of Social Contract		•	101
13.	Socialism		•	107
14.	Anarchy			117
15.	Democracy	•	•	123
16.	The Political Theories of Bodin and Montesqu	· 11e11	•	135
	The Tollical Theories of Bodin and Wionessqu	u	•	105
	PART IV. SOME PERSISTENT HYPO	ГНЕ	SES	
	OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY			
7.	Some Traditional Causes of Social Behavior: Forces			143
8.	Some Traditional Causes of Social Behavior: In			154
9.	The Hypothetical Nature of the Individual			162
20.	The Illusory Nature of Group Existence.			165
	•			

PART V. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

21.	The Formation of Social Behavior-	Pattei	ns		•	175
22.	The Formation of Social Behavior-l	Patter	ns			
	(continued)			•		184
23.	The Problem of Drives					190
24.	Radicalism and Social Control.		•	•		197
25.	Social Cohesion and Disintegration		•			203

PART I Introductory

CHAPTER 1

WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

It will be the thesis of this book that social psychology deals with those human characteristics that make political life inevitable.

It is unlikely that political life is the result of a possession of similar characteristics on the part of individuals. It seems more reasonable to assume that political life is the result of differences and conflicts. The mere existence of laws on statute books and the organized attempt to enforce such laws imply distinctly different forms of reaction to goods, chattels, economic values, credits, etc., on the part of individuals in the community. Quite likely this has come about because of differences in the ability or the opportunity to learn. (Social psychologists in the past have been more concerned in enumerating and describing the characteristics or forms of behavior held in common by human beings, and have attempted to show that these common factors are causative in social life.) This method of analysis, however, emphasizes characteristics that are not fully obvious, and passes over lightly the most characteristic things in social life. If there are social instincts and such instincts are markedly similar in human beings, it is difficult to see how laws could either originate or be enforced. That is, under such simple conditions political life never would have achieved such great importance, and human social life would be no more complex than is the social life of birds or fish. But a

distribution of mental and physical characteristics of such nature that some individuals possess markedly more of some capacities than others will guarantee the ultimate development of political institutions and behavior. It is not necessary to assume that behavior forms that are highly efficient in one period of national development will be equally efficient throughout successive periods of national life. It is quite likely that an individual most markedly endowed for successful behavior in one period of national history may be least markedly endowed for successful behavior in some other period. No amount of searching for common behavior characteristics can succeed in furnishing a basis for the explanation of such phenomena.

About two years ago the author became interested in the promotion of a series of lectures in Clark University which were later published under the title Psychologies of 1925. It is the prevailing fashion to assume that there is a common subject-matter in psychology and that theoretical differences are not of primary importance. The fundamental differences in actual subject-matter used by the various authors in the above lectures came as a kind of shock to most readers. Is it true that the various schools of psychology are dealing with a common subject-matter?

(Let us assume a structuralist and a behaviorist to be interested in the problem of emotion.) Of course, this assumption is an invalid one, since we are using the word emotion to mean two wholly different things. But ignoring that fact for the moment, let us consider the subject-matter used by these two psychologists while investigating what we assume to be a common

WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

problem. The behaviorist is interested in the situation and is careful to describe what the conditions of the experiment are. The structuralist is equally interested in the situation and is equally careful to describe the conditions, but only so far does any similarity exist. The similarity exists up to this point merely because nothing psychological has yet happened. As soon as the experiment begins, the behaviorist becomes interested entirely in what he observes the subject to be doing. The structuralist, on the other hand, after recording in a painstaking manner what the subject has to say about his experiences, reconstructs from such raw material a more accurate statement of what the subject really experiences. The raw material with which the behaviorist has worked is in no way similar to the data gathered by the structuralist. Even if he wished, neither one could make any use of the data gathered by the other. It is of no importance at all that each one admits that there is a legitimate field for the other and that their data represent concomitant processes. Such admissions are merely friendly concessions based on pure inference. Such being the case, how can the two psychologists above be investigating an identical problem? They have merely used the same word as a name for the problem they are interested in. But one is interested entirely in the subjective play of form and structure, while the other is interested entirely in observable physiological and behavior changes in another organism. The two problems are not the same, and nothing is gained by pretending that they are.)

No causative relation being known well enough to

be understood, it would seem to be better science not to assume that the configurations and structures of consciousness are in some way a common subject-matter with muscular contractions of various types. If it is so difficult to determine a common field for the various schools of psychology, how much more (difficult) must it be (to determine the field of social psychology.)

When the average student uses the term "social psychology," he usually intends the term to mean such things as gathering in crowds, fighting, loving, etc. and imagines these things to be determined by some mysterious force or instinct. Such things, however, are exceedingly trivial portions of the subject-matter of social psychology, and in no way deserve the large portions of space they have received in current text-books. Fighting, for example, probably plays a much less significant rôle in social behavior than does the reading of newspapers. Yet the type of behavior involved in the reading of newspapers would scarcely be mentioned in a textbook on social psychology which would give an entire chapter to the problem of fighting.

There are many measurable characteristics which make fighting inevitable. These characteristics are of such an order that they occur in markedly different degrees in various individuals. The ability to acquire, either in the form usually classified as learning or in the form involving the acquisition of wealth, is a characteristic which will largely determine whether the community will be peaceful or pugnacious. It is of more value that such characteristics, together with their varying degree of occurrence, be investigated

WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

than that so much importance be given to the superficial after-effects which are usually classified as the subject-matter of social psychology.

When we speak of the characteristics that make political life inevitable, we mean behavior characteristics. We are not dealing with economic or geographical influences, but primarily with behavior forms. The behavior forms that determine political life are not necessarily merely the behavior of some individual. Neither is it useful to consider that they are the behavior of groups. Both (Allport's concept of social psychology as dealing with the social behavior of the individual and McDougall's concept of social psychology as dealing with the structure and behavior of group minds have proved almost entirely barren as working hypotheses)

I well remember the acclaim with which psychology in general welcomed the publication of McDougall's Introduction to Social Psychology. Here at last seemed to be something really psychological, something that could be applied in the interpretation of the behavior of groups. Of course, it was assumed generally that the human race occurs in natural, well-differentiated divisions or groups varying in size from two to many millions. When McDougall's Group Mind appeared, years later, the acclaim was just as enthusiastic on the part of many psychologists, but a doubtful uncertainty was evident in some quarters. The idea was already gaining ground that the concept of instinct was altogether too superficial for long-continued scientific usage. A critical controversy by Dunlap, Kuo, and Tolman was giving expression to this

attitude of uncertainty. It is not necessary that the old arguments be repeated. The effect has been, however, that psychologists in general do not use the word "instinct" with the old confidence, and the conviction has become widespread that social behavior is far too complex) to be analyzed adequately in terms of group characteristics.

A very few years ago when Allport's Social Psychology made its appearance, a sigh of relief and satisfaction was quite audible in the various quarters where instinct and group concepts were losing caste. Many thought, and openly said, that here at last was just what they had been striving to say for some time, and that it was obviously true that the subject-matter of social psychology must consist of the social behavior of the individual. But the few years since have been marked by a growing loss of enthusiasm for the idea and a marked absence of any practical value to be found in the idea. It is a well-known fact of human nature to proceed from one extreme to the other, when both may be false. Of course, there is no social behavior of the individual which in itself is of any consequence. It is only when there is marked variation in behavior on the part of one or a few powerful individuals, or on the part of many individuals whose combined strength is important, that the behavior itself becomes of any consequence. The degree of consequence can never be determined by observing alone the behavior which has varied, but only through comparison with the main body of community behavior. A simple example will make our point clear. To know that a certain individual has made a score of 185 in one of the forms of the

WHAT IS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

Army Alpha Test would be to know nothing whatever of value concerning that individual. It is only by knowing the relative ranking of his grade among the grades made by many others that his grade achieves significance. The same is true of social behavior. To know that a certain individual reacts to a certain situation in a certain way, is to know nothing of value concerning that individual. It is only as his behavior deviates from the behavior of many others that it achieves significance.) It is this which furnishes the basis of conflict and ultimately makes political life inevitable.

We will only briefly raise here the question of the objective existence of groups. It is our conviction that this notion (is one of the greatest illusions of social science.) There is nothing more real, however, than political life. It possesses as much objectivity as any part of the world can possess, and at the same time embraces, without exception, every phase of human experience or behavior. There are no concepts of forms of habit, no actions or relations of one individual to another, which do not enter into and become an essential part of the political life of the community.

PART II

The Fugitive Nature of Social Behavior-Patterns

CHAPTER 2

CONTROL OVER THE LABOR OF OTHERS

If social behavior were uniform either in time or in locality, there would be some basis for the traditional assumptions of instinct, group mind, etc. But such uniformity seems to be totally lacking. One of the most stimulating books of the last quarter of a century was William Graham Sumner's little book on Folkways. It was the thesis of this book that mores are inflexible, yet change over a period of time. Sumner's original data were and are unusually sound. But the inflexibility which he defended was largely illusory. It will be the general thesis of this section of this book that social behavior-patterns are very fugitive in form, but that a succession of changing names and changing forms really brings about no significant change in individual relationships.

The type of social behavior selected for analysis in this chapter is that which we may describe as control over the labor of others. This condition of individual relationships has existed in various patterns, several of which are known by the names slavery, peonage, employment, and communism. It is not our thesis that these behavior-patterns have invariably occurred in this chronological order, or that they will do so in the future. These patterns, however, are distinctly fugitive in nature and all of them may actually occur under any one of the four names. Our thesis is that control over the labor of others is not a definite social behavior-

pattern, and so cannot be ascribed as a characteristic of any group or groups or as the result of any "instinct" or "social force."

1. Slavery. There are various characteristics of slavery which are well known to all of us. When we read about slavery in our elementary history books, we learned about these characteristics and could repeat them later rather glibly. One of the characteristics is forced control by some individuals over the labor of others. When we read about that characteristic of slavery, we may have inquired rather feebly about the nature of the force which was used. In Uncle Tom's Cabin the question is faced squarely and the force readily described as a whip, a strong right arm, and a pack of hungry bloodhounds. This machinery of force, however, is more comical than true. Its realism is related to the bearded villain trying to destroy the beautiful heroine in any cheap melodrama. It is the nature of however, is more comical than true. Its realism is reaction to the idea of slavery. Certainly the mere fact of control by some over the labor of others is nothing in itself to become emotionally excited about, since it is a drama that is being enacted in the lives of all of us who are not professional hobos. An American citizen in the twentieth century may declare to the heavens that he is a free man and that he will work for whomsoever he pleases, but his freedom is very much of a hollow shell. The fact remains that he must work for someone, and that someone will control his labor. To be sure this someone may be a single individual, may be a corporation of individuals, or may be the pur-

CONTROL OVER THE LABOR OF OTHERS

chasing public. The essential relationship is unchanged and no real force has been removed.

Slavery also involved a control by some over the recreation of others. That control, however, was no more real in the old days than it is now. For when an American citizen wishes to see a baseball game today, he must see it as, when, and where supplied. If he wishes to attend the movies, his range of choice is limited in the same way. Even the mountains and oceans are not free to him, since he must attend designated spots and pay designated ransom or wander alone in the wilderness. Of course, these forms of amusement themselves are the ideas of others and are made necessary entirely through the medium of advertising. In the old "slave" days, a man, in order to be amused, and slaves, in order to be amused, had to attend a chariot race, a gladiatorial combat, a bullfight, or possibly go hunting or fishing. I am not so sure that the modern list of amusements is superior to the old list. I should prefer a chariot race, myself, or a gladiatorial combat, to a fixed baseball game or a dumb-Dora melodrama of film-land.

Slavery also involved the disruption of family life on the part of the slaves. This has historically been listed as one of the horrible characteristics of slavery. In our own twentieth century, both in Europe and in America, family ties are coming to be little regarded anyway. Divorces are almost as frequent as marriages. When they have become more frequent, it would seem that one of the most fearful characteristics of slave life will have been largely lost.

When we of the twentieth century think of the old

practice of slavery, we think largely in terms of ideas which do not belong to us at all, but have been borrowed from the time in which the practice was common. For example, we pity the poor slave because he was forced to work. But in the old days no one worked if he possibly could help it, and everyone pitied anyone else who had to work. It is very unlikely that many slaves ever worked as many hours per day throughout the year as the average successful man of the twentieth century.

If an important percentage of the slaves in any community are better educated or are more skilled in meeting the common situations of life than their masters are, the effect on the community life will not be the same as in the case where most of the slaves are uneducated and inferior in their ability to meet the common situations of life. The best historical example of the former type occurred during the days of the Roman Empire, when military prisoners were continually being brought to Rome to serve in the capacity of slaves. The result was the steady growth of a slave bureaucracy. More and more of the machinery of the government came under the personal care of individuals who were slaves. Most of the army also came to be composed entirely of slaves. As a result, political and social corruption became the ruling order of the day.

An example of the second type is furnished by the ante-bellum days of the old South in the United States, where the slaves were not educated and could not meet successfully the common conditions of American life. As a result, they never achieved control over important

CONTROL OVER THE LABOR OF OTHERS

institutions or other social machinery. Whether or not caused by this condition of political and social life, life in the old South was very markedly free from what usually, in our day, passes as corruption.

There were very few features indeed of ante-bellum slave days that were in any way similar to the old Roman slave days. Yet both were listed as slavery.

2. Peonage. Historical examples of peonage may be found in Russia, previous to the late war, in most of Great Britain, especially Ireland, and in Mexico. These cases are referred to merely because they are examples of peonage to which practically all agree. Of course, there is no form of human life that is free from peonage, but the above cases are traditionally recognized as such.

The peon enjoys a certain degree of liberty. He probably controls the hours during which he will take his meals and during which he will sleep. He may, within certain limitations, control the type of agriculture that he will engage in. All of this, however, is largely a theoretical freedom, since peonage is chiefly admitted to exist in those parts of the world where variety and range of agricultural interest are not very great.

The peon would indignantly deny that he is a slave. He would point to the fact that he has certain legal protection which gives him a status superior to that of the slave. This legal protection, however, is largely illusory.

The peon does not enjoy the personal freedom experienced by large numbers of slaves in the Roman Empire. He does not lead armies nor administer the affairs of state. He is not trusted with important business. He in no way commands the personal respect freely given to many ancient slaves. Why should his condition be considered an advance over slavery? Is not peonage in reality an inferior form of slavery in the true sense?

A distinction may be made of the fact that the peon travels about his small farm or over the estate of his master unaccompanied by a guard. He may not be lashed to his work with a whip or sold for a profit, but his life and happiness are largely dependent upon the wishes of others. He must toil under the physical and economical conditions determined by others. He must starve if he does not make a profit for his master. He can be made to suffer consequences that may be much worse than being sold. Baseball players are sold every day in the public market in all parts of the United States, and very few sentimentalists can be found who deplore the fact. Is a baseball player a slave because he is sold? Perhaps he is. Of course, he is at liberty to quit playing baseball at any time, and in that case he can demonstrate his freedom by starving.

3. Employment. In a general sense everyone can be said to be employed by someone else. Even the large employer is subject to the whims and fancies of the buying public. This relationship may not be consciously recognized by a great many individuals. In the city and town an overwhelming majority of the population is directly employed by the remaining small fraction of the population. In the country districts the proportion of employed and employers may be more even.

CONTROL OVER THE LABOR OF OTHERS

What does employment chiefly consist of? Of course, it is actually a form of control by some over the labor of others. Are the traditional characteristics of slavery, however, missing from this relationship? We abhor slavery because it was forced control of the labor of others. Is the relationship of employment essentially different? The tools of control, to be sure, are not the same. The crude whips, stocks, guns, shackles, bloodhounds, etc., have largely disappeared along with other comical paraphernalia of the old days. The new weapons of control are far more effectual. No one can escape the necessity of having to have money with which to buy food, clothing, and shelter. Of course, any employee can quit working at any time. His freedom, however, would result only in a demonstration of starving. If the employee chooses not to starve but to work, he must work under the direction and the physical conditions determined by others.

Employees may organize into labor unions and achieve considerable power in determining wage scales, hours of labor, etc. This might seem to demonstrate the possibility of real freedom, but such freedom is largely illusory. The cost of living rises with the granting of new wage scales, and the total income represents probably no more than it did before the organization was effected.

4. Communism. It has long been a dream of the employed class and of many theorists to evolve some community in which employers do not exist. Of course, children also have dreams of a world in which parents do not exist. The two dreams probably have

the same cause and likely will come to pass at about the same time.

Communism is built upon an assumption that large groups of individuals have identical interests, and that such groups are qualified to administer their interests effectively. Its doctrines declare that those who work with sheep should own sheep, that those who work with mines should own mines, that those who work with railroads should own railroads, etc. Even though it be admitted that such might be an ideal state of affairs, the machinery of guaranteeing such equality of ownership is not obvious. A poor section-hand driving spikes in the crossties on some obscure portion of a great railroad system would certainly have to trust in God for his rightful share in the earnings of the great system. It would be a physical impossibility for him to examine the books containing receipts and expenditures for a period of over a year for such an organization. It would be necessary for him to be merely represented at such inspection of the books. The man who represented him, and many others like him, might be an honest representative and might not be. machinery of actual operation of the railroad system could in no important respect be different from the machinery involved in the simple employment situation

We have considered four forms of social behaviorpatterns. We have found them to be fugitive in nature, that is, they can easily merge from one form into another. There seems to be little essential difference in the various forms. They all involve control by some over the labor of others. The important problem

CONTROL OVER THE LABOR OF OTHERS

would seem to be not how general any one of the behavior-patterns might be at any particular time, but what selective factors determine which individuals shall control and which shall be controlled. Such factors would seem to be of far greater importance for investigation by the social psychologist than are the vague empty concepts of instinct, of social force, or of group mind.

CHAPTER 3

BIRTH CONTROL

There are various social behavior-patterns as decidedly different in form as it is possible to be, but all involving the single factor of birth control. These various behavior-patterns arrange themselves fairly well in the chronological order of history. The thesis of this chapter is that these various forms of behavior are not essentially different in social content, but vary only in general outline.

1. Infanticide. It is generally agreed that infanticide has been practiced by nearly all primitive tribes. In fact, it has not been many centuries since it disappeared, at least publicly, from European nations. The practice is still common in many parts of the world, especially in oriental countries. The practice consists essentially in the destruction of male infants considered physically unfit for life under tribal conditions, and in similar destruction of a percentage of female infants. The practice was recognized politically, socially, and religiously as being an individual and a tribal duty. It was not accompanied by horror and remorse nor other mental consequences of conscious wrongdoing.

This practice was based upon the assumption that life was hard and stern, and required physically able individuals for the performance of its tasks. Life was accompanied on all sides by warfare, danger from wild animals, and the many hardships of nature.

There is much to be said in favor of the practice

BIRTH CONTROL

under the conditions in which it took place. It eliminated, at a time when the elimination was not painful, those individuals who later would need to be subjected to misery, starvation, and destruction by enemies. It retained only those individuals who could best cope with the conditions of life that existed. The result was a gradual development of tribes of superior individuals in terms of their ability to survive under the conditions. These individuals would be still better able to protect themselves in the community, if not hindered by the possession of deformed, weak, and helpless individuals.

The average citizen of the twentieth century considers with horror the fact of these early practices. He thinks of the poor little babies being torn from arms of loving mothers, and brutally destroyed. Of course, it is unlikely that there were any "loving mothers" of deformed infants. Mothers are not essentially different from the age in which they live. The poor little babies that were destroyed were probably the luckiest ones that were born. We desire only to point out here that the practice was very general, was very frank and simple, and had much to be said in its favor. It is the thesis of this chapter that it is only the outer form of the practice that has actually disappeared, and that the thing itself still exists in more modern dress.

2. Abortion. In most tribes where infanticide was practiced, abortion was also known and practiced. At the present time in America and in European countries, infanticide is very unusual, but abortion is much more common in the United States. Both practices are very decidedly tabooed by criminal law. An im-

portant distinction is made, however, in practically all of the states of the Union between the degrees of liability involved in the two practices. Infanticide is murder, and conviction may result in the death penalty. Abortion, however, is not usually listed as either murder or manslaughter. It carries a penalty somewhat similar to that involved in larceny, and may result in a jail sentence or even a penitentiary sentence.

Abortion cannot easily be supported by the same arguments that can be used in the support of judicious infanticide. There is no way of determining whether the potential child will be a strong, well-formed individual or not. But the circumstances of abortion usually imply that the birth of the child will result, both to the child and to at least one of the parents, in a great many economic, social, and religious penalties. It may be that the danger averted by abortion is just as real as the danger averted by the destruction of an ill-formed infant.

It is the legal practice to assume that murder can take place only on an individual that has already been born. This legal practice is based upon a theological assumption that a soul comes into the infant at birth. Of course, there is no biological reason for establishing any distinction between abortion and infanticide. Both consist essentially of a destructive interference with organic growth. The two merely occur at different stages in organic development.

3. Contraception. If interference with organic growth is pushed far enough back, it may be listed as contraception. Abortion consists essentially of interference with two or more living cells that are existing

BIRTH CONTROL

in contact with each other. Contraception is merely an interference that prevents contact between two or more living cells.

Contraception is very generally practiced among all classes throughout European countries. The practice is equally general among the educated classes in the United States. The one and only immediate social effect is to limit the number of offspring from the parents who practice it.

The arguments in support of contraception are very simple and direct. The practice keeps the size of the family within the economic resources that are available, guarantees maximum social and educational advantages, and releases the parties to obligations and privileges which they consider more important than the mere breeding of children. The disadvantages are equally simple, but are based upon assumptions not fully established. These disadvantages are usually listed as race suicide, non-perpetuation of the superior classes, lack of large families where the physical and social advantages are greatest, etc.

In most parts of the United States it is considered contrary to law to disseminate information publicly concerning methods of contraception. It seems to be supposed in such sections that the act of contraception is in itself illegal, or at least not a moral act. It is not the province of psychology to discuss problems of ethics or of religion in terms of values. The psychologist can only describe, analyze, and classify. It would seem, however, that if the general practice of contraception resulted in the degeneration of society, there would be no vast hordes of immigrants to come

pouring into America from the European countries.

Contraception, like infanticide, is also based upon a realization that life is hard and stern, and that individuals without effective weapons are rather helpless in the unequal conflict. Effective weapons consist of education, economic resources, and the health that comes from proper rearing. In this way, the same results are achieved for individuals as were achieved for the tribe in ancient times by infanticide. The pattern has changed, but the social content is practically the same.

4. Delayed Marriage. A generation or so ago, young people in America were usually married at about the age of twenty. This age has gradually become greater until now it is probably ten years higher than it was fifty years ago. This practice of delaying marriage is certain to have an effect upon the number of children born within the generation in which the practice originates. The reasons for delaying marriage are few and simple. They consist chiefly of the extended period of higher education, the present economic needs of an American family, and the demand, both on the part of the girl and of the man, that he be fairly well established in his business or profession before undertaking the responsibilities of family life. As can be readily seen, these reasons for delaying marriage are reasons that exist almost entirely among the so-called superior classes. Among those classes where higher education is not pursued, where economic demands are not so great, and where professional status does not exist, marriage is probably not delayed any more than it was fifty years ago.

BIRTH CONTROL

It is not certain that a delayed marriage means a reduction in the number of children born to any particular couple. Whether the marriage takes place at the age of twenty or at the age of thirty will have no bearing on the number of children, if the parents have decided what their allotted number will be. Any statistical investigation showing that late marriages result in fewer children than early marriages do is no basis for a criticism of late marriage. Such statistical argument is also obviously fallacious. It is quite probable that the same parents would have had the same number of children even if they had been married ten years earlier.

It has been the thesis of this chapter that infanticide, abortion, contraception, and delayed marriage are social behavior-patterns of totally different form but with the same social content. The four forms of behavior have approximately the same effect and are based very largely upon the same motives. Our brother, the primitive man, faced the problems of social existence just as seriously as we face them, but he was forced to use much cruder weapons than we would tolerate today.

CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

There are many social behavior-patterns varying decidedly in form and all having the same general content-international relations. It would be undesirable, as well as impossible, to discuss all of these many patterns in this book. We shall confine ourselves to four such patterns: blood revenge, war, balance of power, and league of nations. It is the thesis of this chapter that these four forms of social behavior are essentially identical in content, but may merge from one into the other in form. They are based largely upon identical motives and bring about almost identical social effects. In spite of presumptuous claims, all are equally the tools of the capable and strong, and all are equally destructive of the weak and incompetent.

1. Blood Revenge. Blood revenge was not practiced within a tribe but always between tribes. Blood spilled by some member of an alien tribe must always be revenged by a spilling of blood in the tribe that has offended. The practice in ancient times was fairly general throughout those parts of the world where records are now available. It would be absurd to presume that the practice belongs only to ancient times, since modern wars have been caused by the same practice.

The practice of blood revenge was not necessarily engaged in by all of the members of a tribal commu-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

nity. The actual execution of the practice might lie within the hands of a very few individuals, even one individual. But the practice was supported by community approval and could not be avoided by the individual whose duty it was to avenge the spilling of blood.

There are obvious arguments in support of the practice. It gave community worth to individuals, resulting in increased community attachment and vigorous support of the community by the individual. It gradually increased the security of the individual-before the beginning of a feud. It resulted in the development of a conviction of social obligation on the part of the individual. It was probably the genesis of nationalism. The arguments against the practice are equally obvious. No issue was closed until one tribe or the other had been completely destroyed. The practice was all in favor of the stronger and more numerous tribe, and completely destructive of the weaker and less numerous community. From the point of view of the losing community, it was probably poor sportsmanship.

It is a very simple matter for us of the twentieth century to look upon this ancient practice as a sheer, barbarous evil. That is largely because we think too much of the blood that has been revenged, and not enough of the motives and the social effects. The surface of the earth obviously cannot support an unlimited population of human beings. In ancient times the average available resources of the world were far less than now. The food supply and available comforts were decidedly limited. The question of human sur-

vival was a very real one. This does not mean that primitive men were thinking about such matters very seriously. It was not necessary that they do much thinking on the subject—it was necessary only that they do or die. Blood revenge, like so many other practices of primitive man, played into the general problem of survival. It increased the probability that the stronger would survive and that the weaker would disappear. There is no intellectual reason why the stronger should survive in preference to the weaker, but it seems to be an obvious fact.

Where the contrast was limited to an open conflict between weak tribes on one hand and strong tribes on the other, the practice would persist without deviation or change in form. But when the conflict became one between two strong and numerous tribes, there would naturally arise a desirability on both sides for delaying the ultimate decision while better methods were being formulated and being brought into execution. This would result ultimately in truces, treaties of peace, watchful waiting, or inter-tribal combinations.

2. War. War is blood revenge on a large scale. During the progress of war the only motive is to win at any cost. Of course, this is the same motive that functions during the practice of blood revenge. The motives that culminate in war, however, are as various and infinitely numerous as are the motives that culminate in the initiation of blood revenge. Two members of neighboring tribes might meet accidentally in the forest, and in the course of an argument over the fish supply might engage in a personal conflict resulting in the destruction of one of the individuals. The

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

cause of the initial combat might be even more trivial. When once set in motion, however, the practice of blood revenge became stern, relentless, and destructive, regardless of the motive in the original combat.

It is true also that all wars are alike, after once beginning. After the first gun has been fired, all motives merge into one motive—to win at any cost.

The practice of war is accompanied by emotional outbursts of patriotic enthusiasm, of self-sacrifice, bravery, hero-worship, and desire to kill the enemy. All of these outbursts and forms of behavior have only one goal—to win at any cost.

The arguments in favor of war are identical with those in support of blood revenge. The social effects are identical. War is a tool for the strong and competent, and leads inevitably to the destruction of the weak and incompetent. There is no intellectual reason why the strong should win rather than the weak—it is merely a fact of nature and inevitably occurs.

If the resources of the world are limited, the practice of war means that the strong and competent will enjoy these resources, and the resources will not be depleted by being shared with weaker communities or nations. There is a sophistry abroad in recent literature to the effect that the strong always lose in war and that the weak always win. This sophistry is based upon a stupid confusion of definite forms of strength and of definite forms of incompetence. A nation that is strong on the battlefield but weak off the battlefield cannot be listed only as a strong nation, but must be listed in both categories.

If war were always between the weak on the one

hand and the strong on the other hand, there would never be any obstacle to the initiation of war, and the weak would eventually disappear. But when war is between two powerful nations, it becomes desirable that the ultimate decision be postponed while more effective methods are being formulated and being brought into execution. Each of the strong nations is willing to invite the weaker nations to come into the conflict on its side. In this way the weak survive and sit in the council chambers of the mighty. As a result, organizations come into existence that preserve the balance of power, and world politics gain in importance.

3. Balance of Power. The phenomenon of balance of power has existed throughout most recorded history. It has gained in importance in recent times, and previous to 1914 was considered the most effective form of international relationships.

In recent times it has been the popular opinion that antagonistic organizations of nations, preserving a balance of power, existed primarily for the purpose of nurturing peace. This general belief has given prestige to the practice by making it possible for the practice to proceed undisturbed by undue excitement on the part of the general population. The motives behind the practice, however, are not even remotely concerned with the preservation of peace. It should be realized that, though peace may be a necessary condition for the accomplishment of certain things, it, in itself, has no social value. To imagine that great organizations of nations are brought about merely for

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

the sake of preserving peace is an idea as comical as it is stupid.

The balance of power is merely a transient stage in the progress of war. It usually precedes open hostilities, but need not necessarily do so. The idea of "balance" is contributed from the side that is not yet equal in strength and efficiency to the opposing side. The idea makes further preparation and organization plausible and desirable. The process continues until one side or the other, or both together, begins open hostilities.

The practice is one for insuring ultimate victory after the hostilities begin. But, of course, the advantage is all with the side possessing superior diplomacy and physical resources sufficient to attract national accomplices.

If the practice of seeming to preserve the balance of power always resulted in the more stupid nations' banding and being together on the losing side, there would never be any important attempts made to destroy the practice. But if the practice results in an equal division of diplomacy and physical resources, that is, if the practice actually does what it has always claimed to do—make victory uncertain, then it becomes desirable that the ultimate decision be postponed in order that more effective methods may be formulated and put into execution. In this way is born the organization that absolutely guarantees that any war will be a world war—the League of Nations.

4. League of Nations. It seems a far cry from the practice of blood revenge to the practice of such an organization as a league of nations. The content of

the two forms of behavior, however, is essentially identical. Such an organization is generally thought of as being an engine of peace. It is an enterprise, however, that has been generated, developed, and put into execution by the strongest nations on the face of the earth. If it were an organization conceived and advertised by the weak nations of the world, it might be valid to label it as an engine of peace. But it has been conceived and advertised by the strongest and most warlike nations in the world, and is an enterprise which weaker nations may have been coerced into supporting. It is a most interesting enterprise for the social psychologist to observe. The paraphernalia and setting of a league of nations make possible a guarantee that what has been accomplished in the way of preparing for war will not be easily lost. It is a kind of mutual admiration and support of the status quo. Under ordinary circumstances, a nation that has succeeded in building a navy twice as strong as the navy of some other nation could guarantee a continuation of that superiority only by immediate hostility and early victory. If a league of nations is formed, however, the naval superiority can be guaranteed without the experience and danger of immediate warfare. Attention can then be turned to other fields where superiority is still uncertain, and where the authority of the league does not yet reach. It is undoubtedly one of the most brilliant enterprises of modern world politics. The affairs of any league of nations are bound to be controlled by those nations possessing the most able diplo-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

mats and the most effective means of coercing the support of other nations in the conduct of the league. Such an organization virtually guarantees that weak nations will not be exterminated from the face of the earth, but that they shall be partners in the long drawn out and complex contest between the mighty nations of the world.

It has been the thesis of this chapter that blood revenge, war, balance of power, and world-organization of nations are but different behavior-patterns possessing the same general content. It is not important, as traditional social psychology has presumed, that we study these behavior-patterns as such. It is of the greatest importance, however, that we understand the factors that determine which shall be the victor and which the vanquished. These factors are the real subject-matter of social psychology, but have invariably been neglected by social psychologists in favor of the fugitive patterns that are of little importance.

CHAPTER 5

COMMUNITY JUSTICE

Perhaps no single topic in the entire field of social behavior has appealed to so wide a range of intellectual interest as the problem of justice in community life. This problem has appealed to philosophers, politicians, religionists, moralists, legalists, poets, and many others. It has been the dream of nearly all, and the claim of most, that justice is a condition that can be participated in by all. There have been literally hundreds of social balms and contrivances suggested by the reformers of all the centuries for the quick and certain attainment of justice for all. History has not demonstrated that any one of these claims has met with success. Yet the hope has continued to endure.

It will be the thesis of this chapter that several of the traditional forms of justice, varying widely in outline, have a common content. These forms, or social behavior-patterns, have developed chronologically in the occidental world and have carried to an equal degree the same motives and the same effects. These social behavior-patterns may be classified under the following rubrics: preservation of the king's peace, lex talionis, presumption of innocence, and formulation of law.

1. Preservation of the King's Peace. The preservation of the king's peace consisted essentially, in its origin, of meting out severe physical punishment to individuals who were guilty of doing certain things in

COMMUNITY JUSTICE

the presence of the king. In such primitive times, adequate methods of transportation and of communication were so totally lacking that it was necessary for the king to visit the various parts of his kingdom in person in order to learn how things were going with his subjects. The few fragmentary records which give us our information concerning the nature of the king's peace are concerned with matters as trivial as spitting, speaking loudly, or fighting in the presence of the king.

These offenses all carried severe physical punishment as a penalty. This punishment varied from a given number of strokes with a whip to the death penalty. As long as the penalty consisted of punishment of this type the only resulting inequality would be in the variation of different individuals in ability to abstain from habitual conduct. That is, the individual who could be most unnatural for the greatest length of time would be most likely to escape death of this nature. Inequality was not lacking, however.

As kings came to learn more about the value of property, and as the possession of property became more widespread among the king's subjects, the custom became more general to substitute a fine for the physical punishment. Eventually the fines almost entirely supplanted all forms of physical punishment for such offenses.

If fines supplant physical punishment, the man who owns property has achieved an advantage over the man who has no possessions. This advantage is exceedingly real and important, and results in greater privilege and confidence in behavior on the part of the

man who has it. It is not necessary to discuss in this chapter the factors that were influential in determining inequality in the possession of wealth. We are interested here only in indicating that the fact of such inequality had far-reaching effects in community life, as a result of the first crude attempts to establish a kind of law and order. Even in so crude and primitive a situation as is involved in the relationship of a primitive king to a garrulous, vulgar, and pugnacious group of subjects, there will be some who will suffer more than others. In so simple a task as pleasing the king, some will meet with much greater success than others.

2. Lex Talionis. We have heard from earliest childhood of the ancient law demanding an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. It was a primitive method that probably resulted in making people more careful in their physical contacts with one another. The practice would seem to contain the very essence of the democratic ideal, but such seeming is an illusion. Lex talionis would carry no sting without a machinery of execution. The man who has inflicted damage on his neighbor must first be caught, then he must be overpowered and damaged in the same way. Of course, there never has been any equality in the business of avoiding detection and in the business of being overpowered. The more cunning men would be much less likely to be detected than would the average man. the cunning man happened to be at the same time a very powerful man, there would be many social difficulties in the way of enforcing the law. The powerful man might be powerful in many more ways than merely in the possession of powerful muscles.

COMMUNITY JUSTICE

might possess many kinsmen, friends, and servants, who would strenuously object to any attempt on the part of the community to inflict punishment on him.

It was probably the difficulties inherent in putting out the eyes and breaking the teeth of powerful men that hastened the custom of substituting fines in place of the physical penalty. It is also likely that the individual who was injured in the first place would prefer a property settlement to the dubious pleasure involved in taking physical revenge on his adversary. In case death happened to the originally injured individual, his kinsmen might overwhelmingly prefer the property settlement from the powerful neighbor.

The eventual effects are already obvious. The man with sufficient property can enjoy the pleasure of knocking out his neighbor's teeth and escape the painful physical consequences. That, in itself, would of course be a very trivial effect. The important effect lies in the changed attitude of the poor neighbor to the rich neighbor. A condition of deference, built on a foundation of weakness, inevitably occurs. This gives to the powerful man an increased freedom of behavior, greater privilege, and increased acceleration of success.

3. Presumption of Innocence. In practically all of the law courts in the occidental world at the present time, a man is supposed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. It is freely admitted by all exponents of legal theory that this presumption is the very corner stone of modern legal procedure. It is supposed to give to every individual equal rights before the law, and in some way result in a purer form of justice than could otherwise be obtained. The legal machinery

is so carefully built around this sacred presumption that no jury's verdict is ever considered final any more. Even after a jury has found the prisoner guilty, the agents of the law are so desirous of continuing the presumption of innocence that a long series of appeals are probable. This practice is supposed to be built upon sound theory and sound principles of justice. So zealous are the agents of justice in the protection of the prisoner that legal assistance is furnished him free of charge if he has no money.

The equality before the law, which is so painfully demonstrated by the above practice, is an illusion in actual experience. The free legal assistance that is supplied by the state consists invariably of a young lawyer just out of law school or an older lawyer who amounts to very little, and the type of defence which results practically guarantees defeat. The prisoner who possesses an average amount of property will engage more competent counsel and will have a much better chance of coming off victorious in the conflict with the community. An individual of unusual wealth will obtain the best counsel that exists, and will have the maximum chance of being declared not guilty. After the verdict of the jury, the real legal fight is just beginning. The many possible appeals to higher courts are entirely beyond the reach of many who have no money or influence, and are easily available to the individual who can command the necessary counsel. The psychologist sees in this matter merely a series of simple factors. He, as a psychologist, suffers no more emotional disturbance while surveying such factors than a physicist would while observing

COMMUNITY JUSTICE

the various forms of magnetic fields or the differences in expansion of liquids at given temperatures.

4. Formulation of Laws. In olden times laws were very largely made by kings. Later, the king was assisted in the making of laws by the powerful lords who were his relatives and friends. As the democratic idea has become more firmly established in the world, laws have been formulated more and more by certain individuals who are supposed to represent the population of the state. It is supposed that these representatives, because of their intimate knowledge of the minds of their constituents, will make laws that represent the wishes of such constituents. It would be interesting to know how many individuals in the United States have ever expressed to a Congressman a desire to have a particular law passed. The representative gets his information concerning the community mind from the newspaper. The average man in the community gets his information the same way. Where the newspapers get their information is a profound secret. nature of this secrecy, however, that makes all the difference in the world.

The individual having a keen interest in the formulation of certain laws will express his interest through all available channels. This expression or series of expressions will eventually have an effect on the formulation of law. Ordinary individuals, most of whom are not possessed of a keen interest of any kind, live on the legal crumbs that are thrown their way. The result is that the statute books, even of a country like the United States, are filled with laws that are actually desired by a very small fraction of the popula-

tion. It is only once in a decade, when some trivial, stupid idea like prohibition gets mixed up into the legislative machinery, that a majority of the population know what is really going on in the legislative halls. At such times the stupid issue is played up like a smoke cloud for the benefit of the public. This gives the public an expansive feeling of proprietorship in affairs of state, and makes it easier for important laws to be passed unmolested.

It has been the thesis of this chapter that the many forms of behavior involved in such matters as the preservation of the king's peace, lex talionis, presumption of innocence, and the formulation of laws all possess essentially the same content. This content usually passes by the name of community justice. It expresses political equality for all, yet it is obvious that the equality is entirely illusory. These forms of behavior are entirely fugitive and do not furnish the social psychologist any firm basis upon which to construct a psychological interpretation of social life. The essential factors are the factors that make for inequality in these various forms of behavior, and such factors are the true subject-matter of social psychology.

CHAPTER 6

THE ADMIRABLE LIFE-ACHIEVEMENT

It is probably permissible to speak of general social commendation as a type of behavior-pattern. This commendation has certain definite characteristics. The type of individual behavior which the commendation fastens upon varies, however, very widely. The admirable life-achievement of one age may be entirely despised and considered of no importance whatever in some succeeding age. Though the admirable lifeachievement may be almost anything over a period of several thousand years, and though this fact may make the admirable life-achievement available for any type of man eventually, the specific life-achievement of any particular age is not equally possible to all men in that age. Some of the better-known life-achievements have the names victory, asceticism, poverty, service, knowledge, wealth, and personal eminence.

1. Victory. Victory as an admirable achievement consists essentially in overcoming a personal adversary. In ancient times the adversary might be a prominent member of the enemy army, or might be any member of a hostile tribe. A certain amount of honor was attached to the mere act of vanquishing in combat some natural enemy. After fighting men became more highly organized, the leader of the group or army would receive a large proportion of the honor due for the wholesale execution of many enemies. Even in our own day the custom still prevails to give honor to a

general in direct proportion to the magnitude of his victories—that is, the greater the number of the enemy slain, the greater the honor.

In the days when the arts and sciences of western civilization were still unknown, victory in important personal combat was probably the greatest life-achievement for any individual. The ancient songs and stories of mighty deeds all revolve about the clash of swords and spears in hand-to-hand combat. The great games and gladiatorial combats of the Roman Empire were merely an institutional form of the personal combat and its honored victory. It is obvious that the accomplishment of such a life-achievement is not open equally to all of the members of the community. The man possessing the necessary height, weight, agility, and physical strength had all the advantage over those not so endowed. The heroes of early history would therefore come from the group of physically powerful men. The most admirable conduct would not be even remotely possible to a large fraction of the population of any community.

2. Asceticism. This form of behavior has been known for many thousands of years and has been practiced by the devotees of many religions. It consists essentially in ignoring the attractions, passions, and possessions which appeal to most men, and in becoming meditative and solitary. Under the influence of St. Augustine, asceticism showed what it could do as an organized institution.

The ascetic ideal was possibly accessible to a much larger fraction of the individuals in any community than was the ideal of personal victory. In fact, the

THE ADMIRABLE LIFE-ACHIEVEMENT

ideal was probably possible to all individuals. Such an ideal, however, could not appeal to all of the individuals in any representative community. The strong man of the world would have nothing to gain by giving up his worldly interests in exchange for the more intangible rewards of the ascetic life. The man whose worldly relationships were considerably unstable, however, might be more than ready to exchange the very little which he possessed for the great promises handed out as a reward for the ascetic life. In actual practice, therefore, the incompetent individuals would be attracted to the ascetic life and would become an economic burden, even though admired by the rest of the community.

3. Poverty. The asceticism of the thirteenth century took a peculiar form, and resulted in a general glorification of poverty. The poor man was honored because of his poverty, and a wealthy man became an object of contempt in the community. The ordinary levels of poverty were entirely surpassed in this general social glorification. The real hero must not only possess a single shirt, but that single shirt must be dirty, ragged, and vermin-infested. Some individuals demonstrated true genius in achieving levels of destitution far beyond the capacity of the average man.

Of course, this form of behavior was theoretically open to all men. Like any form of asceticism, however, it could not appeal to competent men of the world. Only those men who had least to lose before achieving social admiration would be most attracted to this form of life. The admirable life-achievement

would therefore not be so accessible to some as to others.

4. Knowledge. For considerably more than two thousand years, in certain small areas of the world, the man of knowledge has been highly honored. A great deal of early literature, both in the Orient and in the Occident, reflects this ancient admiration for the individual who has achieved a knowledge that others do not possess. The Renaissance made this attitude toward the learned man somewhat general throughout the European world. Under its influence many European universities were established, and enthusiasm for education has continued unabated down to the present time.

The primitive wise man was an individual who could do many mysterious things. His knowledge had to do with the forces of the unknown, and he was consulted regarding coming events. The wise man of the Orient, of Greek philosophy, and of the early occidental world was an individual who was interested in knowledge for its own sake. He was an admirable individual, because he possessed within his mind a knowledge of many important things. He need not express his knowledge, he need not make any practical use of it, he need only to know.

The modern world has an interest in the wise man that is very similar to that of primitive times. The wise man today is the individual whose knowledge is useful, either now or potentially, to the civilization in which he lives. This wise man also foretells many interesting events, e.g., the coming of storms, of comets, and of eclipses. The admirable wise man has given to

THE ADMIRABLE LIFE-ACHIEVEMENT

the world the machines that are driven with steam, gas, or electricity. He has achieved methods of communication that make it possible for a message to go half-way around the world in a few seconds. The wise man has made a science of war and has also driven many diseases out of the world.

There is no honor too great for the individual who possesses a wisdom that is of great practical value to the human race. The greater the knowledge which he can demonstrate in a practical way, the greater the honor which the institutions of mankind will confer upon him.

Truly we have here a form of admirable life that is open to all men. In all parts of the United States and in most of the countries of Europe, it is possible for any individual to get a university education at very slight financial cost. It would seem to be possible, therefore, for a large fraction of the inhabitants of these parts of the world to become exponents of an admirable lifeachievement. The learned man, however, seems to be just as rare as he ever was at any time in history. He seems to be just as far removed from the average man as he ever was.

The records from the public schools, and from colleges and universities, indicate that only a very small percentage of the individuals who enter school are able to meet the relatively feeble standards of accomplishment that are required. The majority struggle along through the public schools with difficulty, while an important percentage is wholly unable to get beyond the first few grades. At the end of each year, from the first grade to the end of the university course, large

groups of individuals fall by the wayside. It would seem that the road to learning is very rocky and very difficult indeed. Knowledge as an admirable lifeachievement seems to be really accessible to very few people indeed.

5. Service. Even before the advent of Christianity the idea had been introduced into some communities to the effect that the most admirable life was the life of service to others. Christianity has especially emphasized this principle with the result that thousands of missionaries have been sent into all parts of the world, fired with enthusiasm for the slogan of service.

It is difficult to say what the effect would be if all men were to become imbued with this enthusiasm and were to spend their lives serving one another. It is probably not important to the social psychologist to consider such contingencies. It is important, however, to observe that the idea of service makes a much greater appeal to some individuals than to others. Whether the causes are intellectual or emotional is of little consequence. As a result, a life of service to others will be entered by a very few individuals. Though they may be honored for their sacrifice and their devotion to what they consider to be a sacred cause, they are not envied by those who honor them. Such an admirable life-achievement must, therefore, be limited to very few individuals and not be participated in by the overwhelming majority.

6. Wealth. The wealthy man is more universally admired by all conditions of men than any other type. The man of the world, the small boy, the ignorant peasant, and the professional man who claims to possess

THE ADMIRABLE LIFE-ACHIEVEMENT

higher interests, all join in admiration of the personal qualities that accumulate great possessions.

Wealth has an influence that cuts through natural boundaries at nearly all points. There are no institutions that can function without its help. There are very few individuals in the world who can continue to exist independently of money. The possession of wealth may be largely important in establishing ideas, customs, and law. All history demonstrates the power of wealth, and indicates the limitless opportunities for its acquisition.

It is obvious, however, that there are very few wealthy men in the world. In proportion to the population, there are probably no more wealthy men now than at any other time in history. The world may be filled with opportunities, but only a few individuals seem capable of taking advantage of them.

7. Success. In recent times the individual who is able to demonstrate marked ability in any line of behavior becomes an admirable individual at least for a day. His success may consist merely in the ability to knock baseballs farther than anyone else has yet knocked them, to play a round of golf in a lower number of strokes than anyone else has yet done, to swim a dangerous strip of water that no one else has yet been able to swim, or to fly an aeroplane across the ocean for the first time. All of these forms of behavior attract attention, and cause an individual to be greatly admired by multitudes for the time being. More enduring forms of success are demonstrated in the continued admiration for great statesmen, generals, lawyers, physicians, merchants, automobile manufacturers, and

others. The man who can rise head and shoulders above the crowd in any profession or occupation acquires an admirable life-achievement.

It is obvious that such men are very rare. There can be only one individual who can knock baseballs farther than anyone else, there can be only one individual who can build more automobiles than anyone else, there can be only one President of the United States, only one supreme lawyer, etc. All the others are those who admire but who do not actively participate in the processes of such achievement.

We have indicated in this chapter that there are many forms of admirable life-achievement. Most of these forms of behavior are mathematically possible for all men, but are practically inaccessible to most. Any given form of life-achievement is accessible to very few individuals. All such achievements give great social influence to their exponents for at least a short period of time.

CHAPTER 7

MORAL LIFE-ACHIEVEMENT

Moral life-achievements are not necessarily identical in any respect to admirable life-achievements. It may even be doubted whether there are any purely moral achievements that are enthusiastically admired even by the moralists themselves. Moral behavior is not accompanied by the enthusiasm of admirable behavior, either in the individual or in the social media which express the prevailing opinions of the community. In so far as moral achievement is positive, it consists of behavior which has some resemblance to the behavior of most members of the community. The result is bound to be that the behavior will not be enthusiastically admired. It is either drab, in that it is lacking in variety, or it is highly negative.

1. Sex. The traditional institutional forms of sex behavior are polyandry, monogamy, and polygamy. Very rarely in history have any two of these three forms existed simultaneously in the same community. Almost never have any two of the three forms existed simultaneously in any social class in any given community. One of the three forms has usually prevailed all alone as the moral form of sex behavior.

Polyandry is a very ancient form of sex behavior which has disappeared from practically all of the polite communities of the world. To be sure, it still exists in practically all parts of the world in an informal way but not in any institutional form. As long

as the institutional form prevailed, moral sex behavior would consist in the sharing of one woman by many men under certain specified conditions. In such communities other forms of sex behavior would be considered either immoral or ridiculous.

Monogamy is considered by Westermarck as the most ancient of all institutional forms of sex behavior and consists essentially of pair marriage. Where monogamy prevails, polygamy and polyandry are certainly not considered moral, but may be considered as immoral, illegal, ridiculous, or unsafe.

Polygamy is probably the most modern of the three forms of sex behavior. It existed until recent years in certain parts of the United States and still prevails throughout most of the oriental world.

It is obvious that polyandry, monogamy, and polygamy cannot flourish equally under identical economic conditions. Wholly regardless of the moral factors involved, the economic factors are bound to be of tremendous importance. While life is hard and food scarce, polyandry is bound to be given serious consideration and is certain to be encouraged if once begun. Where the standards of living are not high and property is not unusually important, polygamy is likely to develop and flourish. The higher the standards of living and the more organized and important property becomes, the more likely it is that monogamy will become the institutional form of sex behavior. It is obvious that definite economic groups will uphold the moral standards of sex behavior in definite ages.

In America, where property is important and controls legislation, monogamy is enforced by law. This

MORAL LIFE-ACHIEVEMENT

guarantees that institutional and informal sex behavior will become dissimilar. In countries where property is not so important and where custom controls legislation, there will not be so great a difference between institutional and informal sex behavior.

Moral sex behavior may be almost anything depending upon the community and the period of history. The economic group that is most interested in supporting the prevailing institutional form of sex behavior will vary in different communities and different economic periods. There is practically no admiration for the individual who conforms with the prevailing institutional form of sex behavior, and failure to conform may result in ridicule, contempt, anger, prosecution, isolation, jealousy, and sometimes admiration. Conformity itself is a kind of psychological sea-level from which deviations are measured. The deviations may cause a variety of emotional reactions, but no emotion seems to attach to the observation of conformity itself.

2. Drugs and Foods. In the United States it is generally considered immoral to consume such drugs as cocaine, opium, etc., for the sake of pleasure alone. In the same community no such stigma attaches to the use of caffeine, nicotine, etc. In certain other countries, for example China, no stigma would attach to the use of any of these drugs. Their use would be considered far more moral than would indulgence in impolite conversation or other forms of rudeness.

It is not easy to determine how the moral stigma has become attached to the use of some drugs and not to the use of others. Used in the same excessive manner, it is likely that the effects would not be markedly different. Yet it would be considered immoral to use small

amounts of cocaine, and not immoral to indulge in copious quantities of strong tea or coffee containing caffeine.

It is contrary to law in all parts of the United States to indulge in the use of cocaine, opium, etc., unless prescribed by a physician. The economic interests which resulted in the formulation of these laws will determine very largely the social prevalence of observance. Individuals not associated with such economic interests will not recognize the importance of the moral stigma, and are more likely to break the law than are those individuals who are part of such economic interests. Consequently the attitude of contempt for the drug user will not be found in all communities.

It has not yet served any economic interest to prohibit the use of tea and coffee. Consequently there are very few people in the United States who do not use these two drugs.

Strange to say, the moralists have established very few taboos on the basis of health or general hygiene. This all-important reason for any form of behavior is usually the last and least important argument advanced by moralists in support of any form of behavior. This has been a serious administrative oversight on their part, for no motive is more enduring.

With the exception of the Catholic denial of meat on Friday and the Jewish denial of pork, moral achievements in the western world have had very little to do with food. The moralists in the occidental world have not cultivated this field. Consequently it has been regulated entirely by considerations of preference, fashion, and health. It is not demonstrable that

MORAL LIFE-ACHIEVEMENT

these considerations have been insufficient. Surely it is just as possible to destroy health and efficiency by overindulgence in food, as by overindulgence in drugs or any other form of behavior. Economic regulation seems to be a sufficient regulator, while openness of indulgence seems to remove most of the undesirable consequences which accompany the secret practice of prohibited things. Regardless of what a particular individual does with food, whether he expands his waist-line or shrinks to a shadow, in the Occident the moral stigma is not attached.

3. Citizenship. There is no universal formula for determining the characteristics of the good citizen. In various parts of the world and in various periods of history the good citizen might be any one of a number of things. He might be any individual who supports the current government, any individual who opposes the current government, any individual who lets the government entirely alone, any individual who pays income tax, any individual who pays no tax at all, any individual who belongs to a particular church, any individual who does not so belong, any individual who amasses great wealth, any individual who does not, etc. The characteristics are limitless, and in no way are unique in all parts of the world and in all periods of history. It is purely illusory to speak of the good citizen without at the same time designating what community and what period of history is being referred to. Even so insignificant a thing as the wearing of a white collar may determine whether or not a man is a member of the elect group, while if one does not wear the white collar one is a member of another elect group. Of course, either group is purely illusory.

The big majority of standards determining good citizenship are standards which make it impossible for all of the members of the community to participate equally in such virtues. If wealth is a criterion, it is obvious that all of the members of a community cannot be equally wealthy. If intellectual development is the criterion, it is obvious that all of the members of the community cannot be equally intellectual. If ignorance is the criterion, it is obvious that all of the members of the community cannot be equally ignorant, etc. As a result, there is a great variety in the degree of good citizenship in any one community. There are no outbursts of enthusiasm, however, for the spectacle of the good citizen. He may be respected, he may be tolerated, he may be trusted, he may be maligned, but he is practically never admired.

4. Religion. It is very doubtful whether any religious man in history has ever commanded unbounded admiration purely because he has religious beliefs or practices. The religious hero is invariably an individual who is admired for some spectacular deed that is only incidentally related to the conviction and practice of the faith to which he belongs. It is very simply admitted in the writings of the New Testament that the multitudes followed Jesus because of the spectacular miracles which he performed. There is not the slightest recorded indication that these multitudes were interested in religious life to the extent of admiring Jesus for his religion. The veneration, awe, respect, and love which many individuals in the New

MORAL LIFE-ACHIEVEMENT

Testament exhibited for Jesus, as a person and as a religious individual, were quite different from the enthusiastic admiration which the multitude had for his spectacular miracles. The same thing is true of any community today. The good man may be respected for his goodness, and the good woman may be loved for her reverence. Neither, however, is admired as the multitude admires a good baseball player, prizefighter, or aviator. If the good man performs a spectacular deed, the resulting admiration of the spectacular behavior may mistakenly be interpreted as being inspired by his goodness.

The maximum achievement possible in the development of the religious life is not actually open to all men. Theoretical claims to the contrary are on a par with the assumption that any boy can grow up to be President or that any man can become a millionaire. All three claims are mathematically possible, but never have and never will be demonstrated in any community. There will always be those who are very religious and those who are not very religious. The maximum achievement will be participated in only by a few.

5. Virtue. In most occidental communities, virtue is thought of and spoken of principally in connection with sex behavior, and almost entirely in connection with the sex behavior of women. In the case of the unmarried girl, virtue is retained as long as she does not engage in a particular form of sex act. In the case of a married woman, virtue is retained as long as she is faithful to her marriage vows. It is of little consequence whether the married woman loves her husband or whether she sold herself to him. If the relationship

is recognized, it is virtuous. It is obvious that there is nothing to admire in the above forms of moral achievement.

In the very nature of things, virtue, as above defined, is merely assumed to exist. Any suspicion to the contrary is invariably followed by an assumption to the contrary. Consequently, all do not participate equally in such moral achievement. The accidents of association, enmity, spite, braggadocio, charm of scandal, leisure for talking, density of population, ease of transportation and communication, all contribute to a determination of one's virtue in the community. No standard of moral achievement is so illusory or is based so completely on verbal reaction-patterns.

6. Temperance. From very ancient times the temperate life has been extolled as a moral achievement. But there is no universality or uniformity in the characteristics of the temperate life. The temperate life in Vermont would be quite different from the temperate life in Paris. Temperance among the Athenians was in no respect similar to the temperate life in ancient China or in Plymouth. In a particular community within a particular period of history, temperance consists of a certain balance of reaction to the variety of stimuli contained in the environment. There is no exact determination of the balance. Each individual needs to discover this through his own responses. It is on this account that temperance and virtue can never be synonymous.

The determination of balance presupposes experience and at the same time requires a large amount of knowledge. Unless one has knowledge concerning the

MORAL LIFE-ACHIEVEMENT

potential and present stimuli in the environment, one cannot achieve the experience necessary for a judicious determination of a proper balance. This presupposes intellectual development of a high degree, as well as an ability to perceive the value of temperate behavior. In any community there are all degrees of intellectual development and all degrees of ability to perceive judiciously. Consequently, the temperate life is a life that can be only approached by the majority of individuals, and can be achieved by very few. The man who does achieve such balance in his behavior must find his reward largely in his own self-satisfaction. There is no general enthusiastic admiration for such behavior, however enthusiastic the professional moralist may be concerning its value.

It has been the thesis of this chapter that moral achievement varies widely in different communities and in different periods of history. In any particular community and any particular period of history, moral achievement is of such a nature that its reality must be presumed, or of such a nature that it can be participated in fully by only a fraction of the community. The determination of the exact behavior-pattern of moral achievement is a hopeless task. The form is both fugitive and varied. Such forms do not furnish a very substantial subject-matter upon which to build an interpretation of social behavior. Here again a social psychologist would be interested chiefly in the factors that determine the fugitive nature of such behavior forms.

CHAPTER 8

HUMAN RIGHTS

It has become customary during the last few hundred years to speak glibly of certain inalienable human rights and to assume that these rights are attached to certain specific forms of behavior. Several well-known state documents of recent centuries have even enumerated certain human rights and have attempted to use such rights as a foundation for the structure of democratic government. It will be the thesis of this chapter that such rights are almost entirely illusory and that they attach to forms of behavior which are either difficult or impossible for the majority of individuals in any community. Some typical traditional human rights are liberty, freedom of speech, pursuit of happiness, ownership of property, form of religious worship, and equality.

1. Liberty. Traditional liberty consists essentially in the conviction that one's life is not regulated by someone who belongs to a different social class. There are two distinct elements in this conviction—one concerns the fact of life regulation, and the other concerns the fact of class distinction.

No human life in an organized community could long continue if unregulated. No individual could long protect himself from natural human enemies. Neither could the community protect any particular individual for any length of time, if his life did not follow along certain designated channels. For example, how would

it be possible to determine responsibility in automobile accidents, if there were no laws concerning parking, speeding, or position on the highway? No individual could long protect himself against the fraud of stock dealers or of drug vendors if there were no laws concerning such things. It would be possible to extend the list indefinitely, showing that the very continuance of human life in an organized community is made possible only by the fact of continued and persistent regulation.

There are practically no pleasures open to the unregulated man. If he wishes to dine the second time with his friends, he must observe certain forms of behavior in partaking of his food. If he wishes to continue to be a spectator in a theater, he must observe certain regulations concerning quiet conduct. If he wishes to be loved by some woman, there are certain rules which he must observe. If he wishes to acquire an education, there are very strict and formal regulations which he must recognize. If he wishes to be admitted to the pleasures of religious faith, there are very definite sacramental behavior-patterns which are imposed upon him by others. Practically the entire world is a closed book to the unregulated man. Surely the fact of regulation is no illusion. However hard and stern it may appear to the weak sentimentalist, there are very few forms of life that are possible to the unregulated individual.

There is nothing illusory about the variation in ability to regulate or be regulated. The reality inherent in class distinction is a reality based fundamentally upon variations in ability. There is no known

method of measurement that fails to reveal a wide discrepancy of ability in any given type of skill, learning, or other forms of behavior. There is no measurable factor in human nature that occurs equally in all men. Class distinctions are as biologically certain as are differences in the altitude of mountains. Merely to change the name of the regulator from king to president or from lord to "boss" is in no way to change the situation. To refuse to use the words at all and to fall back upon the universal use of the word "comrade" for a man is merely to revert to a period of primitive language development. Such reversion in no way changes the reality of any social situation.

To assume that liberty is a condition in which one's life is not regulated by someone who belongs to a different social class is merely to become interested in an illusion. The literature and practical life of the occidental world have been saturated for some hundreds of years with dreams of liberty. The names of forms of government have changed, the names of government officials have changed, the names of the many social classes have changed, but none of the facts of persistent, inexorable regulation of life by others of superior ability have in any way been altered.

Surely liberty is far less possible today than ever before in the history of the world. The media of transportation and communication have become so highly developed that regulation of the life of the many by the few is more obvious than ever before. It is no idle fancy to state that eight or ten men have determined the main outlines of European and American life during this century. No ancient king ever dreamed of

such power or could have comprehended it. It is needless to point out that the powerful man also is regulated in his life-behavior. He is hampered by insufficient knowledge of human nature, by insufficient technical knowledge, and by limitations of time. He is surrounded by advisors of varied integrity and ability. His life-work may be swept away in a very short period of time through the superior ability of some rival. Surely the dream of liberty is truly a dream.

2. Freedom of Speech. The words "freedom of speech" have probably been written more times in state documents and in other literature having to do with human rights than has the name of any other single "human right." Of course, this may be explained by the fact that the words vitally concern the welfare of newspapers, magazines, etc., and that such media vigorously defend themselves against encroachment.

When an individual is exercising freedom of speech, it is traditionally supposed that he is speaking his inner convictions—untrammeled, as it were. It is supposed to be of great value, both to the individual and to the community, to have this flow of language proceed unmolested. It is claimed in all seriousness that such freedom guarantees to the community and to the individual the continuance of certain sacred institutions and the possession of certain priceless forms of happiness. Nearly all politicians at some time in their career, and all newspapers without exception, speak learnedly of the great benefits that follow from this inalienable right.

Seemingly it has not occurred to the historical ex-

ponents of this blessed privilege to examine carefully into the nature of this free act. Surely one cannot speak freely without having something to say. And one can be prepared to say only what one has learned from the speech of others or from one's own very limited experience. Unless one is also free to make others speak the truth and the whole truth, one's own freedom to re-speak what one has heard is of no important value.

The information of the average man on the street comes almost entirely from the newspapers which he reads. He is as likely as not to limit himself to the reading of headlines, reading the text only when he is especially interested in the story. These headlines are usually only remotely indicative of what has really happened. It is well known by most people, and freely admitted by newspaper writers themselves, that newspaper stories are written almost entirely for the purpose of entertaining the readers. Only the superficial entertainment features of an event are even mentioned. The average newspaper, when reporting an international economic conference or arms parley, will build a story around some incidental, absurd, insignificant remark on the part of some delegate. This remark is distorted into an important gesture of belligerency. The real, serious, important facts presented at a conference would not be printed by the average newspaper even if they were delivered in typewritten sheets. The newspaper assumes that its sole province is to print what the people are interested in. Of course, the newspapers have a perfect right to conduct their business just as any other business is conducted, but it

should be recognized that the newspapers are not guaranteeing any inalienable human right to any greater extent than is the street-car conductor, or the farmer, or the bootblack, or the druggist.

The average American infant begins to learn some of the words of his language towards the end of the first year after it is born. For the next five years his knowledge of the world is derived from his parents and playmates. Then for a period ranging from eight to sixteen years he becomes an intellectual reservoir into which is poured such knowledge of the world as his teachers happen to possess. At the end of his school training his intellectual development becomes somewhat less systematic, because of the necessity for making room for other forms of behavior. During this period of life he must get his information of the world from newspapers, magazines, books, theaters, and personal travel. At no time is the individual free to guarantee to himself that he is reading the truth, or hearing the truth, or seeing the truth, or even speaking the truth.

Let us return to the case of an international arms parley or economic conference at which some delegate has been seen by a newspaper reporter to make a frightful gesture of belligerency. It must be presumed that the delegates themselves do not merely sit around a table and make belligerent gestures at each other. It must be presumed that they have brought with them large masses of facts which they discuss as openly and judiciously as they dare. The results of the conference will depend almost entirely upon the discussion of these facts. Yet these facts do not become public

knowledge. There is no conceivable way by which they could become public knowledge. Even if such facts were printed in the newspapers, they would not be even remotely comprehended by the majority of readers. What value can be attached to the report of the belligerent gesture? What sacred institutions and enduring forms of happiness can be guaranteed by such worthless phenomena?

If one could learn nothing but the truth about the world and speak nothing but the truth concerning the world, it would still be highly improbable that freedom of speech could guarantee anything of enduring value. For an example, let us presume that all automobile advertisements told the truth and nothing but the truth. Let us presume that we could buy any car advertised in the Saturday Evening Post and immediately achieve the glory and splendor that are supposed to go with such possession. It would still be obvious that there might be automobiles manufactured that are far superior in their ability to give splendor and grandeur, but which cannot afford to advertise themselves In this case, freedom to repeat the in that medium. truth would be relatively unimportant compared to the value of being able to force the world to tell all it knows about automobiles in general.

For the average man, freedom of speech must continue to be an illusory freedom. Every time he opens his mouth, he merely becomes a free advertiser for the ideas of someone else. His brand of cigarettes is always the best; his brand of toothpaste is the most desirable; his make of automobile is the greatest value on the market; his candidate for the presidency is

usually the ablest man in the field; and so it goes, ad nauseam. The average community is filled with human telephone receivers who blare forth the language of someone at the other end of the line. The man at the other end of the line is keenly interested in having the delusion continue. It gives him a fighting army which he does not need to feed nor pay. Surely, in any community and in any period of history, men cannot enjoy equally a freedom of speech. In the case of a majority of the members of any community, it would be difficult to establish that such freedom is of any value to the individual who exercises it.

3. Pursuit of Happiness. What would make one man happy would make another man unutterably wretched. The inventor might achieve great happiness while spending twenty hours of each day in his laboratory. At such times he might consider food and sleep of little consequence. There are other men who could be supremely happy only while eating and sleeping twenty hours each day. To these individuals the toil of the inventor would cause intense agony. Just what can the state guarantee in the way of happiness to such wholly different individuals?

There are probably no duties in life which do not give a degree of satisfaction to the people who perform them. Very few of the duties of life have ever been prohibited very seriously over any large area of the world. Of course, we can imagine an extreme case of an individual, in some crude primitive community, being continually picked on by other members of the community. We might imagine such an individual being deprived of his property, his wife, and his

children. This is, of course, an extreme case, and would very seldom happen except in time of war. It is needless to point out that such an individual would suffer in that way merely because he was not strong enough to protect himself or to influence friends to help him. Exactly the same thing may happen to any man in any community today. If he is unable to support his family, his family will be taken away from him and supported in some charitable institution. If he is unable to protect his property, it will be taken away from him by some fraudulent stock salesman. Surely the dangers involved in owning property and having a family have in no way disappeared as a result of much talk about an inherent right to pursue happiness.

Because men differ in ability, in personality, in imagination, endurance, and in influence of friends, it is obvious that the so-called inalienable right amounts to no more than does a right to be tall, or heavy, or fleetfooted, or agile. It is merely a name that may be attached to many forms of behavior. Being nothing definite or enduring, it can in no respect be guaranteed by any constitution or organization. It is not a definite form of behavior.

4. Ownership of Property. This is a right also that cannot be guaranteed by any individual nor by any community. It matters not whether the property is owned privately by individuals or whether it is owned publicly by the state. The mere fact of ownership cannot be of any importance. It is what one does with property that gives property all of its value. If sheep were sacred animals, they might be worth many thousands

of dollars each. We eat them for food, however, so their value is reduced to about ten dollars a head. So it is of no importance merely to own sheep. The matter of real importance is what can be done with a sheep.

It is demonstrated daily to anyone who is capable of observing that a mere possession of dollars is of little consequence. It is of greatest importance, however, that the dollar have a potential purchasing power. At the beginning of this generation an unskilled laborer who could get one dollar per day for his labor considered himself lucky if he could get such wages during most of the year. His wildest dreams of avarice did not extend so far as the present earning power of unskilled laborer Yet the unskilled laborer of today is just as far away from his dreams of avarice as was the laborer of a generation ago. Both laborers are equally unable to possess the things they desire, though one possesses a great many more dollars than the other. The whole difficulty is caused by the fact that there are so many people in the world who possess much greater ability than that of the unskilled laborer -more dollars and more things that they can do with those dollars. If those superior individuals did not exist, we might hypothetically presume that the present-day laborer has achieved his old dreams of avarice and is satisfied. But this is entirely illusory, since he could not have achieved the additional dollars if there had been no one interested in paying them to him. That is, if the individuals ahead of him had not advanced, he would not have advanced either. Of course, he might have become a contractor and ad-

vanced in that way, but that is a wholly different story. Continuing as a common laborer, his advancement must follow the advancement of those who are beyond him.

To guarantee ownership of property is merely the guarantee of certain rules concerning the handling of property. It may be against the law to rob a man at the point of a gun. It is not against the law, however, to sell him stock the value of which depends upon the integrity of men who are total strangers to him. It is not against the law to lose money in the stock market, though it may be against the law to lose money in a crap game. There is no law that guarantees a minimum of ownership. A man may be required to wear a shirt and trousers upon the streets, but he can ignore this law if he wishes.

If property belonged to the state, it would be necessary that such property be administered by representative individuals. The total value of the state's property would thus depend upon the ability and integrity of such representatives. Ability and integrity cannot be guaranteed in any individual by the state. What could be done with this property which might belong to the state would be the problem that would need to be solved in order that the property possess any value. In solving a problem of this nature, some individuals in the community would show a much greater genius than others. Consequently their suggestions would prevail, and their use of the state's property would be much greater than the average. Inequality in the use of property would quickly become established and demonstrable, and prophets would arise who would

support a system of providing individual ownership in order to curtail the activities of these more energetic members of the community.

5. Form of Religious Worship. It is traditional in the Protestant world that each man has a right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. This sounds very fair, until one begins to analyze the possibility of such behavior. What information does the average man have concerning God, or how God should be worshipped? The average man, except in so far as he remembers what his parents told him, must go to some preacher to get his desired information. The effect of what the preacher tells him will depend entirely upon his own intellectual development and the intelligence and personality of the preacher. No one of these three things has any bearing on the nature of God.

What the preacher tells depends on his own reading and instruction in a theological seminary and various modifications brought about by experience and personal idiosyncrasies. The professor in the theological seminary got his information in the same way a generation earlier. If we trace back the pedigree of such knowledge, we come eventually to some individual of unusual personality who possessed the rare ability to make others believe what he said. In all of this, there seems to be little room for the much talked about freedom to worship God according to the dictates of one's own conscience. One cannot worship what one does not know about, and one's conscience can undergo great modifications if one is persuaded enthusiastically enough.

The guarantee seems to amount to no more than a statement to the world that certain rules will be observed in the coercion of religious worship and that whatever happens under these rules will be legitimate. As usually interpreted in most ethical communities, it is illegal to confiscate a man's property because of his religious belief, but it may be perfectly judicious and advisable to take his job away from him.

Whatever state documents guarantee concerning this illusory freedom, it is obvious that the community takes no steps to guarantee this freedom to any individual. All of us are taught certain religious principles in our infancy, and we grow to accept these principles as universally true. Most of us still believe them, not because of the exercising of any freedom on our part but because we do not know anything else. Some individuals even sign an agreement before marriage to the effect that their children will be taught certain religious principles and ritual. Freedom of worship is something that these potential infants are not consulted about.

It is difficult to see just what such freedom consists of. It does not guarantee that each individual will learn something that is true about God or that he will be told what forms of worship are most acceptable to God himself. All important matters seem to be left entirely untouched. A right to worship God according to the dictates of one's own conscience would seem to be a right to something that cannot be delivered. It is certainly a most fugitive form of behavior and is a name that may be attached to anything—meaning nothing.

6. Equality. Some state documents assume to guarantee equality before the law. One of the most ambitious dreams of the French Revolutionists was to achieve a condition of equality. Inferior races and conditions of mankind have plotted, schemed, dreamed, and fought for a condition of equality. Many political theories have been based upon the assumption that human beings are very much alike. Learned wiseacres frequently are heard to make the statement that human nature is very much alike in all parts of the world. This illusion of equality, which in many quarters persists as a delusion, has resulted in some of the most destructive wars in history. It turns class against class and man against man for the very simple reason that the facts of life do not seem to agree with the illusory belief. A man believes himself the equal of any other man and then finds himself licked in a social contest with other men.

The persistence of this idea of equality has resulted in the growth of some strange institutions. It would be hard to imagine a more absurd, uneconomical, and wholly ridiculous system of education than that prevailing in the United States. All individuals, regardless of differences in ability, regardless of differences in the quality of home training, are crowded into the lower grades and fed through the American educational machinery. The result is a huge economic loss involved in the attempt to educate incompetent individuals and another huge loss sustained because of lack of advantages for the more competent students. In this vast machinery may be found thousands of teachers who are themselves incompetent to do effective

work in the very subject-matter which they pretend to teach. All of this economic loss and stupid series of educational gestures are the result of the strange assumption that men are equal.

It is interesting at least to speculate on the possibility that the idea of equality is largely responsible for the dissociation of Christianity into many sects. The more liberal souls seem to find greater comfort among the institutions and theological interpretations of Protestantism. Within Protestantism we find a series of marked differences extending all the way from the House of David to Unitarianism. It may be good theology to assume that men are equal before God, but it has not yet been demonstrated that the idea can achieve an institutional form.

It seems needless and tedious to enumerate the well-known symptoms of inequality. These symptoms are obvious and unmistakable. There is no form of mental test that fails to reveal a wide variation in the distribution of ability in that type of subject-matter. There is no form of learning which does not indicate tremendous differences in ability to learn. Any form of behavior that involves skill cannot be engaged in with equal success by all the members of any community.

Variation in the ability of men is in no way determined by forms of institutional life. No power on earth can long keep inferior men in a position of control over men with greater ability. It makes no difference what the form of government may be. If kings are inferior in ability, their advisers will rule both them and the country. The man who is capable of

ruling will rule anyway, whether he is king, prime minister, secretary of state, or personal friend. If allowed sufficient time for readjustment, the abler individuals will run any form of government. If they themselves are not government officials, they will control government officials. Incompetent individuals cannot actually rule any important community even as long as one generation. Mankind has achieved no great victory by overthrowing thrones and turning the kings out of office. If the kings were incompetent, they were not ruling their countries anyway. If they were competent, nothing has been gained, and a destructive period of readjustment is inevitable. In no case does the inferior individual win anything.

It has been the thesis of this chapter that many social behavior-patterns are concomitant with, or possibly virtually the result of, certain widespread convictions concerning human rights. Analysis seems to indicate that nearly, if not all, of these so-called rights have no basis in fact. Most of them are sheer illusions, and the social behavior-patterns which demonstrate them are fugitive in nature. They may sweep across a nation like a flood, destroying institutions and overturning governments. When the flood has passed, the same facts of life prevail that have always prevailed. All that has been achieved is trouble. The man who has most to lose may seem to suffer most in the early years of such a social upheaval. But in the better years of readjustment there is no doubt about who will starve and no doubt about who will survive. The inferior and the incompetent may prolong their lives in

charitable institutions and through organized charitable agencies, but they never can win anything through the medium of revolt and revolution.

PART III

Some Historical Theories of Political Life

CHAPTER 9

THE PLATONIC DREAM AND DISILLUSIONMENT

Plato's Republic has been the model followed by dozens of political theorists during the last two thousand years. It would not be far wrong to assume that that remarkable symposium has been the source and fountain-head of most political utopias since the fifth century B.C. Other political theories have varied widely in form and content, but nearly all political ideas are expressed more or less clearly in this book. The fact is usually overlooked that the Republic was a product of Plato's youth, and that some of his most important ideas were modified later in the Statesman and completely discarded in the Laws. This last was a product of Plato's old age and was his final expression and observation of the human nature involved in political behavior. In order to evaluate the importance of the Platonic contribution to political theory, it will be found to be convenient to examine briefly the political organization of Sparta and Athens during Plato's career. Such examination will indicate that many of Plato's ideas were borrowed from the actual political customs of one or the other of these two Greek cities.

Sparta was a very small city comprised of the following classes of men: Spartans, tradesmen, and slaves. Only a small fraction of the city consisted of Spartans, but the Spartans alone ruled the city. These Spartans were not allowed to engage in commerce nor till the soil. Their entire life was devoted to political duties. They were organized under two kings of equal power and dignity. Under those two kings was a Senate composed of twenty-eight men. Though most of the administrative work of the state was attended to by a group of five individuals, all Spartans who had the right belonged to a General Assembly. This General Assembly gradually became less and less significant in Spartan life. Since the kings controlled the army, and the Group of Five were the actual administrators of the city, both the kings and the Group of Five were elected by those Spartans who had the right to vote. The tradesmen, who were much more numerous than the Spartans, engaged in industry and commerce. They had civil rights, but possessed no political rights whatever. The slaves, who were by far the most numerous group, were chiefly engaged in tilling the soil. They were probably the descendants of the people who once owned the surrounding country. They had no rights of any sort, political or civil.

Young Spartans were taken over by the state at the age of seven. There followed a long period of rigorous training, which consisted almost entirely of military discipline and combat. The girls were definitely trained to be mothers. Children that were not very strong were left in the snow to die.

The Spartan men had a common mess which required attendance. Each man was forced to contribute to the support of this mess. If he failed to contribute, he lost his vote in the General Assembly. As

a result, the number of votes in the General Assembly became of minor importance.

It must not be supposed that Sparta was communistic. Far from it. The land passed to fewer and fewer individuals. There were no written laws whatever. The Senate of twenty-eight men made their own laws. No one knew exactly what these laws were, except the members of the Senate. No man could appear before the court unless he was a citizen. Since the number of citizens grew less and less, litigations before the court naturally became obsolete.

The young Spartans were engaged exclusively in warfare or in learning about war. That not only was part of their education but was their very life. They became eligible for the Senate at the age of seventeen and at that age possessed all the rights of citizenship.

Surely no form of political organization could be more serious, stern, and scrupulous. There was no such thing as individual freedom. Every form of behavior was controlled by the state. This entire organization was probably the contribution of one man—Lycurgus. It is a perfect form of aristocratic government.

The political organization of Athenian life was quite different. The population consisted of two groups, the freemen and the slaves. The freemen were divided into commoners and nobles. There was a Senate which eventually consisted of approximately five hundred men. The Senators were elected by chance, each one of the names merely being drawn out of a box. Any eligible Athenian was as likely to be a Senator as any other. The Senate was divided into committees. These

committees were changed daily. On any given day, any Senator might possibly become a member of any committee. In addition to the Senators, there was also a Judicial Body of five hundred men who were elected by lot also. These Judges were divided into various groups selected by chance. As a result, any eligible Athenian might any year be selected a Judge and help to decide any type of legal matter. Just imagine what would happen in the United States if the Judges of the Supreme Court were selected by lot from the inhabitants of the entire country! There was a hierarchy of wealth among the freemen, which resulted in much quarreling.

Plato, living in Athens and knowing intimately the political life of the Spartans, constructed in the ideal Republic a community possessing the advantages of both Sparta and Athens, and not possessing certain social conditions which had proved troublesome in either Sparta or Athens. Plato did not make very many important modifications himself.

Plato raised the question as to how the state originated. His reply to that question was that the state originated because of a division of labor which made trade necessary. In any ideal community, according to Plato, there must be a group of artisans to do the work of the community and who do not need to fight; a group of soldiers who do the fighting, who themselves do not possess any wealth or have any family ties but who live a communal life; and a group of guardians who make the laws, pay undivided attention to the affairs of state, and who, because of their high education, become Senators, generals, and wise men.

PLATONIC DREAM AND DISILLUSIONMENT

According to Plato, the children in such a community must be educated by the state in gymnastics, military training, music, and literature. This music must be of the simplest kind, and literature must be entirely philosophical. Of course, this is the Spartan idea of education by the state, plus some more liberal factors from Athenian education.

Plato is facing here the problem of wealth and the problem of education. He could observe in his own city the disintegrating influence of jealousy and bickering caused by the hierarchy of wealth. He did not say that it was the artificial hierarchy that was causing the trouble but presumed that wealth must be inherently evil. So the real "ideal community," according to him, must be very poor. The soldiers must possess no wealth of any sort, and the other inhabitants of the state, and the city itself, must possess very little. Plato assumed that poverty would be no attraction to invading armies, so the ideal community would not be damaged by invading forces.

Plato faced a much greater difficulty in the problem of education. In order to justify the practice of having the state take over the children, Plato suggests a community of women and children. The children would be taken from their mothers immediately after birth, and would be placed in the state nurseries. The women would visit these nurseries daily and care for the children, but no woman would know her own child. There would be a system of mating by which all the women within certain age limits would bear children each year. This mating would be arranged by lot, and would have for its purpose the breeding of only the best and strong-

est of children. It was Plato's idea that this system would cement the community beyond all danger of disintegration. The older mothers would love all men as sons and would oppose war. The affections that were usually lavished on family life would be transferred to the state.

Plato's system of education was to extend far beyond that functioning in either Sparta or Athens. During the first eighteen years the children were trained in arithmetic, geography, astronomy, and music. This was followed by two years of intensive training in gymnastics. Between the ages of twenty and thirty, there was a ten-year course on the interrelations of the above elementary subjects. Individuals who would find this course too difficult would not be asked to go on. Between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, individuals possessing the necessary ability were given a five-year course in philosophy. Those who could complete this course would then be introduced to fifteen years of active life as politicians, generals in the army, state officials, etc. At the age of fifty, these individuals would retire from active life, devoting themselves to a further study of philosophy, and would become guardians of the community in a true sense.

Plato's ideal community consisted essentially, therefore, of an aristocracy, with the wisest and most intellectual acting as guardians of the others, where the affections and sentiment had been transferred to the state, and where the evils of wealth did not exist. It is a community the very existence of which depends upon a real transfer of affection from the family to the state, a real elimination of the evils of wealth, and a real ability on

the part of the inhabitants to achieve the intellectual development necessary.

In Books VIII and IX of the Republic, Plato shows a distinct distrust of his previous assumptions. No matter how perfect the citizens of a community may be to start with, there will be always the possibility of bad people's being born. That is, a certain percentage of evil men will not possess a consuming love of wisdom and so will not acquire wisdom. Their affection will be lavished not upon the state but upon their passions. These men will love the things that wealth will buy, will begin to accumulate private property, and the contagion will spread through the community. The "ideal community" will disintegrate and will eventually be ruled by a tyrant. This tyrant will act for his own interests alone, and anarchy will finally prevail.

Plato meets with no difficulty whatever in painting the general outlines of an "ideal community" functioning perfectly, so long as he assumes an approximate equality within the various classes comprising the community. But as soon as he comes face to face with the hard facts of human nature, he finds that his presuppositions are false and that none of the various classes in the community will consist of individuals who are equal to each other. The discord is introduced because of Plato's recognition of the hard facts of inequality in human nature. Because Plato is young and enthusiastic, he meets the issue by substituting an "ideal community" of the soul, where these imperfections are less bothersome.

Plato's youthful enthusiasm assumes that the citizens of the ideal community will all freely admit that the

community is ideal and will all freely submit to the dictates of wisdom. He does not explain why the lower classes should submit passively to their slavery or why anyone should submit to the advice of the wise old guardians. It may be true that some men love wisdom more than they do the fleshpots of the world, but the teachings of history are usually to the effect that such men are not tall enough to reach into the fleshpots. As Plato grew older in worldly experience, he began to lose the enthusiasm of his youthful idealism. This fact is usually ignored. But in order to know Plato's political theories truly, we must take into consideration his more mature judgments.

The Statesman is much shorter than the Republic, being only about one hundred pages long. The last quarter of the Statesman is the most important. The statesman is he who has passed through the educational training as described in the Republic, has reached the age of fifty, and is now studying philosophy and ruling the state. He should not rule the state according to law but according to his wisdom, says Plato. Written law merely cramps the wise judgments of the statesman, and should be used only in those communities where wise statesmen are not available. Why educate a man for fifty years, asks Plato, if his wisdom cannot be trusted to function without the restraint of written law?

In the Laws, written at the age of seventy-four, Plato reverses most of the theories of his youthful Republic. In the Laws, he admits the impossibility of persuading men to give up all of their private possessions in order to support a community lacking ordinary comforts. He admits that men must be allowed to bring into such a

PLATONIC DREAM AND DISILLUSIONMENT

community such wealth as they possess, providing that wealth is no more than five times the amount possessed by the poorest class of citizens. He also admits that each individual should be allowed to bring with him his own beliefs, customs, traditions, etc. He agrees also that each man must be allowed to have one wife of In short, Plato admits in his old age that a human community cannot be organized apart from the traditional beliefs, desires, and passions of its inhabitants. These admissions reverse all the important demands considered essential for an ideal community in the Republic. In the Laws there is no discussion of education, Plato evidently assuming that people in general will not be primarily interested in education anyway. Neither does Plato discuss the guardians nor wise men in the Laws. He really reverses the theory of the statesman who ruled without law, substituting a community in which written law is superior. Plato implies that he himself is to give this written law and that it will be so perfect that it will never need to be changed. He admits that love of wisdom is not strong enough to hold the state together. In place of wisdom, he introduces religion as a cementing force.

It is quite clear that Plato recognized in the Republic the variations in human nature that would make his ideal community impossible. He was not disturbed by the discovery, however, feeling self-sufficient enough to construct an ideal community of the soul as a substitute for the defective community of worldly human beings. In his old age he seems to lose all faith in his early belief that wisdom is available to most men and comes to the conclusion that wisdom is very rare

indeed. He realizes that organized communities must be conducted according to written law and that force of some kind must be used by some members of the community in coercing the behavior of other members of the community.

Plato's chief contribution to political theory will be found in the beautiful literary form of his earlier writings. The elements of political life he has borrowed bodily from Sparta and Athens. They do not seem to work any better in the new combinations he makes of them than they did in the everyday life of Sparta and Athens. Just as Sparta and Athens lost their power and were swept away by inconsiderate barbarians, so Plato's ideas concerning harmonious, peaceful, wise, utopian political behavior disintegrated and died as he came more and more in contact with the hard facts of human nature.

CHAPTER 10

THE CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL LIFE

Jesus lived in a small community during all of his life. These communities were in no way similar to average small communities in the United States or Europe. They were ruled by a government which to them was as far away as Japan is to us. These communities were forced to pay a kind of tribute in one way or another, or forced to observe certain general regulations, but within certain limits could control the behavior of their own inhabitants. It was certainly not political life at its best.

If we will understand this clearly, it will help us to interpret the early Christian attitude toward things political. What could such a community ever hope to achieve politically? It was situated in a part of the world that had been used almost exclusively for battlefields and camping-grounds by the armies of Babylon, Egypt, Greece, and Rome. There was no possibility of becoming strong enough to keep out these more powerful armies, so political life became associated in their minds with war, large armies, tribute, destruction, and fate.

These people, however, on account of their religion, felt themselves a chosen people. It is not clear just what mission they felt themselves chosen to do in the world. They dreamed of confounding enemies and inhabiting lands filled with milk and honey. But there

seems little chance that they could confound the great armies that marched from the south and the north.

With a social and political background of this type, it is little wonder that Jesus faced the question concerning political obligation with the admonition, "Render to Caesar those things which are Caesar's and to God those things which are God's." The admonition did not make political duties very clear. If Jesus had simply said, "Always do what is right," it probably would not have been left any more obscure. Of course, the admonition was interpreted by the early Christians to mean passive yielding to the forces of authority, accompanied by natural reservations to the effect that such yielding was not of very much importance anyway. This attitude toward political life deprived early Christianity of any appearance of heroism. worldly relationships it appeared effeminate, insipid, and weak. Consequently, the earliest Christians consisted chiefly of women, slaves, and men of no importance. I do not know to what extent this early development was influenced by the above alleged admonition from Jesus and similar statements which he must have made, but the early Christians must have been influenced very largely in their political behavior by the teachings of Jesus, which were being reported from mouth to mouth. Of course, these reports were highly distorted and may have been misrepresented in many important respects even by those most closely associated with Jesus. This attitude of passive submission, however, came very near resulting in the early extinction of Christianity. Without heroic men, no organization can long survive.

Stoicism contributed to Christianity the factors necessary to attract heroic followers. The Stoics were the real, heroic, strong people of the time. It made no appeal whatever to women, slaves, or insignificant men. The Stoic found himself superior to any pains, disillusionments, sorrows, or defeats. It was the addition of the vigorous, intellectual interests of Stoicism that gave Christianity its early appeal to important people. These people made Christianity heroic and martyrdom inevitable.

Augustine's most important book was a narrative description of the development of the City of God. Augustine thought of this city as having always existed. He thought of it as growing to proportions that would eventually include the entire world. He left very little in his organization of this great state to be built by human hands. The Christian needed only to wait, and the historical miracle would unfold. Of course, this conception of political life would make the Christian indifferent to political happenings in his immediate community.

Thomas Aquinas was far more systematic in handling the problem of Christian politics than anyone before or after his time. But Aquinas thought of the state as a systematically constructed machine, completely subordinated to the theories and beliefs of scholasticism. Of course, such a state would possess no attraction for an individual who did not care to become one of the elect in the scholastic hierarchy. There was no room for the strong man in the determination of the political behavior of the community.

The addition of Stoicism did not change the Chris-

tian indifference towards things political. The Stoic himself was just as indifferent towards political matters as he was towards the other trivial things of life. He exhibited no passive weakness, however, in the presence of political problems. He faced political duties calmly, performed them with equanimity, and was in no way disturbed by defeat. It is in this very strength that the Stoic exhibits his greatest weakness as a political figure.

Defeats that are unimportant are not avoided with the same skill that one uses in facing the possibility of important defeat. The Stoic would, therefore, not be so interested in organizing governmental and social machinery that would give the maximum security. He is more like the fisherman who is an expert swimmer. He does not fear falling overboard. This will play into the hands of the opposition and insure eventual defeat—all other conditions being equal. As a condition for protection against specific ills of life, Stoicism was undoubtedly highly efficient. As a positive factor, molding political organizations in any important world community, it is difficulty to see how it ever could become important.

It is very obvious that only a small number of individuals in any important community are indifferent to the political welfare of their community. A large fraction of the voters may not actually go to the polls and cast their votes, but that is no criterion of their interest in the political destiny of their city, state, or country. Most people do not consider that it is of no importance whether their streets are well paved, their cities well policed, well provided with city schools, and possessing convenient means of transportation, communication, and comfort. Most people do not consider that it is unimportant whether the taxes are high or low, whether the roads are good or bad. Most people do not consider it unimportant that their country be defeated in war or invaded by a foreign enemy. The early Christian interpretation of the importance of political life seems to have undergone important changes in the present-day occidental world.

It is useless to assume that Christianity has fundamentally changed during the last two thousand years. Christianity is still based to a large extent on the teachings of Jesus and his immediate followers. Christianity, in its early years, ignored politics. In all parts of the world at the present time, politics ignore Christianity. It is necessary only to read the records of any important international conference on peace, economics, or arms, or the records of any conference for determining how the spoils of war shall be divided. The delegates at these conferences are nearly all members of some branch of Christianity, yet the records do not indicate that the principles of Christianity are even mentioned in considering any of the problems that involve the political welfare of the world.

The world is divided and controlled by sheer or potential force. Force amounts to nothing if it is equally divided. The teachings of Christianity to the effect that men are of equal value may undoubtedly be true in the ideal world of religion, but men are not equal in armies. They vary markedly in ability and in effectiveness. In considering the political welfare of the world, therefore, international conferences are

more likely to consider the factors that enter into the composition of armies than those factors that have to do with eternity. This may not be as it should be, but the facts run that way just the same.

CHAPTER 11

MACHIAVELLI AND HUMAN NATURE

Machiavelli contributed his political theories during the first quarter of the sixteenth century. The idea of nationality was beginning to gain a foothold throughout Europe and was becoming strong enough to oppose the continuance of a united Christian Europe. England, Germany, and France were becoming strongly nationalistic, and international politics were becoming, as a result, more and more a conflict of national interests. Of course, the Platonic ideal of a city-state could not survive for any great length of time in such surroundings. The Christian interpretation of political life was coming to be more and more disregarded. Force, directed by secret intrigue, was the ever present threat.

Italy, not possessing any national organization, was suffering the consequences of such helplessness. No effort had been made by the Catholic Church to promote a national organization in Italy. In fact, the influence of the Catholic Church was always directly opposed to any such development in Italian life. The various states of Italy depended entirely upon their own intrigue for survival.

Machiavelli was born in Florence, which was the leading city of Italy. The Renaissance was just at its height in that part of the world, and general intellectual awakening was taking place. There was no possiblity of joining in the national contests of conti-

nental Europe for the simple reason that Italy possessed neither an army nor a navy. A very high order of diplomacy became inevitable.

Machiavelli quickly became one of the leading figures in Italian diplomatic life. He represented his city at various conferences and observed at first-hand the real motives that dominated international relationships. If he had ever possessed at any time romantic notions concerning political behavior, those notions were very quickly swept from his mind.

There are three outstanding characteristics in Machiavelli's political philosophy: (1) He insists that there is a sharp distinction between private and public morality. He points out that the state would not long continue to exist if national morality were like individual morality. Any possible method of promoting the welfare of the state, if it succeeds, is justified. Deception and intrigue are justified in promoting the welfare of the state, though not justified in individual behavior. (2) He identified political idealism with political practice. The ideal of any state, if worth considering, is what the state actually succeeds in doing. He insisted that what is must not be thought of as being wholly different from what ought to be. What is actually working should be accepted as the ideal or approximately so. Theories that are wholly different from the practices of actual political life are not worthy of intellectual consideration. (3) Selfishness and national prosperity are the real motives behind all behavior, individual or social. It merely confuses the understanding of a situation to assume that either individuals or states act from motives that do not con-

MACHIAVELLI AND HUMAN NATURE

tribute to national prosperity nor to ordinary pleasure.

All of Europe shuddered at Machiavelli's wicked theories. "Machiavellianism" has been used as a word of reproach down to the present time. The law of parsimony was certainly not used by Machiavellian critics as a test of the motives that dominated the political life of the time. Machiavelli had no organized psychology upon which to base his interpretations of political life, but no political theorist has ever guessed so amazingly well. Because he had no standing as a scientist, the growing prestige of science, since his day, has not cleared him of the general odium that was placed upon him. Thomas Hobbes said over again most of Machiavelli's worst statements concerning human nature, but has been kept uncontaminated because of the reflected prestige of science.

Of course, Machiavelli's theories were the direct result of his own personal experiences in the diplomatic life of Europe. If his theories were true in his own day, they are still true, even when applied to the political life of our own time. Do the citizens of the United States make Machiavelli's distinction between public and private morality? How many men pay their income tax in the same spirit that they pay their grocery bills? The items on the grocer's bill are passed as obviously correct. The items in the income-tax report, however, are passed with reluctance. In both cases, something is being received for the money, but the standards of value received are not identical. any post-office building ever constructed with the same care for economy that the contractor would use in building his own home? Do the taxpayers ever expect that this will be the case? Does anyone suppose that a battleship is constructed as economically as it would be if it were being built by and for the United States Steel Corporation or some other private enterprise? It seems to be obvious that there is a very great distinction between public morality and individual morality.

It is an open question whether ideals that are dissociated from daily life actually contribute anything of value to daily life. During the final year of the World War, most of us thought that the ideal that accompanied the conflict was that of making the world safe for democracy. The very mentioning of that ideal now, however, only ten years later, results in nothing but ridicule. It is perfectly obvious that the ideal was not actually realized in any degree whatever. If the war had any effect on democracy, the effect was to hasten the extermination of the democratic idea. Even assuming that democracy was worth saving, the World War was the most terrible thing that could have happened to it. If the real motives of the war had been advertised and considered as carefully as were the idealistic delusions, the war might have resulted in something of profit to the world.

The word "selfishness" has a bad connotation for many people. The words "material prosperity" are not so high in the hierarchy of language as are such words as "spiritual force," "humanity," "brotherhood," etc. The major part of the odium that has been heaped upon Machiavelli consists of reactions to the bad connotations of certain words. If Machiavelli had used different words as names for the same facts which he discussed, he would have been hailed as a political

MACHIAVELLI AND HUMAN NATURE

genius by the people who have shuddered at the mentioning of his name. It is possible to classify any motive as a selfish one. All motives, whatever they may be, contribute some pleasure. Such pleasures may be interpreted as being selfish pleasures. So far as material prosperity as a determinant of national political behavior is concerned, it is necessary only to refer casually to the diamond mines of South Africa, the sugar plantations of Cuba, the concessions in China, and the oil wells at the Peace Conference. These are obvious facts. Why ignore them as being nasty? They are not to be ashamed of. The executives who actually come into contact with these matters do not meet at international conference tables with shame in their faces. It is only the unimportant citizen, who presumes to substitute illusory nothings for the obvious facts of political life, who speaks of these things with shame. These illusory nothings, if given the necessary newspaper emphasis, will draw millions of otherwise inert individuals into the national maelstrom, but will exert little influence on the initiation of national policy.

Individuals differ in the intensity of their selfishness and in the intensity of pleasure derived from any given level of material prosperity. There are also so many forms of selfishness and so many forms of material prosperity that the concepts of selfishness and of material prosperity become inadequate for a proper interpretation of political life. That is, the Machiavellian principles were only half-truths. They were a tremendous advance over the utopian dreams of Platonic idealism. They directed attention to human nature as

it actually occurs without any regard to what it ought to be. But it never could furnish the basis for a genuine interpretation of complex political life.

CHAPTER 12

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTRACT

In any discussion of the theory of social contract, it is necessary to examine the theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau. These three men all assume the validity of the theory of social contract. They assume different conditions preceding the formulation of the contract, however, and advance wholly contradictory conclusions concerning the method by which such contract must inevitably function.

Thomas Hobbes was a product of the first half of the seventeenth century. This was the period of the Puritan revolt, and Hobbes's political theories were naturally contradicted on all sides in actual facts of the daily life of the times.

We can get some insight into some of the peculiar characteristics of Hobbes's political mind by considering the fact that he was first a mathematician. He was never a great mathematician, but he was a very persistent and verbose one. He entered into controversies with some of the greatest mathematicians of the world concerning questions about which he knew little. One of his most enthusiastic mathematical attempts had to do with the problem of squaring the circle. He thoroughly convinced himself that he had succeeded in doing this. This fact of his earlier life will help us to understand his complete inability to see on all sides a

complete contradiction to the political theories of his later life.

When King Charles I was expelled from England, Thomas Hobbes accompanied his retinue to the Continent. It was during this exile that Hobbes wrote his most important work. The actual political status of the King at the time shows up Hobbes's theories like a modern comic opera. Yet these theories had a direct influence on the serious but dumb intellects of the time.

According to Hobbes, the original nature of man was solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish. In this condition every man's hand was against every other man. There was ceaseless conflict, ceaseless struggle, with defeat just around the corner for everyone. Such pleasure as was possible needed to be seized from each moment for fear the opportunity would never return. It was obvious that no organized life was possible under such circumstances, because the passions of men were in conflict and no one could profit from anyone else. These selfish brutes, acting wholly without regard for each other and entirely through selfish motives, resolved to submit to the rule of one man. This one man was not to be one of their own number, but one who would continue to live according to the fancies of his own passion. This individual would be one who could do no wrong because he had never agreed to abstain from following his own selfish interests. All the other individuals in the community would give up certain natural rights in order to submit to the rule of this one individual. If any of them should at any time refuse to submit to the rule of this one person, such individual would be breaking his contract with the other individ-

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTRACT

uals of the community. In short, the king can do no wrong. He rules according to an agreement entered into by all the other members of the community, but of which he is not a party. He himself can follow the fancies of his own passions freely.

A king who rules by divine right is indeed a sorry spectacle in exile. A king who can do no wrong is indeed a weak figure if he is kicked off the throne for undesirable behavior. A social contract which is not admitted to be true by the parties to the contract is surely worth much less than a scrap of paper. Hobbes is completely carried away by the logical form of his deduction from a wholly imaginary major premise. Assuming that primitive human life was solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish, he assumes that such life was equally undesirable to all. But such conditions would be highly profitable to some since the weak would be exterminated by the strong or forced into a conditon of servitude. This condition of slavery would be a condition highly desirable for the strong, and it would not matter what the weak thought about it. Why should the strong, therefore, enter into an agreement with the weak that all should submit to the rule of some one person? Even assuming the primitive conditions of life as Hobbes describes them, human nature, as we know it, would never proceed to the formulation of any such contract as Hobbes believed. Hobbes exhibits throughout his discussion the same type of mind that was convinced that he had succeeded in squaring a circle.

John Locke admitted the validity of the social contract theory. He denied, however, that it was possible for the members of the community to transfer their

sovereignty to some one individual. They might agree to submit to the rule of any given individual, but they would always retain the power to terminate the rule of that individual. Sovereignty resides in the people and not in the king.

Locke's position is much more consistent with the facts of life than is Hobbes's. Much of the logical difficulty of the problem disappears if we agree to this simple and obvious fact—sovereignty resides where the power is. If this power is taken away, sovereignty disappears. This would not change Locke's position in the slightest, but would reveal the obvious absurdity of Hobbes's belief that a king can retain his sovereignty in a condition of exile.

Of course, sovereignty is nothing but a name for power. It is obviously impossible for power to be transferred. A delegation of authority is in no respect a transfer of power. A financier may delegate to a clerk the authority to buy a railroad, but if the financier should become bankrupt before the railroad is actually purchased, the delegated authority would have no value and would not be recognized by anyone as even existing. Yet it would just as truly exist as would any sovereignty in an exiled king.

Because sovereignty resides in the individuals of the community, it must not be presumed that it resides equally in all the individuals of the community. Locke's mind was altogether too able, and his observations of the facts of life too clear, for him ever to fall into such democratic absurdity.

Jean Jacques Rousseau was a wholly different type of mind from either Hobbes or Locke. Where they

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTRACT

were learned, he was ignorant; where they were systematic, he was purely romantic; where they were interested chiefly in realistic problems, he was interested entirely in social values; where they looked upon the past as a condition from which the human race had mercifully escaped, he looked upon the past as the romantic golden age of history; where they looked upon the present as a period of equality and harmony, he looked upon the present as a condition of slavery and wretchedness.

According to Rousseau, the primitive condition of mankind was a condition of freedom and happiness. The present is a condition in which all men are in chains. This condition of slavery is a social contract, under which men have surrendered their freedom and sold themselves into servitude. The only way out of this servitude is the way which involves a dissolution of the social contract, an overthrow of civilization, and a return to the simple freedom of natural life.

Rousseau does not explain how men, living in a condition of freedom and happiness, should deliberately give up that freedom for a condition of servitude. He assumes that primitive individuals were actually happy, actually free, and that they all actually agreed to surrender that happiness for a condition of slavery. It did not seem to occur to him that it takes power, unlimited power, to bring about such radical social changes. A mere contract does not create power. The power that enforces a contract is at all moments the power that is interested in the origin of that contract. The result is the same even if the contract is never formulated.

The whole social contract theory becomes absurd if it is assumed that all the individuals of the community have an equal stake in its formulation. It is this fallacious assumption that has made the theory an evil influence in political history. But if the facts of individual differences are taken into consideration, it is obvious that the social contract theory, supported by each individual to the extent of whatever his ability may be, becomes merely a formal statement of the facts of life and in no way changes the course of history from what it would be anyway. If the facts of individual differences are ignored, it is only so much the worse for those who ignore them. The status quo is never of any importance, if the community wishes to change it and has the necessary power to bring about the change.

CHAPTER 13

SOCIALISM

The main thesis of socialism is to the effect that society should be supreme as opposed to the individual. This theory presupposes that the individual has no right to challenge the authority of the community. The various schemes of public ownership of property are merely devices for bringing about subordination of the individual to the community. It is not the fundamental thesis of socialism that private ownership of property be done away with, and that the state own all tangible It is because such devices have so frequently been confused with the main thesis that most people are at a loss as regards any insight into this political theory. No device can be considered seriously unless its object is possible of achievement. In discussing the psychological aspects of the theory of socialism, it is wholly unnecessary to consider the device involving the public ownership of property. It is necessary only to consider the psychology of a situation in which the community is supreme as opposed to the individual.

It is necessary to direct attention to the fact that no community has developed in nature as a result of the functioning of socialistic factors. It would be necessary to consider a community of ants or of honeybees in order to find a social organization which even remotely resembled a socialistic community. But it is only a very crude observation which would find such analogies even among ants or bees. Among human beings no

such community has ever arisen except on paper. It would seem that nature is not primarily socialistic but works chiefly through the agency of individuals. Our only interest here is to point out that we are dealing with a theory which is not the result of an analysis of actual life conditions but a theory looking towards a complete metamorphosis of the social community.

Karl Marx has pointed out that various classes of men have ruled the world during historical times. These classes followed one another in a certain chronological order. The only class left is that class composed of all of the rest of the individuals in the world, and these individuals should now in turn begin their domination of the world.

In this general exposition of history, Marx does not balance a fact with a fact or a should with a should—he balances a should with a fact. He admits as fact certain dominance over social and economic communities in the past. He formulates as a should the possible domination of social and economic communities in the future. He does not consider whether certain classes dominated social and economic life in the past because they should have. If he had gone into such an analysis, he would have completely destroyed the very foundation of his theory.

The fundamental question is whether, at any time, it is worth while to consider whether things ought to be different from what they are. The exponents of uplift and progress may have been convinced that agitation can make the community better and wiser. There has been no historical demonstration that this is true. There have always been individuals who dominated

SOCIALISM

their community because of superior might and influence. The question of whether they should or should not exert such influence is a purely academic question and can have no practical value. If the great men of the future are to arise from the peasant classes, time will demonstrate the fact. It is more than likely, however, that great numbers, educational facilities, ease of transportation, and speed of communication will bring about such demonstration, wholly regardless of whether Marx ever lived or whether the "fourth estate" ever had a name.

The socialistic community is a purely theoretical community. It cannot be maintained that theoretical communities can never be realized in this world. It is obvious, however, that no theoretical community has ever yet come into actual existence. It is easy to consider historical examples of attempts to realize theoretical communities. We might take Christianity as an example.

The Christian community is a community in which all individuals love God with all their hearts, and their neighbors as themselves. Has anyone, in his travels up and down the world, ever happened into such a community? The conditions of realization are very simple and do not involve the destruction of social institutions. Surely it is a very simple matter for each individual to begin loving God with all his heart, and begin loving his neighbor as himself. The attempt has been tried for two thousand years. Every known method of human coercion, intrigue, preaching, and simple example has been tried. All the nations of the occidental world freely admit that they are Christians,

but has even a small community of a hundred individuals yet achieved the Christian ideal? Has there ever been a Christian church in which the members did not quarrel over trivial matters? Has there ever been a ministers' association in which there was complete harmony of purpose? Of course, no individual can claim to have examined personally all of the small communities that exist in the occidental world. I do not believe, however, that any Christian community exists. If anyone knows where there is such a community, I shall be glad to receive the information. I promise faithfully that such information, if found to be true, will receive wide publicity.

There are not many theoretical arguments that can be used successfully against the main thesis of Christianity. Most men admit that it would be a good thing if all of us loved God with all our hearts and loved our neighbors as ourselves. But such admissions have not yet resulted in creating any community in which such love exists. Christianity has always had a very easy time of it. There has been very little organized resistance to its theories. The world has been turned over to it to be done with as it might wish. But Christianity does not dominate the world. It merely dances attendance like some spirit gnome. The Congress of the United States may be opened with prayer, but who knows or cares what the preacher says? A world arms conference is participated in almost entirely by Christian nations, but who knows or cares what St. Paul would do with the oil wells or how many battleships he would allow Japan to have?

Socialism is just as truly theoretical as Christianity.

SOCIALISM

No such community has ever existed, so there is plenty of opportunity to demonstrate the feasibility of the Socialism has a much greater handicap, however, to overcome than Christianity ever had. The world has not welcomed socialism with open arms. It has by no means had an easy time of it. By no stretch of the imagination could one suppose that the world has been turned over to socialism. In fact, a vast majority of the more influential members of most communities are extremely antagonistic to the socialistic theory. Obviously it can never have as great an opportunity to dominate the world as Christianity has had during the last two thousand years. If we put prejudice entirely to one side and examine the socialistic theory as coldly as we would examine a theory in mathematics, we might find in the theory something not easily disputed. Surely the community has greater worth than the individual and surely the community interests should be superior to the individual. Suppose we admit that such statements are obviously true, what difference does it make? Do we surrender our human nature merely because we have given assent to certain theoretical propositions? By no means. socialistic community is not any more likely to spring up on the basis of universal admissions than is a Christian community likely to come into existence merely because men admit that God and one's neighbor should be loved.

Let us take logical analogy to place beside the historical analogy which we have used. Consider the community of exact relationships that exists in the mind of an expert mathematician. In this community of accurate relationships, things happen in absolute propor-

tion of sequence, function, and deduction. If a relationship is once observed, it is no longer a problem but absolutely true. The mathematician gives intellectual assent to all the factors in this mathematical community, but in the biological, geological, social, and economic world in which men live and have their being, the mathematician's daily life is in no respect a demonstration of the orderly and accurate sequence of relationships in his mathematical world. His behavior is no more consistent and accurate than is the average behavior around him. As he takes a walk across his lawn, he is no more likely than anyone else to demonstrate that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, or that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. Just as it would take a super-wise man to tell from the behavior of men which ones are Christians and which ones are not, so it would take more than a super-wise man to tell from the behavior of men which ones are mathematicians and which ones are not. History does not demonstrate that theoretical admissions are very important in the determination of daily life.

In order for the socialistic theory to become embodied in a modern political state, it would be necessary for a certain fraction of the population to lose much of their influence in determining community behavior. It would also be necessary for a certain other fraction of the population to improve tremendously in their influence in determining community behavior. Public ownership of property, alone, with the facts of human nature undisturbed, is a question of little importance.

SOCIALISM

The problem of property is an important problem simply because so many able men are in that field. There is no form of activity in which the game of life can be played for such large stakes as in the field of money. Money rules the world, not because it is money but because a majority of the world's able men are interested in money. When the world's able men were interested in fighting, fighting ruled the world. When they became interested in ecclesiastic organizations, ecclesiastic organizations ruled the world. Now that able men are interested in money, money rules the world. In a few more centuries, some other form of activity may begin to appeal to the world's most active minds. If that should happen, money as a worldpower would pass off the stage. In the meantime, it is sheer idle fancy to consider restricting the influence of money. Who is going to do the restricting?

It is usually presumed by exponents of socialism that the socialistic community will be a more moral and more just community in its dealings with individuals than is the type of community with which we are familiar. It is necessary only to consider the morality and honesty of communities that already exist. It is admitted that a truly moral community deals with all of its members in an impartial, unbiased manner. It has not yet been demonstrated that any community has ever succeeded in dealing with its inhabitants in that way. Take the very simple phenomenon of taxation. Are the members of the community taxed the same amount per dollar of income or possession? By no means. Men of small incomes who possess very little property are not taxed anything in most of the com-

munities of the United States. Men of unusually large incomes are taxed up to more than one-half of their net income. It would be silly to give this as an example of community justice. There is no justice in it It is merely a practical contrivance for getting as much of the tax money as possible out of each individual. To take taxes from a man of low income would be a positive expense, since it would involve the necessity of giving it back again in the form of charity. The people who pay taxes are the people who determine the rate of taxation. Evidently they are willing to pay the taxes in order that the community may be safe for those who wish to work. They are interested in the community merely because they are first interested in their work. If they were to lose interest in their work, they would lose interest in their community. If the community, because of some pathological lesion, should destroy the value of men's work, the community itself would rapidly disintegrate. How such a dissolved community can contribute anything to any individual is not readily observ-Every community, in a way, influences the behavior of its inhabitants. Individuals are not supposed to commit murder, steal their neighbor's automobile, rob a bank, nor set fire to the courthouse. Men who own automobiles are supposed to drive on a certain side of the street, to park in certain sections of the city, and not to exceed a certain speed limit. well known that communities thus regulate certain forms of behavior. In a way, no form of behavior is entirely unregulated. Individuals are not supposed to sell worthless stock, they are not supposed to disturb

SOCIALISM

religious worship, they are not supposed to keep their children out of school nor desert their families unprovided for. It should be observed, however, that all of these regulations are ideas that make for the greater stability of the community and in no respect merely restrict. These ideas have not been contributed by the community but rather by the wiser individuals in the community. They contribute something to every individual concerned. The individual who ignores traffic regulations is bound to get killed himself. His own personal safety lies in a general observance of the regulations. Children who go to school are better able to earn their own living later. There is no common community regulation which really restricts the opportunities of any individual. In this respect, community regulation should certainly be considered as superior to individual whim, but no intelligent person ever presumes that there is a conflict between his personal rights and these simple community regulations. If a large percentage of the individuals in any community were to experience such a conflict, the regulation would become impossible of enforcement. It is probably a legalistic axiom that regulations which are irritating to an important fraction of the community cannot be enforced. This fact is usually obscured by an insistence on the statement that good regulations should be enforced. It is idle, however, to talk about what should be if the necessary power is not available. For example, how would one go about the task of forcing men to love their neighbors as themselves?

It has been the thesis of this chapter that socialism is entirely a theoretical form of social behavior-pat-

tern and has not yet demonstrated an actual existence. In other words, it is a social behavior-pattern that has been much talked about but not yet observed. It has also been the thesis of this chapter that socialism has a hypothetical form incompatible with the facts of human nature as we know them. Such incompatibility is a fairly convincing guarantee that no socialistic community will long endure. Whatever there is in socialistic behavior that is compatible with the facts of human nature has long existed and been observed in daily community life.

CHAPTER 14

ANARCHY

Anarchy is that theory of government which defines individual rights as always superior to the rights of the community. It does not give to the community the power to interfere with or in any way restrict individual behavior. This is all that anarchy means. It has nothing whatever to do with the traditional pictures of dynamite, outrage, and other absurd devices used by certain crack-brained individuals as symbols of anarchy. Most people are convinced that anarchy means outrage and general destruction. It means nothing of the sort. It is merely a recognition of inalienable rights on the part of the individual which must not be interfered with by the community.

The most respectable name connected with the theory of anarchy is that of Herbert Spencer. The name of Herbert Spencer is much more eminent and respectable than is the theory of anarchy. The prestige of Spencer's scientific work was sufficient to neutralize the odium attached to his connection with anarchistic theories.

It is obvious that anarchy is exactly the opposite of socialism. All of its presuppositions, implications, and desired results are exactly the opposite. In fact it may be presumed that all other forms of government carry presuppositions and implications that lie at some point between the two extremes of anarchy and socialism. Anarchy may seem to be more truly based upon

psychological facts than is socialism. I do not believe that this is true, however, and I am convinced that the two theories are actually far removed from the recorded facts of human nature.

A condition of anarchy is usually presumed to have existed in the most primitive times, before tribal or family groups had come into existence. Such assumptions are purely hypothetical and are of no value whatever in considering the theory of anarchy as a workable theory.

We are not interested in anarchy from the economic, social, or political points of view, as such. We are interested solely in considering the theory from the psychological point of view, together with its necessary implications in these other fields.

To initiate a condition of anarchy, it is necessary to assume the existence of a force that is great enough and interested enough to destroy all existing social institutions. Crack-brained individuals may have supposed that such force could be found in dynamite and in bullets, but such are the weakest and most impotent forces that may be involved in social behavior. The organized agencies of social control are, of course, not interested in bringing about a state of anarchy. Unless there are disembodied spirits who may be interested in the project, all of the force that may be marshalled can be no greater than the force of one man. A combination of men is not anarchy and cannot bring about anarchy.

Let us imagine a hypothetical anarchistic community. In this community there are no social organizations, no families, no clubs, no church organiza-

ANARCHY

tions, no armies, no police power, no public opinion. Of course, it is obvious that public opinion and anarchy cannot coexist, since public opinion coerces the individual. In order that this community may continue, there must be no newspapers, no books, no art, no games, no mingling in crowds, no general communication. Any newspaper would create community opinion that would cramp the style of individuals. Any school would coerce the children into believing the same things. Any important books or pictures would influence individuals to coerce the behavior of others. Any mingling in crowds would make the immediate community superior to any individual.

How could these various influences be kept out of an anarchistic community? It would be necessary for the citizens to organize and vote the extinction of newspapers, books, pictures, movies, etc. An organization that could perfect such elimination would in itself be a social organization superior to the power of any individual. Such organization would not be anarchy and would not result in anarchy. It could only result in terrorism for all.

Let us assume that the inhabitants of this anarchistic community are all exactly alike, in that they possess identical knowledge, identical skill, and identical ability. If all social institutions in such a community were completely destroyed, and all of the inhabitants were in a mental condition involving complete forgetfulness of social institutions, we might have a condition closely approximating a condition of anarchy. This condition would not long prevail. Economic conditions are not equally distributed over

large geographical areas. As a result, some of these inhabitants would possess more economic goods than others, and would become more influential in the community. This could not be prevented unless all economic goods were destroyed or unless the superior individuals were destroyed. In the former case, individuals with less economic goods would probably get killed in the attempt. If the less fortunate individuals combined against the more fortunate ones, there would no longer be a condition of anarchy.

Using the facts of human nature that are available to us in psychology, let us presume that this anarchistic community is inhabited by such individuals as now inhabit the world. In this case there will be a marked variation in ability, in skill, and in knowledge. This variation in human nature will largely offset any chance distribution of economic conditions on the surface of the earth. The more able individuals will inevitably control the resources of the surrounding country. This will give them a common interest, and they will organize and combine against attack from the less able individuals. As soon as this has happened, the condition of anarchy will have disappeared, and we will have in its place government as we now have it in the United States and in Europe.

It is impossible for individuals of unequal ability to live in contact with each other and in a state of anarchy. Wherever there is contact between numerous individuals, there is coercion and restriction. This is just as likely to be the case if two individuals of equal ability but different experience come in contact with each other. The cowboy and the sailor, being so dif-

ANARCHY

ferent from each other in experience, may coerce each other because of that very fact. It is doubtful if any two individuals can come in contact with each other without modifying each other's behavior in certain respects. The utterly dumb athlete or movie actor may intrigue a great statesman because of the novelty of the bizarre and dumb personality. A personality that is vivid enough and forceful enough may intrigue all the members of the community to such an extent that those individuals will combine to further the idea of the forceful personality. Even in a state of complete anarchy, people would crowd around to see a Houdini do his tricks, to see a Babe Ruth knock a home run, to see a Lindbergh return from flying across the Atlantic, to see a man like Roosevelt or Wilson. As these individuals crowd around to admire the great individual of the moment, any other individual in the crowd that should presume to interfere with the stage behavior of the hero would be immediately mobbed, and anarchy would disappear. In a condition of anarchy the community could in no way protect any individual from attacks by other individuals. If an individual possessed goods desirable to some other individual, that other individual would either take the goods himself by force or would combine with two or three other individuals and divide the spoils. If the first got other individuals to help him defend his goods, a crude form of modern government would appearand anarchy would have disappeared.

In a state of anarchy, there can be no current idea of justice, of truth, or of right. Such idea, if of any

value, would lead to individual coercion and would destroy the condition of anarchy.

If the exponents of anarchy were to organize community agencies such as militia, police, etc., to protect and guarantee the rights of individuals as against the community, there would be a situation that could not possibly continue, since such agencies would be the natural enemies of the community that paid their wages.

It has been the thesis of this chapter that the theory of anarchy is entirely inconsistent with the recorded facts of human nature and that such a community cannot long continue to exist.

CHAPTER 15

DEMOCRACY

The essence of democracy, in theory, is that sovereignty resides in the people and that the people can express their will through such contrivances as legislative bodies. The localization of sovereignty may be considered a purely academic question. Except for certain legalistic purposes it really makes no difference whether sovereignty resides in the people, in legislative bodies, or in one person. Psychology can have no concern whatever with the problem of where sovereignty resides. The question of whether the people can express their will, however, is a question with which psychology is well equipped to deal. any practical examination of the theory of democracy, it is more important to know whether the people can express their will than to know where sovereignty resides. Sovereignty that cannot express itself is legalistic nonsense. If the people can really express their will, sovereignty residing elsewhere cannot prevail against it. The important question is this: Can the people express their will?

An answer to this question involves an examination of the historical career of certain democratic forms of government. This examination will indicate whether the people have ever yet demonstrated that they can express their will. If they have demonstrated that they can express their will, the theory of democracy is sound to that extent. If they have not suc-

ceeded in demonstrating such ability as yet, it will be necessary at least to withhold favorable judgment concerning the eventual success of the democratic theory. If the democratic theory is found to be incompatible with the known facts of human nature, it will be necessary to look with suspicion upon the possibility of any success for the democratic idea.

The democratic idea is primarily a child of the eighteenth century. All of the presuppositions upon which the idea is based are presuppositions that were formulated by the eighteenth-century mind. All of the promises which the exponents of democracy have made to the world are promises based upon eighteenth-century knowledge and directed to eighteenth-century intelligence. The great strides made by science during the last one hundred and fifty years have in no way altered the traditional forms of democratic theory. In short, democratic theories have been formulated, declared to the world, fought for, and died for wholly without any regard for human nature as it exists.

When the American Declaration of Independence was first advertised to the world, it constituted the greatest promise ever made to mankind. Here at last in a new republic of the West was to be demonstrated, in tangible, historical form, the thesis that a government of the people, by the people, and for the people can exist. It is impossible for any man who lives in the twentieth century to imagine fully what that promise meant to the European world during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. It seemed to be a promise altogether too wonderful to be true. The amazing miracle was that the armed states of Europe

DEMOCRACY

allowed the enterprise to continue in existence. But the miracle happened, and a great republic began to be built by the millions of immigrants that poured in like a tide from all of the countries of Europe. To what extent have these millions succeeded in expressing their will? To what extent has the promise of the democratic idea been fulfilled?

The early legislative bodies were composed of the ablest individuals in the community. These individuals were selected because of outstanding ability, demonstrated integrity, and interest in the welfare of the new republic. These individuals served without pay, because no pay was necessary to enlist the services of such men. The judges of the various courts were the ablest jurists that existed in America. These jurists were really interested in the administration of justice according to the democratic plan-with equal and certain justice for all. During these early days American legislative and judicial bodies were held in greatest respect by the population of the country. The whole dream of democracy was recognized to be resting squarely upon the integrity and upon the intelligence of these two great branches of democratic government.

In the year 1928, approximately one hundred and fifty years after the founding of the country, what is the status of legislative and judicial bodies? Any statement to the effect that the ablest men in the community are elected to legislative bodies would get a horselaugh even from the newsboys on the street. Any statement to the effect that the best jurists are the only ones to occupy judicial benches would cause paroxysms of laughter among the lawyers themselves. These

conditions are a far cry from the conditions which prevailed during the early days of the republic. What do the people themselves think of the changed conditions?

Throughout all classes of people in America there is a general distrust of legislative bodies. It is obvious that able men are rarely elected to such bodies or would even consent to be elected. It is obvious that such bodies are not interested in the will of the people nor could do anything about it if they were interested. The vast majority of laws that are printed every year in various statute books do not interest the average man even remotely.

No attempt is made by legislative bodies to discuss legislative matters with the people in general. Legislative bodies do not take it as their function to inform the public concerning matters of legislative interest. If the people find out about what is going on in legislative bodies and howl about it loudly enough, some notice will be taken of the howling, but there is not even the remotest indication of cooperation nor the remotest suggestion that the representatives really represent anything. So the people look more and more upon representative bodies either as nuisances to be watched and guarded against or as weapons that can be used for the furtherance of private interests.

This is really an amazing commentary on the possibilities of democratic government. In most communities, very few people have the remotest idea who their legislator is. There are a few more who know who their Congressman is, but that is merely because a Congressman is more widely advertised. Still a

DEMOCRACY

larger percentage know the Senators who represent their state in Washington, but that also is because Senators are still more widely advertised. Everyone knows who Babe Ruth is—very few know the individuals upon whose integrity the continuance of democratic government depends.

It is obvious that a large proportion of the ablest jurists refuse election or appointment to the bench. Such individuals feel that they cannot afford to sacrifice themselves to the restrictions imposed upon such appointment. It is well known that the majority of people expect judges to apply the law as leniently as possible. In fact, criminal procedure protects the criminal much more studiously than it protects the community. Any error, slip, or mistake made by the prosecution is made the basis of appeal and used against society and in support of the criminal. Such mistakes made by the defense, however, cannot be used by the state as a basis of appeal nor as a weapon against the defense and in favor of the community. It is assumed that the community is actually on trial and must prove its innocence, while the criminal is assumed to be innocent and must be proved guilty. This assumption that the criminal is innocent until proved guilty can mean nothing more than that the community is wrong in its charge and must prove that it is right. That is, the law presumes that the community is guilty. This whole ridiculous distinction restricts judicial procedure and makes martyrs of all criminals. As a result, the judge is unable to thrust the sword of justice to its hilt but must be satisfied with scratching the hardened skin of the confirmed criminal, while the long-suffering

community must swallow the sword—blade, hilt, and all.

Is it any wonder that judges come to be looked upon as natural enemies, as men whose mission in life is to cause suffering and discomfort to tender-hearted, innocent burglars and highway robbers. Intimidation has its inevitable effect. Able jurists avoid the bench as if it were a plague, while the poor unfortunates who wear the legal robes are reviled, appealed from, and have their homes dynamited.

How has this great change taken place in the attitude of the American people toward these two great branches of democratic government? Some will say that it is because representation in legislative bodies and on the bench has been put upon a financial basis. It is perfectly true that, as the salaries of legislators and judges have increased in size, legislators and judges themselves have decreased in caliber. It is very improbable, however, that there is any causal relationship between these inverse variations. The increase in salaries has been the inevitable result of the increased emphasis on money that has taken place in all phases of American life. To assume that men of lower and lower caliber will be more and more interested in the sheer financial emoluments of representation is nothing but nonsense, because it assumes that able men are interested in small sums which are not large enough to attract unimportant men. It is quite improbable that money has had anything whatever to do with the general decline in enthusiasm for democratic government. There seem to be two possible explanations, both of which may be equally true.

DEMOCRACY

First, most people have discovered the futility of any attempt to express the will of the people. People cannot express their wills without doing so in some conventional form such as spoken language in conventions or written language in the form of letters, newspaper articles, magazine articles, or books. Very few people can ever gather together in conventions. In any convention, very few individuals can talk anyway. If all the individuals in any convention were to do even a small amount of talking, no one would know what it all meant, and it would never really amount to anything. Very few people can write articles for newspapers and magazines, and very few indeed can write books. If all the inhabitants of the United States were to engage in this form of expression, what would it all amount to? It could not possibly get printed nor read by anyone. So the very idea of the people's being able to express their will becomes futile and idle fancy—a fancy filled with glorious promises but signifying nothing. If a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of a community are convinced of the futility of democratic government in that community, then democratic government has ceased to exist as far as that community is concerned. Under such circumstances, the dream of democracy is dead.

Second, the measurable facts of human nature indicate that it is impossible for the people to express their will in democratic form. By democratic form is meant the assumption that the will of the people can be measured by a counting of ballots. It is perfectly obvious, however, that men differ tremendously in the knowledge they have concerning matters to be legis-

lated about and also in ability to acquire such knowledge. Men differ tremendously in intelligence, independence of thinking, and in the extent to which they can be influenced by suggestion alone. It is always possible that a given group of one hundred ballots may represent the will of only one man. How can the people express their will if they are more interested in expressing the will of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, or certain class interests?

It really is amazing how far removed we are from the possibility of any expression of will on the part of the people. For any given office there are usually not more than five or six candidates at the beginning of a campaign. When election day comes, the choice is usually narrowed down to two. A choice between these two is really all the latitude that is allowed the people in which to express their will. How much freedom of choice would a man think he had if upon going into a hat store and announcing that he wanted a hat, he should hear the proprietor say, "Take your choice between a brown derby, size 73/4, and an old-fashioned silk topper, size 6½"? There would, of course, be some freedom of choice involved, but it would certainly be a wholly useless freedom and might just as well not exist.

Every department of human life, except government, is regulated by ceaseless research into the nature of the material dealt with and the purpose for which the material is destined. The modern farmer has a chemical analysis made of the soil he works with, and at the same time is keenly interested in the markets for which his products are destined. His methods of farm-

DEMOCRACY

ing will be modified by both the soil analysis and the market situation. The gas-engine expert investigates the factors necessary to make an engine run, and also the use to which the engine is to be put after it has been constructed. New discoveries in either of these fields will influence his design for the new engine. The bacteriologist must investigate the characteristics of the human organism, as well as discover what bacteria will destroy other bacteria. The fact that bacteria A will destroy bacteria B is of little importance in the practice of medicine if the human organism is destroyed at the same time. The marvelous advances being made at the present time in world-transportation and communication are the result of ceaseless investigation, research, and experimentation.

In the field of government, however, little research has ever taken place. The research projects that are supervised by the government are not projects that concern the problem of government itself. There is only one problem of democratic government, and that is the problem of whether the people can or cannot express their will. In order to investigate this problem, it is necessary to investigate the characteristics of human nature and the ends for which democratic government presumes to exist. These two fields have never been investigated by any government. As a result, the essential idea of democracy has not changed since the American republic was founded. It is still a form of government built up on the old juvenile presuppositions of the eighteenth century, and functions as a piece of juvenile machinery might be expected to function.

It is doubtful if there have ever been many advances

in the theory of government. Governmental theories have usually been constructed on the basis of legalistic presuppositions that are absurd, as any other free fancies are likely to be. In this respect, how different are other theories! No science would continue to exist if its exponents merely guessed at their hypotheses and laws. Scientific theories are kept in touch with scientific experimentation. It is on this account that no present-day science is cluttered up with dead hypotheses and dead laws. Every hypothesis becomes modified as soon as experimental evidence justifies the modification.

But in the field of democratic government we come face to face with the hypotheses of centuries ago. Hypotheses that are at present wholly false, utterly impossible, and ridiculous are preached from soap-boxes, lecture platforms, the cheaper members of the press, and legislative halls, as everlasting truth. Such interpretations of political theory are as incompetent and comical as are the interpretations of the mind of God advanced by the "River Brethren."

An examination of democratic government in America does not create much enthusiasm for the democratic idea. An examination of other democratic governments will only increase the general dissatisfaction. In France there is a form of government which passes as democratic, but which has retained all the old forms of monarchy. The government is wholly centralized, even the local police force being under the supervision of the national government. In order to make France a monarchy, it would be necessary only to call someone king. No other changes would be necessary. The same governmental machinery would con-

DEMOCRACY

tinue to function. In Switzerland we find the nearest approach to a condition where the people seem to express their will. But Switzerland is no argument in favor of democratic government in other parts of the world. In Switzerland the total range of life-activity is very limited. If the Swiss Alps were suddenly to reveal untold treasures of iron ore and coal, Switzerland's democracy would quickly become a tradition in history. In the British Empire we have several examples of democratic government. But in none of these various members of the British Empire have class distinctions ever been done away with. It would not be far wrong to state that the various members of the British Empire are paternalistic aristocracies.

If forms of government ever become based upon the results of scientific investigation and experimentation, it is certain that the democratic form of government will cease being advocated. Since it is not very likely that forms of government will ever be based upon the results of research, it is likely that government will always pretend to be one thing and actually be something else. There will always be a flourish of pretense on the part of government officials, while the competent and forceful classes in the community continue to rule and dominate the entire community. This will always be the case for the simple reason that incompetent people are never able to observe and admit their incompetency.

It has been the thesis of this chapter that the democratic idea, which promised so much and which seemed for a short while to realize some of its promises, has become largely a tradition. This failure to function is obvious on all sides. It may be because the people

have lost interest in democracy, but it has more likely been caused by the fact that the democratic idea is inconsistent with the measurable facts of human nature. If human nature is such that ballots do not represent it, then democratic government becomes largely illusory.

CHAPTER 16

THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF BODIN AND MONTESQUIEU

The political theories of Bodin and Montesquieu harmonize so amazingly well with the measurable facts of human nature that they sound completely modern. These two individuals had only their personal observations to guide them in the formulation of their theories. No research investigations into human nature were available. When the crazes for democracy, socialism, anarchy, and bolshevism have passed entirely from the stage, these two individuals will remain as the cool, undisturbed formulators of political theory based upon human nature as it exists.

According to Bodin, no state can come into existence without a curtailment of the freedom of the units that comprise such state. That is, no individual or group of individuals can become a part of a larger organization without surrendering some of the liberty that goes with isolation. This part of Bodin's theory has never been questioned by anyone. The socialist and the anarchist agree with Bodin that individuals or groups of individuals lose certain amounts of freedom upon becoming integral parts of organized communities. The only disagreement in the matter has been concerning the amount of freedom that is lost and the importance of the loss that is thus sustained. The anarchist would consider the loss as great and irreparable, the socialist would consider the loss as great and de-

sirable, while Bodin would consider the loss as variable in amount and necessary.

Bodin denied that all the units comprising a state are of equal importance to the state or equal to each other in ability. He held that all claims of equality are utterly absurd. As a result, he was convinced that absolute democracy is impossible. Bodin's statements concerning equality are entirely supported by our present-day knowledge of the measurable characteristics of human nature. In such convictions he varied widely from the exponents of democracy, socialism, and anarchy.

Bodin also held that revolution is a growth phenomenon and is inevitable. It was his conviction that progress could never take place apart from revolution. He did not believe, however, that revolution must always take the form of collapse or of destruction. He felt that violence would never be necessary unless human nature were suppressed. If human nature is not suppressed, then revolution takes place imperceptibly, and growth and progress result.

Montesquieu was a great literary critic of his time who was keenly interested in achieving personal fame. He seriously considered the question of what field offered greatest opportunity for such achievement, and decided to become a political theorist. He became a serious student of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. His most important book, Spirit of the Laws, will certainly guarantee the fame which he so much desired.

Montesquieu starts with the general supposition that everything is brought about by natural causes, that is, that natural law rules all of the phenomena of the world. He states that this presupposition has been admitted in physics and other natural sciences, but that it has never been considered in the field of government. Assuming that forms of government are also brought about by natural causes, it is necessary only to investigate the conditions from which social institutions spring and to discover whether such institutions are allowed to be formulated by such conditions. That is, if social institutions have actually sprung from certain conditions, such social institutions must be presumed to be the best social institutions for such conditions. On the other hand, if certain social institutions have been imposed by force upon certain conditions of life, such social institutions may or may not be the best possible institutions for such conditions. So there is just one question to ask concerning the best form of government, and that question is this: What is the best form of government for these conditions? It is entirely fatuous to ask or pretend to answer the general question: What is the best form of government? Such a question means nothing, and no answer to it would be of any value

In order to determine the best form of government for certain conditions, it is necessary, first of all, to determine exactly what the conditions are. Certainly conditions vary with the traditions of a community. Such traditions may be entirely at variance with certain forms of government, while they may be in perfect harmony with some other form of government. Traditional class distinctions would not function very well in a pure democracy nor in a socialistic or anarchistic community. Economic factors must also be taken into

consideration. A widely unequal distribution of wealth would not support the same type of government that would be supported by a community in which there was an equal distribution of wealth. There are cultural factors to be taken into consideration also. If all the people are educated, the form of government should be quite different from that in the case where only some of the people are educated. There are also climatic and geographical factors to be taken into consideration. Montesquieu even assumed that the amount of moisture in the air might have an important bearing on the best possible form of government. The best form of government is the most fitting for all the conditions present.

Montesquieu, like Bodin, insisted upon the great importance of individual differences. He insisted that people are neither free nor equal. He insisted that we must take into consideration racial, national, and individual characteristics. Even if all other conditions were the same, it would not follow that the best form of government for a European country would also be the best form of government for an oriental country.

Montesquieu, like Bodin, agrees that there are only three distinctive forms of government—monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy. He held that if most of the people are ignorant, the best form of government is monarchy. If most of the people are educated, the best form of government is democracy. If the two groups are about equally divided, the best form of government is aristocracy. He held that a government unfitted for the conditions under which it exists is bound to result in tyranny or in some other undesirable form of the government in question. That is, there are many

possible forms of monarchy but only one perfect form. But if monarchy is forced upon the people when they are not ideal subjects for monarchy, an undesirable form of monarchy will result. If aristocracy is forced upon a people who are either all educated or all uneducated, an undesirable and ridiculous form of aristocracy will result. If democracy is forced upon people who are not by nature suited for democracy, absurd and undesirable forms of democracy will result. The world's history since Montesquieu's day has been one continuous verification of these principles of government.

It seems strange that Bodin and Montesquieu should stand so nearly alone in formulating political theories that are consistent with the facts of human nature. It is an improbable explanation to assume that they are merely more recent in time than many of the other classical political theorists. The eighteenth century is far removed from our own day. Herbert Spencer was more than a century later and was himself a scientist. They lived in an age when the theories of democracy and socialism were flourishing. They were wholly different from their contemporaries and wholly different from political theorists who are still living. The legalistic theories of government which Willoughby is expressing in our own day are centuries farther removed from a consideration of the measurable facts of human nature than were the theories of Bodin and Montesquieu.

I think that the explanation probably can be found in an analysis of what various political theorists were trying to accomplish. Plato was largely interested in

the definition of a word and the analysis of a concept. Machiavelli was chiefly interested in diplomatic success. Hobbes was interested in retaining the favor of the King. Rousseau was interested in the rationalization of his absurd personal life. Marx was interested in the abstraction of money. Spencer was interested in his organic theory of society. Willoughby is interested in the consistency of certain legalistic propositions. All of these men have been interested in something wholly different from human nature. Human nature, however, is the very foundation of good government. The above political theorists are like architects who are interested entirely in the design and form of their structures, but who pay no regard to the material from which the structures must be built. Bodin and Montesquieu are chiefly interested in the material from which government must be constructed if it is constructed at all. They are not so keenly interested in the consistency of legalistic propositions. It is their position that legalistic forms are of no value whatever unless they are built from the right material. They had no means at their disposal of measuring any of the characteristics of human nature. Many such means are available in psychology today, however, and the results of such measurement support the contention of Bodin and Montesquieu that human nature varies widely in its composition. Political life of today offers strong verification also of their contention that government must grow naturally from natural conditions.

PART IV

Some Persistent Hypotheses of Social Psychology

CHAPTER 17

SOME TRADITIONAL CAUSES OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL FORCES

It is impossible for the psychologist to discuss the principle of causality in social behavior without considering some of the traditional concepts of historians and sociologists. The concept of social forces has been emphasized in history by such writers as Henry Thomas Buckle, Karl Lamprecht, Charles A. Beard, and Frederick J. Turner. The concept has become equally fixed in sociology through the influence of such writers as Herbert Spencer, Gustave Ratzenhofer, Lester F. Ward, and Albion W. Small. Some of these points of view can be found in convenient form in Park and Burgess' Introduction to the Science of Sociology. For convenience a series of quotations may be taken from the section entitled "Social Forces."

"The idea of forces behind the manifestations of physical nature and of society is a notion which arises naturally out of the experience of the ordinary man. Historians, social reformers, and students of community life have used the term in the language of common sense to describe factors in social situations which they recognized but did not attempt to describe or define. Movements for social reform have usually met with unexpected obstacles. Public welfare programs have not infrequently been received with popular antagonism instead of popular support. Lack of success has led to the search for causes, and investigation

has revealed the obstacles, as well as the aids, to reform embodied in influential persons, 'political bosses,' 'union leaders,' 'the local magnate,' and in powerful groups such as party organizations, unions, associations, of commerce, etc. Social control, it appears, is resident, not in individuals as individuals, but as members of communities and social groups. Candid recognition of the rôle of these persons and groups led popular writers on social, political, and economic topics to give them the impersonal designation 'social forces.' "1

"The philosophy of the eighteenth century viewed external nature as the principal thing to be considered in a study of society, and not society itself. The great force in society was extraneous to society. But according to the philosophy of our times, the chief forces working in society are truly social forces, that is to say, they are immanent in society itself.

"Let us briefly examine the social forces which are at work, either concentrating or diffusing the ownership of wealth. If it is true that, necessarily, there is going forward a concentration of property, that the rich are necessarily becoming richer, that wealth is passing into fewer and fewer hands, this gives a strong reason for believing that those are right who hold to the fact that every field of production must soon be controlled by monopoly. If, on the other hand, we find that the forces which make for diffusion are domi-

¹Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), p. 435.

SOCIAL FORCES

nant, we may believe that it is quite possible for society to control the forces of production."²

"Every desire that any man harbors is a force making or marring, strengthening or weakening, the structure and functions of the society of which he is a part. What the human desires are, what their relations are to each other, what their peculiar modifications are under different circumstances—these are questions of detail which must be answered in general by social psychology, and in particular by specific analysis of each social situation. The one consideration to be urged at this point is that the concept 'social forces' has a real content. It represents reality. There are social forces. They are the desires of persons. They range in energy from the vagrant whim that makes the individual a temporary discomfort to his group, to the inbred feelings that whole races share. It is with these subtle forces that social arrangements and the theories of social arrangements have to deal."3

"All phenomena of government are phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming one another, and pushing out new groups and group representatives (the organs or agencies of government), to mediate the adjustments. It is only as we isolate these group activities, determine their representative values, and get the whole process stated in terms of them that we approach to a satisfactory knowledge of government."

"The principle that I assume at the outset is that

²*Ibid.*, p. 444.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 453–4.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 459.

every idea tends to act itself out. If it is an isolated idea, or if it is not counter-balanced by a stronger force, its realization must take place. Thus the principle of the struggle for existence and of selection, taking the latter word in its broadest sense, is in my opinion as applicable to ideas as to individuals and living species; a selection takes place in the brain to the advantage of the strongest and most exclusive idea, which is thus able to control the whole organism. In particular, the child's brain is an arena of conflict for ideas and the impulses they include; in the brain the new idea is a new force which encounters the ideas already installed, and the impulses already developed therein. Assume a mind, as yet a blank, and suddenly introduce into it the representation of any movement, the idea of any action—such as raising the arm. This idea being isolated and unopposed, the wave of disturbance arising in the brain will take the direction of the arm, because the nerves terminating in the arm are disturbed by the representation of the arm. The arm will therefore be lifted. Before a movement begins, we must think of this; now no movement that has taken place is lost; it is necessarily communicated from the brain to the organs if unchecked by any other representation or impulse. The transmission of the idea to the limbs is inevitable as long as the idea is isolated or unopposed. This I have called the law of idea-forces, and I think I have satisfactorily explained the curious facts in connection with the impulsive actions of the idea."5

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 461–2.

SOCIAL FORCES

In addition to the above series of quotations, we give also quotations from Spencer, Turner, and Ward.

"The many facts contemplated unite in proving that social evolution forms a part of evolution at large. Like evolving aggregates in general, societies show integration, both by simple increase of mass and by coalescence and re-coalescence of masses. The change from homogeneity to heterogeneity is multitudinously exemplified; up from the simple tribe, alike in all its parts, to the civilized nation, full of structural and functional unlikenesses beyond enumeration. With progressing integration and heterogeneity goes increasing coherence. The wandering group dispersing, dividing, held together by no bonds, the tribe with parts made more coherent by subordination to a dominant man; the cluster of tribes united in a political plexus under a chief with sub-chiefs; and so on up to the civilized nation consolidated enough to hold together for a thousand years or more. Simultaneously comes increasing definiteness. Such organization as the primitive horde shows, is vague; advance brings settled arrangements that grow slowly more precise; customs pass into laws which, while gaining fixity, also become more specific in their applications to varieties of actions; and all institutions, at first confusedly intermingled, step by step separate, at the same time that each within itself marks off more distinctly its component structures. Thus in all respects is fulfilled the formula of evolution, as a progress towards greater size, coherence, multiformity, and definiteness."6

⁶Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology* (New York: Appleton, 1885), I, 617-8.

"Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions. The peculiarity of American institutions is the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the changes involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life. Said Calhoun in 1817, 'We are great, and rapidly—I was about to say fearfully—growing!' So saying, he touched the distinguishing feature of American life. All peoples show development; the germ theory of politics has been sufficiently emphasized. In the case of most nations, however, the development has occurred in a limited area; and if the nation has expanded, it has met other growing peoples whom it has conquered. But in the case of the United States we have a different phenomenon. Limiting our attention to the Atlantic coast, we have the familiar phenomenon of the evolution of institutions in a limited area, such as the rise of representative government; the differentiation of simple colonial governments into complex organs; the progress from primitive industrial society, without division of labor, up to manufacturing civilization. we have in addition to this a recurrence of the process of evolution in each western area reached in the process of expansion. Thus American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development has been

SOCIAL FORCES

continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character. The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West. Even the slavery struggle, which is made so exclusive an object of attention by writers like Professor von Holst, occupies its important place in American history because of its relation to westward expansion."

"Now feeling is a true cosmic force, as will be fully shown, and constitutes the propelling agent in animals and in man. In the associated state of man it is the social force, and with it the sociologist must deal. Under this agency social phenomena take place according to uniform laws which may be studied in the same way that the laws of any other domain of phenomena are studied. Sociology is thus a true science, answering to the definition of a science, viz., a field of phenomena produced by true natural forces and conforming to uniform laws. But feeling as a dynamic agent manifests itself in a variety of ways, and just as it is convenient and practically correct to speak of a plurality of natural forces, the modalities of the universal force, so it is convenient and practically correct to speak of a plurality of social forces, the modalities of the general social force, or dynamic agent.

"The conservation of energy and correlation of

⁷Frederick J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Holt, 1920), pp. 2-3.

forces are as applicable to psychic and social forces as to physical forces. This truth has been perceived by sociologists, but failure to understand the principle of creative synthesis has led to grave misconceptions."8

In dealing with the above types of historical and sociological explanation of social behavior, it is necessary first to raise the question: What is force? It is not a simple matter to answer this question even by inspecting the discussion of experts in mechanics. One requires, at least theoretically, that the controlled passing from one energy form to another, without loss or gain, be a criterion of force. One may study the phenomena of light wholly in terms of speed and refraction, yet the test of whether or not one is dealing with force would be to translate it into heat or some other form of energy. One thinks of electricity as a force. One can measure its intensity and volume, or express its value in terms of units of work. This form of energy can be translated into heat or light without theoretical loss or gain. In mechanics, therefore, one seems to be dealing with energy which may take various forms, but all of which can be measured with a high degree of accuracy. Regardless of the form taken, the total amount of energy present can be measured with very slight error.

How does the psychologist deal with force, if at all? He merely takes the familiar categories furnished by the physicist. He deals with light as he conducts his experimental investigations on vision. It is doubtful

⁸Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology* (New York: Macmillan, 1903), p. 99.

SOCIAL FORCES

whether the psychologist considers light as force. He merely takes the concept and certain apparatus as essential elements in an experimental situation. really does not care whether light is a force or not. The psychologist also deals with heat in conducting his various experimental investigations of temperature spots, pain, etc. He is dealing with something that the physicist has classified as energy, but as a psychologist he does not care whether heat is a form of energy or not. It is merely an essential element in an experimental situation. The psychologist also uses sound waves in his investigations of hearing. Here also, he is merely interested in sound waves as an essential element in an experimental situation. He does not deny that this element is a force, neither does he affirm it. For him it is only a necessary condition. The psychologist also uses mass, density, acceleration, momentum, etc., in his various experiments on pressures, kinaesthesis. etc. Here also he is dealing with conditions and not with forces as such.

It is exceedingly doubtful whether the psychologist ever deals with forms of energy as such. He deals with visual fields, but these consist entirely of dimensions, qualities, forms, relations, etc. He deals with perceptual forms, but these consist entirely of spacial relationships and time relationships. He deals with memory, but this is entirely a matter of sequence, clearness, recognition, etc. He deals with feeling, but only in terms of tone. The so-called higher mental processes are discussed in terms of time and space relationship, clearness, quality, etc. At no place in this general subjectmatter does the psychologist come face to face with

force. Even the behaviorist in his investigations of conditioned reactions, pattern reactions, or the modification and sequence of such forms does not consider any material which he must classify under the category of force. The question is not being raised whether the psychologist should or should not deal with force, but it seems very doubtful that he has done so up to the present time.

The various categories of psychology are merely convenient forms of phenomenological classifications. These categories may possess certain sequence characteristics but are not considered as forms of energy. Psychology has no unique categories for forces and so cannot be required to make its categories consistent with those of physics. The Gestalt psychologists have attempted to demonstrate consistency between the categories of psychology and physics. These attempts are interesting but not necessary. Such consistency is necessary only in case the psychologist deals with force. Since he does not deal with force, any attempt to demonstrate such consistency is largely superfluous.

Of course, the psychologist has no right to question whether the historian or the sociologist may deal with force. He does have a right, however, to determine whether or not prevailing concepts in history or sociology have been borrowed from or have a basis in psychology. If the sociologist deals with wishes in the Freudian sense, it should be clearly understood that this is not necessarily a sense to which psychologists in general would consent. As a matter of fact, less than a majority of psychologists are willing to admit very much psychological validity in the categories of

SOCIAL FORCES

Freudianism. If the sociologist deals with instinct, it should be clearly understood that at least some psychologists who use the term do not necessarily intend that it be considered a form of energy or a force. In short, it should be clearly understood that the concept of social forces is not a concept borrowed from the general field of psychology and is not even based upon the general subject-matter of psychology. This is probably as far as the distinction should go in a book on psychology. But there are certain points of general intellectual interest which may be mentioned.

Can the historian or the sociologist demonstrate that the categories of social forces are consistent with or in any way similar to the categories of physics? The physicist can demonstrate a translation from heat into light. Can the historian or the sociologist demonstrate a translation from idea to frontier, or from language to economic influences, etc. Unless such translation is actually demonstrable, the word force is being used with a meaning wholly different from that of the physicist. Such assumption of the validity of the concept of social forces must either be based upon a dualism of physical forces and social forces or must be able to demonstrate that social forces can be translated into physical forces without loss or gain. Can frontiers be translated into electricity, or ideas into light, or language into heat, etc?

In considering questions of social behavior, it is very doubtful whether the concept of social forces is useful to the psychologist. The fact that the idea is ancient and widespread may be of importance to the historian of ideas but of little consequence to the experimentalist in psychology.

CHAPTER 18

SOME TRADITIONAL CAUSES OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: INSTINCTS

Psychologists themselves, in dealing with the problem of social behavior, have used a category to which they have given the name of instinct. This is an ancient word, but has been popularized in modern psychology by such writers as William James, E. L. Thorndike, William McDougall, and others. In general psychology, the term has been used chiefly to apply to a large section of that general subject-matter listed as original nature. William James and E. L. Thorndike have used the term especially in this sense. In social psychology, the word has been used in a slightly different sense, much more restricted. In general psychology, the term may apply to almost an infinite number of things, while in social psychology it has been customary to apply the word to a very few forms of behavior.

A few years ago, quite a fierce discussion was conducted in this country concerning the general concept of instinct. The discussion was engaged in by Dunlap, Kuo, Tolman, and others. The main points of the above controversy will be given as a matter of convenience.

The greatest exponent of the instinct theory has been William McDougall. His position is, briefly, as follows:

"We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity;

INSTINCTS

by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from an instinct), every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means.

"Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn. These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life and mind and will."

The controversy was probably initiated in 1919 by Knight Dunlap. In a paper read before the American Psychological Association and later published, he stated his criticism as follows:

"The present tendency to develop social psychology on the basis of a classification of 'instincts' results in as many kinds of social psychology as there are classifications: and the possible number is legion. By assum-

¹William McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology* (Boston: Luce, 1917), p. 44.

ing that some preferred classification represents an ultimate list of essentially different units, a psychologist is enabled to develop a system which is in reality nothing but a logical deduction from the assumptions made in the list adopted. Each system may be as logically perfect as any other. In the same way, Euclidean geometry, hyperbolic geometry, and parabolic geometry, each legitimate and exclusive of the other, are built up, each on its definite postulates. As an illustration of this sort of construction in social psychology we may compare Trotter's Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War with McDougall's Social Psychology, and with the Freudian system. might go further, and consider the less sharply drawn systems resulting from the assumption of moral and religious 'instincts.' If an 'instinct to imitate' be assumed, still different systems result."2

A couple of years later a more extensive criticism of the instinct theory was presented by Kuo. His criticisms, as selected from his published article, are as follows:

"1. We have stated that there is no general agreement among the students of instincts as to the number and kinds of instincts. Writers on the subject arbitrarily list them in accordance with their own purposes. If the writer is interested in social psychology, his list of instincts will be based on those reactions that are socially significant. If his interest is in economics or in religion, his list will inevitably be quite a differ-

²Knight Dunlap, "Are There Any Instincts?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XIV (1920), 310.

INSTINCTS

- ent one. As the purposes are varied so the classifications of instincts are unlimited and uncertain.
- The so-called instincts are in the last analysis acquired trends rather than inherited tendencies. an acquired trend is simply meant a habitual tendency to act in a certain way under certain conditions. this connection it must be kept clearly in mind that a trend or tendency to action is different from an actual act; the former is simply a potential behavior which becomes an actual act when the organism is properly stimulated. A behavior tendency can only be developed as a result of the previous experience of the organism—that is, as a result of previous performance of an actual act in the presence of adequate stimuli. To assume any inborn tendency is to assume a priori relation between the organism and stimulating objects; for every behavior is an interaction between the organism and its surrounding objects. Such an assumption is no less objectionable than the theory of innate ideas. As a matter of fact both the theory of instinct and that of innate ideas are based on the same conception; namely the conception of a priori relation of the organism to external objects."3
- "3. Psychologists frequently speak of instinct in terms of purpose or teleology. Certain reactions accomplish certain ends. If these end reactions are performed without previous education, they are called instincts. Thus, if a bird has never seen other birds build a nest or has never been taught to build it, the

³Zing Yang Kuo, "Giving Up Instincts in Psychology," Journal of Philosophy, XVIII (1921), 648.

first nest that it builds is considered as the result of instinct. But an end reaction may involve a great number of mechanisms or subordinated acts most of which may be acquired, and yet all of these acquired mechanisms or subordinated acts may be overlooked because of interest in the end reaction, the 'instinct.' Walking is usually asserted to be the result of instinctive action. But how many acquired mechanisms are involved in the walking process? The movements of the trunk, of the head, of the legs and feet, hands and arms, in fact almost every part of the body, must be coordinated before walking can take place. Are we justified, then, in calling walking an instinct while the mechanisms involved in the process are acquired?"4

"4. The methods used in investigating instincts are unreliable. The genetic method seems more advantageous than the others, but it has so far yielded few positive results. What is found in the young babe is a number of random and unorganized acts. Nothing that we can call a specific instinct has been found to have ever appeared at birth, or even shortly after birth. If the student of instincts limits his list to these random and unorganized acts, we shall have no particular objection to his using the term 'instinct'; but we do object to the calling of any reaction an instinct if it does not appear at birth or shortly after birth; for, as we shall see, all the activities of the organism in later life are various organized reactions of elementary movements."

⁴Ibid., p. 650.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 651-2.

INSTINCTS

- "5. There have been at least two motives which have led the psychologist to insist on the existence of instincts and their significance in behavior. The first is the notion that every instinct has an adaptive function. Biased by the Darwinian theory of natural selection, students of psychology are apt to interpret every spontaneous reaction of the organism in terms of biological value. They argue that instincts play a very important part in the preservation of the organism and the species. These instincts, because of their adaptive value, are preserved in the race through natural selection and are handed down from generation to generation. This view is both theoretically and practically ungrounded."
- "6. The second motive in the discussion of instincts I wish to combat is the motive on the part of the students of instincts to conceive an instinct as an impulse which furnishes the drive or motive power that leads the organism to action.

"As Woodworth has pointed out, the actions of the human adult 'are more and more controlled by inner drives.' But these inner drives are by no means mystical forces suddenly bursting forth from the organism; on the contrary, they have their history and development: they are products of the constant interaction between the organism and its environment. There is every reason to believe that the motive forces of human behavior are largely shaped by society. Living in a given community one acquires certain motives of action. It is not that the social instincts tend to create

⁶Ibid., p. 653.

society, but that the constant association tends to breed the social trends in the organism. The man is fond of living in a family not because he was born that way, but, rather, because he has lived in that way."⁷

A year later Knight Dunlap restated his criticism as follows:

"At the present time, I can see no way of distinguishing usefully between instinct and habit. All reactions are definite responses to definite stimulus patterns, and the exact character of the response is determined in every case by the inherited constitution of the organism and the stimulus pattern. All reactions are instinctive: all are acquired. If we consider instinct, we find it to be the form and method of habit-formation: if we consider habit, we find it to be the way in which instinct exhibits itself. Practically, we use the term instinctive reaction to designate any reaction whose antecedents we do not care, at the time, to inquire into; by acquired reaction, on the other hand, we mean those reactions for whose antecedents we intend to give some account. But let us beware of founding a psychology, social, general, or individual, on such a distinction."8

The above criticisms have been replied to by several individuals, but the most representative and characteristic response has come from E. C. Tolman. The entire burden of his reply is summed up by himself in the following single statement:

"But let us also confess our own faith that instincts

⁷Ibid., pp. 654-6.

⁸Knight Dunlap, "Identity of Instinct and Habit," Journal of Philosophy, XIX (1922), 94.

INSTINCTS

cannot be given up in psychology, but rather that they must be retained, and retained under some such conception as that of the driving adjustment."9

This assumption of instinct as a driving adjustment puts the entire problem of instinct into the category of force. There have been attempts by Moss, Dashiell, and others to measure the force of elemental drives, but psychology stands only at the beginning of investigations of that sort.

⁹Edward C. Tolman, "Can Instincts Be Given Up in Psychology?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XVII (1922), 152.

CHAPTER 19

THE HYPOTHETICAL NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The most important field of psychology has for many years carried the title, "Adult Human Psychology." Further analysis of this title has invariably led to the statement that adult human psychology is concerned with the psychology of the individual. Nearly all psychologists and practically all of the elementary text-books in psychology speak fluently of the various psychological characteristics of the individual. As one reads the pages and pages of descriptive matter and listens to the hours and hours of oral analysis, one wonders just who this hypothetical individual is. In this chapter we seriously raise the question concerning the identity of this man, and intend that some of the current psychological assumptions be re-examined.

The average elementary textbook in psychology invariably carries a few chapters dealing primarily with the nervous system of the individual. We are told how the nerves have developed, through a process of evolution, from more primitive neural structure. It is quite doubtful whether anyone has ever seen this happening, yet it is in some way supposed to be descriptive of the inner physiological and neurological history of the individual. We are told also how the nervous system develops in the individual himself, from the embryonic form to full maturity. Of course, no one has ever seen this happen in any individual, yet it in some

way is supposed to be an actual description of at least some of the characteristics of this hypothetical person. These neurones are of various lengths, shapes, and histological structure. Some are wrapped in medullary tissue, and some are plain. Over these hypothetical structures nervous impulses travel, coordinating the various parts of the individual to the variety of stimuli in the outside world. The inner structure of the eye is fully described, as well as of the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. All of this detailed study is accompanied by much analysis and synthesis, and presented to us for the purpose of making accurate and clear the exact psychological and neurological characteristics of this hypothetical individual who stalks unseen and unmeasured through the field of psychology. No wonder that Allport must include in his textbook on social psychology a visceral description of the individual that he presumes to be the central figure in social psychology.

There is always a chapter on the senses of this individual, or some equivalent of the senses. This material may be presented under the rubric of sensation, or of configuration, or of stimulus and response, or of situation and reaction, etc. This material in some way is supposed to comprise the elementary, crude stuff from which the psychological life of the individual is developed. No one has ever seen this happening to this hypothetical individual, yet this tissue of assumption passes as science.

After the chapter on the senses there is usually a complete chapter on perceptual processes. We are told how the crude material of the senses gets put to-

gether into the forms and objects symbolic of the outside world. The significant assumption is that this construction of forms and objects is actually being described as happening in the hypothetical individual.

This psychological individual is so completely transparent that it is possible to observe even his imagination, his memory, his attentive processes, his skills, his fatigues, his dreams, and the various interrelations of his personality. Nothing is omitted. Just as a zoölogist nails the body of a frog to a dissecting board, so psychologists in general have nailed the hypothetical individual to the pages of textbooks and to the demonstration apparatus of lecture platforms.

The question is merely being raised as to whether it is legitimate to assume that this varied knowledge applies to some hypothetical individual, and is in some way more accurate, more significant, and more scientific than is a knowledge of the comparative characterization of many individuals. The question is seriously raised as to whether the concept of the individual in psychology is not a bit of verbal self-deception on the part of psychologists.

CHAPTER 20

THE ILLUSORY NATURE OF GROUP EXISTENCE

In this chapter we face the problem of the nature of group existence. McDougall has been the chief exponent of this concept in social psychology. He states his position as follows:

"The conception of a group mind is useful and therefore valid; and, since this notion has already excited some opposition and criticism and is one that requires very careful definition, some attempt to define and justify it may usefully be made at the outset; though the completer justification is the substance of the whole book. Some writers have assumed the reality of what is called 'the collective consciousness' of a society, meaning thereby a unitary consciousness of the society over and above that of the individuals comprised within it. This conception is examined in Chapter 2 and provisionally rejected. But it is maintained that a society, when it enjoys a long life and becomes highly organized, acquires a structure and qualities which are largely independent of the qualities of the individuals who enter into its composition and take part for a brief time in its life. It becomes an organized system of forces which has a life of its own, tendencies of its own, a power of moulding all its component individuals, and a power of perpetuating itself as a selfidentical system, subject only to slow and gradual change."

Like the problem of the individual, the problem of the group is not an easy one to consider. The difficulty lies chiefly in the fact that all of us are so well educated to the ideas of individual existence and group existence that it is difficult for us to get ourselves into the mental state involving the possibility that these ideas are mere words. Unless one can, for the time being, become somewhat free from verbal bondage, one can never realize clearly the possibility that social groups may have no real existence.

Let us consider some typical types of social groups the entities that sociology and social psychology have considered in so much detail. Let us take first the smallest and presumably the simplest of all social groups—the family. Probably very few people could be found who would be willing to question the real existence of the family as a social group. All of us remember very clearly that we were born and raised as members of such a group. We remember in detail the natural form and outline of the group in the community. It had geographical location bounded on all sides by other groups of a similar nature. It was formally recognized by these other groups. It had a definite economic status represented by earned income, investments, and credits. It was socially recognized by the government of the town, the city, and of the nation. How could one possibly question seriously the real existence of such a group?

¹William McDougall, *The Group Mind* (New York: Putnam, 1920), pp. 11-12.

If the question is put in this form the essential difficulty is lost sight of. The existence of the particular members of this so-called group is in no way questioned. The existence of the varied relationships is in no way questioned. But the existence of the particular individuals plus the existence of the various relationships constitute all the reality that exists in the situation. None of these existences or relationships belong to the group as such but only to one or more members of the group. It is really a mere matter of convenience to assume the existence of the group in the first place. Mere propinquity in a house, hotel, or apartment in no way creates a group, any more than the mere possession of red hair or of seventy inches of height would create natural groups. The "naturalness" lies altogether in the mere convenience of the assumption. Psychology is a science and should deal with a real, objective subject-matter. How can social psychology present a scientific analysis of entities that have no existence except in the convenience of word usage?

McDougall seems to assume that an institution is in some way a group possessing real existence as a group and demonstrating in its behavior the possession of many mental traits. He would assume that the Catholic Church, for example, is truly a group, even a kind of personality. Most of this group existence which McDougall professes to perceive so clearly is contributed from the mind of McDougall himself. No cold observer looking down at the world from above would ever detect the outlines of any such group. It would possess no localization, no traditional group

characteristics, in short, no group existence. It is a mere convenience that the many individuals who class themselves under a common name should be considered as an organic group. I do not for a moment question the value of talking about the members of such an institution as if they were a group possessing group characteristics, but I do personally object to the assumption that there can be real scientific investigation of a subject-matter the form and content of which are assumed as a mere matter of convenience.

Is it even valid to assume that national groups are any more than convenient classifications? From our earliest school-days we have learned that such natural groups as Spain, Italy, England, Germany, Russia, Japan, Sweden, and the United States were real nations possessing national characteristics and national will. After so much classroom training in elementary geography, it is difficult indeed to assume that these great nations of the earth are mere conveniences of verbal classification, and that all of them are equally real and equally unreal. The disappearance of Russia from the national face of the earth is a convenient illustration of the problem. The very name has gone, the old form of government has gone, all of the old rubrics, landmarks, and criteria of nationality seem to have disappeared. For the time being, it is difficult to think that a nation still exists in that part of the world. We know that many human beings still live there, we know that the same old forms of existence are well known throughout the broad expanse of the territory that once was Russia, but nationhood has disappeared. For the time being, there seems to be no group existence for the

ILLUSORY NATURE OF GROUP EXISTENCE

human beings who live there. When we think politically of the whole face of the earth, we think in terms of the various nations plus the Russian people. Is this not a clear example of the sheer assumptions residing in the idea that nations possess group existence?

The principle of group analysis would even lead to the assumption that the human race is a distinct group possessing distinct existence, and that this group demonstrates peculiar group characteristics. The simple facts of warfare and economic and social strife are sufficient commentaries on this assumption.

We do not find the situation any more simple when we consider the classification of professional and occupational groups. No amount of observation will reveal the outlines of that social group usually spoken of as the legal fraternity. Neither will a diligent inspection of the territory lying between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans show any structure or form resembling the plumbers' union or the brotherhood of locomotive engineers.

The thesis of this chapter can be made to appear to better advantage if we consider the character of certain non-social groups. Let us consider first certain groups which we can classify as convenience groups. For example, let us put into the following two groups all of the inhabitants of the earth: those who are sunburned on their left ears and those who are not so sunburned. Here we have two groups that possess most of the characteristics of traditional group existence. In the case of at least one of the groups, there is a common interest that is quite obvious. Yet the two groups have been created during this very moment and really exist no-

where as groups except among the rubrics of this printed page.

Another hypothetical convenience grouping would be to classify adult men as those who are in love with widows and those not in love with widows. This gives us two distinct groups, at least one of which is composed of individuals possessing something like a common interest. Yet obviously we have just this moment manufactured these two groups. It would be a simple matter to analyze from the behavior of the two groups all of the traditional characteristics of group behavior.

Other examples of non-social groups can be found in any textbook of botany. The traditional botanical classifications are purely matters of convenience for the botanist himself. Such groups have no real objective existence as groups. Any fiction writer or poet, however, would be quite capable of reading into these groups many of the characteristics of group behavior. Consider the prestige and social tradition of the orchid as compared with the more democratic sweet pea!

Certainly there are many mathematical groups which might be considered as possessing practically all traditional group traits. But surely these mathematical groups are manufactured merely for the convenience of the mathematician and possess no existence further than that.

The various pigeonholes from which the man at the General Delivery window at the Post-Office selects the letters that are being called for might also be considered as a series of groups. All of them together might even be said to possess a kind of national life.

Yet the idea is not very fruitful beyond certain poetic requirements.

Another example of non-social groups might be drawn from the classifications of literature. The various groups carry the names fiction, poetry, drama, essay, etc. Each of these groups may be further subdivided into smaller groups. It is obvious that such classifications are purely for the convenience of the student and have no further significance.

In a territory lying somewhat between the two classifications which we designate as social and non-social groups, we may draw some examples from history. We speak rather easily of seventeenth-century English literature, of fifteenth-century miracle plays, of eight-eenth-century sentimental literature, as if such classifications were real and referred as names to organisms or substances possessing real existence in some particular time and place. I remember hearing a professor of English discuss the literature of eighteenth-century England as if he were describing some real personality and as if he were very much in love with such personality. Yet, of course, no such group existed, and the name applies merely as a matter of convenience to some mental pigeonhole.

Most of us who are more than thirty-five years of age have heard the old Greek professors talk about the golden period of Athenian life, the wonderful fifth century with its philosophy, its art, and its love of the beautiful. These old Greek scholars usually spoke of the fifth century as if it were some personality that lived and could influence and be influenced by other such personalities. Yet surely there never was any such ex-

istence, and the old scholar's love was based very largely on the symbols of his language habits.

It is but a step from such admittedly non-social groups to traditional social groups such as the family, the crowd, the labor union, or the state. The reason there is only one step is because there are no important distinctions. Both non-social and social groups are merely convenient symbols for the guidance of the man who is using the words.

PART V The Nature of Social Behavior

CHAPTER 21

THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR-PATTERNS

In the traditional literature of social psychology it has been presumed that the forms of social behavior are unique, easy to recognize, and that they are similar in all individuals. It is the thesis of this part of the book that these traditional assumptions are entirely incorrect. Several types of social behavior will be examined, and in each case it will be pointed out that such type of social behavior has no unique form whatever but occurs in many varieties of form depending upon the characteristics of the individual concerned.

1. Sex. Sex has usually been referred to as an instinctive form of behavior, extremely mysterious in its origin and implications, and expressing itself in a definite, obvious form. But sex is really very closely associated with many varieties of behavior. Some of these varieties consist of the physiological sex act, sex amusements, the behavior involved in the rearing of children, the formulation and administration of the home, and the various forms of family amusement. These are only a few of the varieties of social behavior that are closely associated with sex.

The physiological sex act has been very rarely observed and still more rarely described. There is no indication, however, that it is especially unique in its form. There are certain structural and physiological limitations, but within the range of these limitations

there is probably as much variety in the form of the sex act as there is in any other type of behavior. These various forms depend for their expression upon the sex experience, sex tone, and sex taste of the participants. If these latter factors markedly vary in the two individuals concerned, there will either be a modification of the sex act, or the sex relationship will be discontinued.

There are many varieties of sex pleasure. They consist essentially of men and women's doing things together. Some of these types of behavior are working together, swimming together, reading together, skating together, going to the theater together, dancing together, flirting, and love-making. These forms of sex pleasure vary widely from one another, and are determined very largely by variations in physical and mental characteristics and variations in opportunity. These various forms of behavior have nothing in common except that their participants consist of a man and a woman. There is no indication that these forms vary in the total amount of sex satisfaction which they afford. This is entirely a matter of conditioning. To the uninitiated and inexperienced swain, the reading of a poem to his ladylove is just as exhilarating as a waltz, a fox trot, or more direct love-making would be to a more sophisticated individual.

The behavior involved in the rearing of children consist largely of two things. The first is a tendency to do what is considered the proper thing, and the second is the avoidance of solitude. It would be interesting to know just how many young couples plan their first child entirely because it is considered quite proper and

right to have children. Evidently this is the experience of large numbers. After the first two or three years of married life, the avoidance of solitude begins and is a real factor in determining whether there will be any or more children. This avoidance may be intensified by an observation of childless, lonely, friendless, old couples who have lost contact with the world. This motive is especially strong in the woman who finds herself left at home while her husband is occupied in the many details of his business life. The extent to which the parents strive for the love of their children varies inversely with the extent and range of their life-interests. The busy father may think of his children only incidentally. The less busy mother may think of her children as being the most important part of her life. If the father is not very busy, he becomes a rival of the mother in struggling for the love of the children. It is a common observation that fathers who are not very successful in the world are great lovers of their children and spend hours playing with them. The successful man is more interested in having his children represent adequately his achievements, his ability, and his home. If his children get along well in school, in the community, and later in business or professional life, he is quite satisfied. Such things are less importance to the unsuccessful father. wants his children to be congenial, lovable, and fond of their parents, and is not greatly disturbed if they show promise of not amounting to very much in the world. Such parents talk freely of those things which are worth more than gold, riches, and worldly success. It is obvious that the variety of behavior in-

volved in the rearing of children is very extensive indeed and varies with the individual differences of the parents.

The home is very closely associated with sex. Language usage makes it appear that homes are very much alike and have a great deal in common. It is language usage alone, however, that is responsible for this delusion. The only things in common that homes have are those things determined by architects, furniture manufacturers, landlords, and others who have a commercial interest in homes. The contributions made to the home by the individuals who comprise the home vary just as widely as do individual homes. In the home where there is little imagination, there is very little modification of what is furnished by the architect and the furniture manufacturer. In such homes, life flows on its easy way like some sluggish stream through a swamp. Dirt and disorder prevail, while beauty and neatness are unknown. In other homes where there is much imagination, the contributions of the architect and furniture factory are obscured in quite a different way. Cleanliness, neatness, and beauty prevail. If the occupants of two such homes were to change houses with each other, the characteristics of the two homes A heautiful house and beautiful would follow them. furniture will not long be beautiful if used by the one group, while the less attractive house and the less attractive furniture will not long be less attractive if used by the other group.

When we consider the more purely physical characteristics of homes, the same variety is observed. The Irish peasant's hut has nothing in common with the

stately country estate of the English lord, the tenement hovel has nothing in common with the town house of the successful man. The hovel and the town house are both called homes merely because of the limitations of language. Practically no duplications can be observed, even after minute comparison. We are unable to agree that homes have a unique and common form. There are many varieties of form, and these varieties are determined by the human characteristics of the individuals who inhabit such places.

There are many forms of family amusement which must be considered as closely associated with sex. Some of these forms consist of playing bridge, dining with friends, travel, attending church, attending the theater, shopping, listening to the radio, attending parties, quarreling, gossiping, fighting, sitting around, and planning for the future. These various amusements have little in common and vary over a range that is just as great as the range in human nature itself.

It has been the thesis of this section that sex behavior is not a unique and easily recognized form of behavior, but that it occurs in myriad forms depending upon the variation, in the individuals concerned, of the various human characteristics. In any given individual, any one of these many varieties of sex behavior may predominate. A given individual's sex behavior may consist largely of the behavior involved in the rearing of children, may be more centered on the building and administration of a home, or may find its outlet almost entirely in the form of various family amusements. It seems reasonable to suppose that some balance of these various forms of sex behavior will lend stability to, and

make for survival of, both the individual and the community. Irritation, disgust, and divorce are inevitably the result of a lack of balance, in the family, of these various types of sex behavior. The formation and persistency of each given type will depend upon the past experience and the present general environment of the individual. The past experience has been the result of a combination of previous experiences and customary environment. For the purpose of social psychology, it does not matter whether these various experiences are the cause of the individual differences or not. The fact remains that individual differences are very real and determine variations in the form of social behavior-patterns.

2. Pugnacity. We are justified in considering pugnacity as a form of social behavior for the simple reason that it has usually been classified in the traditional literature of social psychology as an instinct. It has been supposed that pugnacity is a unique and easily recognized form of social behavior. It will be indicated in this section that this assumption is incorrect. The general connotations and limitations of language make it possible for many classes of social behavior to be classified under the rubric of pugnacity. Fighting with the fists is a most simple group of such behavior, but there is no simple form of such fighting. The behavior may be wild and furious, slow and deliberate, crude and ineffective, or scientific and deadly. It varies all the way from the rough and tumble fighting of the small boy to the highly polished behavior of the world-champion in the prize ring. Such behavior may include the pulling of hair, the biting with the teeth, kicking with the knees or feet, choking, and many other accompanying features. These various types will depend upon the past experience of the individual, his physical and mental equipment, his training in such matters, and the degree of irritation which he has experienced previous to the onset of the behavior. It is purely a convenience of language to classify all of these many varieties of behavior under the general rubric of fighting with the fists.

There are verbal battles also which may be listed as pugnacious. Such battles vary all the way from the tongue play of small boys to the highly abstract, dignified attacks of scientists and literary men. Such battles may be accompanied by the sticking-out of tongues, the rolling of eyes, the wagging of heads, the waving of arms, the stamping of feet, shrugging of shoulders, the using of obscure words, the marshalling of obscure data, and the use of lofty and detached literary style. No wider range of behavior can be imagined than can be marshalled under this single rubric of verbal pugnacity. Yet all of these varieties are very common and occur in each individual according to his education, cultural training, language ability, and knowledge of the characteristics of the opponent.

Another form of pugnacious behavior is that of presuming to forget the existence of some other person or persons. This other person is never recognized on the street, is avoided at the reception or other gathering, is not invited to one's own social gatherings, and in all respects is treated as with great indifference. This behavior may be accompanied by a crossing of the street when the undesired person is about to be met, by a

pose of abstraction when the undesired person is near, by a coldness in the voice and manner, by averted eyes, by staring eyes, by a violent outburst when the name of the undesired person is mentioned, or by an attitude of unfamiliarity with the undesired name. These many forms of social neglect occur on all sides in any large community and vary in any given individual with education, cultural training, emotional make-up, ability to act, and many other factors.

We should also classify under the rubric of pugnacious behavior the many varieties of intrigue which may be observed in any community. This may consist of a variety of behavior involved in defeating some candidate for the presidency of the ladies' aid society, may consist of deliberate gossip intended to prevent certain friendships from becoming too stable and dangerous, may consist of deliberate attempts to interfere with the rapid success of some professional rival, may involve all the machinery of bringing about the defeat of a candidate for the presidency of the United States, and millions of other examples. A given individual will behave in any one of these many different ways, depending entirely upon his social status, economic status, political status, education, cultural training, emotional make-up, geographical location, and many other factors.

The majority of cooperative enterprises may also be listed under the rubric of social pugnacity. Labor unions are in direct opposition to employers. Business combines are in direct opposition to business rivals. Farmers cooperate for the purpose of doing away with the middleman. A political campaign exists for the

purpose of defeating some other political party. All of these types of social behavior are organized attempts to defeat other organizations or persons. The American Bar Association exists for the purpose of keeping incompetent individuals from the practice of law. The American Medical Association exists for the purpose of preventing untrained and unskilled individuals from practicing medicine. The various scientific societies exist largely for the purpose of eliminating fakers and charlatans from recognition as scientists. The type of such cooperative behavior that each individual will engage in depends upon his professional training, occupational training, degree of competence, and many other factors that determine one's professional or occupational status.

It has been the thesis of this section that there is no unique and easily recognized form of social behavior that may be listed as pugnacity. Because of the connotations and limitations of language, a very great variety of behaviors may be listed under this rubric. These many varieties vary in communities and in individuals, depending upon the variation of a multitude of factors involved in heredity, training, and immediate environment.

CHAPTER 22

THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR-PATTERNS (continued)

3. Avoidance. The instinct of flight has usually been listed, in the traditional literature, as a very definite form of social behavior. Avoidance is probably a much better word, however, to use as a rubric for a large variety of social behavior which may be listed in this group. The simplest varieties in this group of behaviors are not of great importance in social psychology for the simple reason that they very rarely occur in complex society. Flight, in its primitive, ungarnished form, is very rarely seen. It may consist of running away, flying away, or swimming away from some dangerous or otherwise undesirable person, persons, or situation. These simple varieties of avoidance are so rare and insignificant in the life of a complex community, as scarcely to merit consideration.

Modesty is probably the simplest form of avoidance that is still of much consequence. A very great number of behaviors can be listed under the rubric of modesty. In some communities, modesty consists in keeping the body and its various functions as completely covered up as possible. In primitive communities, modesty might consist in quite the opposite of this form of behavior. In advanced occidental communities, at the present time, modesty consists largely in conformity

to fashion in dress, language, and polite behavior. It is the conformity which furnishes a basis for modesty. This is true also in the backwoods community where the legs must always be covered and where the bodily functions must be secret both in place and time. The important point is that almost anything may be considered modest or immodest, depending upon the community and the training of the individuals involved.

Timidity is a much more complex social behaviorpattern than is modesty. It consists essentially of avoidance but varies extensively in the form which the avoidance takes. It may consist of shrinking behavior on the ballroom floor, of hesitation in crossing the street, of awkward misery at the dinner party, of lack of decision on the shopping expedition, of helplessness in battle, of paralysis in a financial crisis, etc. Language limitations alone are adequate to account for the absurdity of listing these many varities of behavior under a single rubric.

Inhibition is probably the most complex and most varied of all avoidance behaviors. Of course, inhibition may be almost anything. We may class under such rubric a large part of cultural training, a large percentage of school training, and much of the social effects of religious belief. Expression that has resulted in undesirable consequences in the past is likely to become less dominant in the behavior of any given individual. But, of course, the undesirable consequences depend entirely upon the situation in which the expression has taken place and upon the ability of the individual concerned to recognize undesirable consequences. It would be difficult to find any two individ-

uals in whose behaviors could be found identical degrees of repression and emphasis. In the learned professions there are forms of behavior that involve professional ethics. Such ethical behavior is almost entirely inhibitory but varies in range and degree in different individuals.

In this section it has been the thesis that avoidance behavior is not a unique and easily recognized form of behavior but that it is merely a convenient rubric under which may be classified a very large variety of behaviors, behaviors varying in different individuals according to degrees of education, cultural training, hereditary factors, and general environmental conditions.

4. Work. Work has not usually been listed as an instinct in the traditional literature of psychology, although there is no reason at all why it should not have been. It is something that is engaged in universally by all types and conditions of mankind. Like all other rubrics of social behavior, however, it is a classification with an infinite variety of social behavior-patterns. It may consist of washing dishes, sweeping the street, digging in a coal mine, running a railroad train, defending criminals at the bar, feeling the pulse of a sick patient, conducting a bit of scientific research, administering the affairs of a nation, or interceding with God concerning the destiny of mankind. Some of these forms of work require no practical nor professional training and no great amount of ability, while others require long years of technical training and the possession of an unusual amount of sheer ability. Yet all the individuals in this great variety of occupational and professional interest are engaged in work. The word

is a mere convenience, designating nothing in particular and yet carrying a kind of general meaning. Work can be almost anything. One individual may play golf for fun, while another individual may play the same game for money. One individual may run or play bridge for fun, while another individual may do the same things for money. Anything that a man does for money may be classified as work. That would not be an exhaustive classification, however, for many men work for the sake of work alone and not for any financial return. It is obvious that there is no unique and easily recognized form of social behavior to which we may give the exclusive use of the word "work." It is a rubric under which may be listed almost every form of behavior that has ever been observed. Any particular instance of work will depend upon the large number of factors that comprise the individual, and the still larger number of factors that comprise the community. Any given grouping of hereditary factors, training factors, and environmental factors will surely result in a different behavior form which may be listed as one of the instances of work.

5. Play. Play has very frequently been listed as an instinctive form of behavior, but it certainly has no definite form and is in no respect unique and easily recognized. All the free behavior of children is usually listed as play. This is a very silly assumption since there is no indication that children are not just as serious in their behavior as adults are. Children engage in those forms of behavior that give them the greatest return, just as is the case with adults. The reason adults engage in those forms of behavior that bring a finan-

cial return, while children do not, is because adults have learned the secret of such behavior, while children have not as yet. Children play for their own amusement and have not yet learned that a financial return depends entirely upon the extent to which they behave for the benefit or amusement of others. This bit of worldly experience is probably the most essential difference between the behavior of adults and the behavior of children. Anything may be listed as play, just as is the case with work. Some men dig in their gardens for play, but the gardener sees no play in it. Some women do housework for play, but the housemaid is unable to recognize the behavior as play. Many successful men build up great enterprises purely because of the joy derived from the game of such activity. The various assistants in the enterprise probably see nothing but hard work. The proper amount of imagination added to any kind of work will change it into play. There is an infinite variety of such behavior, and it varies in individuals in the same way and to the same extent that individuals vary from each other.

It has been the thesis of the last two chapters that social behavior-patterns occur in almost an infinite variety of forms. These forms are not unique and easily recognized. Only a few of the groups of varieties have been discussed. These varieties depend for their expression upon the variable characteristics of individuals and of communities. Any given definite type of pattern is the result of an occurrence in the individual of a certain grouping of human characteristics. This individual, with his grouping of characteristics occur-

FORMATION OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR-PATTERNS

ring in a definite type of community, will inevitably behave in a certain way. All the variations in individual characteristics will cause a variation in social behavior, while a variation in the environmental and historical characteristics of a community will also result inevitably in a variation of the social behavior of the individual. The task of the social psychologist is not to look for instincts or other simple teleological methods of interpreting behavior but to look for the measurable factors of individuals and of communities. In no other way will the social psychologist ever arrive at an adequate insight into community life or become capable of recording data that can be used by others in the task of perfecting social organizations, progress, and control.

CHAPTER 23

THE PROBLEM OF DRIVES

The problems of motivation, social force, and drives are rather persistent problems in the fields of education, sociology, and social psychology. Most of the workers in these fields have found that it was necessary to assume the existence of some kind of force in order to explain why the phenomena of learning, of conformity, and of behavior-pattern should ever occur at all. The problem has been dealt with experimentally, both in education and in experimental psychology. It is likely that the problem is largely logical rather than experimental. A bit of recent experimental work will illustrate this point.

Moss placed some rats in a situation which involved reaction to either of two stimuli. One situation involved food which could be arrived at only by passing over an electrically charged plate. The problem was to discover how many days it was necessary for the rat to go without food before he would pass over this charged plate to get the food. It was supposed that this was a method of measuring the food or hunger drive. The result could not in any way contradict the logical presupposition. Another situation involved sex which could be arrived at only in the same way. Still another situation involved both sex and food, the problem being to determine the relative drawing power of the two stimuli. Another situation involved the choice between electrical punishment and exposure to cold

THE PROBLEM OF DRIVES

water. In all of these experimental situations, which were very carefully organized and controlled, the measured results would not only seem to substantiate the logical presuppositions but would seem to give accurate measurement of them. But, of course, it is fallacious to assume that logical presuppositions are in any way substantiated by any conceivable result of the experiment. Logical presuppositions are always logical and never can be anything else. If the existence of drives is presupposed, no measurement of degree of drive can ever be used to substantiate the presupposition of the drive itself. This is simply and obviously true. If the behavior of the rat were to be supposed to result from a direct interference by God, the same experiments would substantiate the fact of the interference and its degree. Such a conclusion might not be false, but it certainly would be absurd. We wish to point out, with some emphasis, that the assumption of drive in the above behavior forms is based entirely upon the fact that rats do not behave alike but meet with varying degrees of success in their reaction to stimuli. The situations have involved not only simple and complex stimuli but also the factor of time. In terms of stimuli, time is merely summation or dis-In terms of organism, time is merely a greater or lesser displacement in space. Except for the convenience of language, there is no reason for presuming the existence of any force or drive. If all the rats had behaved in exactly the same way, it is likely that no presumption of drive would have been entertained.

It has been supposed for some years that intelligence

is a driving force. This assumption has been based on the observation that mental-test scores correlate positively with various desirable types of behavior. For example, it has been found that there is a positive correlation between mental-test performance and classroom performance, between mental-test performance and location in professional or occupational groups, and between mental-test performance and degree of success. These correlations, however, in no way involve the concept of intelligence, for intelligence is entirely presupposed, and no amount of experimental work with quantitative results can ever have the slightest bearing on the question of the existence of intelligence.

If we attempt an analysis of any typical mental-test performance, we shall find that the performance consists of language reactions or manual reactions. Language reactions comprise solution of mathematical problems, knowledge of the meaning of words, bits of information, insight into the logical validity of situations, etc. Manual reactions involve the manipulation of blocks, of pieces of pictures, elementary skills, etc. That is, the ultimate elements of mental-test performance are found to be bits of the environment. Why does such a displacement or rearrangement of the elements of the environment have the appearance of being directed by force or drive? It is likely that the idea is based altogether upon the phenomena of variation in mental-test performance and performances in various desired types of behavior. If all human beings were equally good students, equally successful in business, equally eminent in professional life, and all made the same scores in mental tests, it is fairly likely that the

THE PROBLEM OF DRIVES

concept of intelligence never would have arisen. The phenomena of variation in inequality of success and variation in performance all tend to give an illusory indication of some unseen force or drive beneath the surface of behavior.

It is usually supposed that ambition is a driving force in the affairs of men. It is so described in the drama, in romantic fiction, and in scientific literature. The assumption is supported by the fact that human life affords a great variation in the degree of success achieved by various individuals. It is usually supposed that this variation in degree of success is a direct result of variation in degree of ambition. Young men are usually classified as individuals who either possess a great deal of this drive or who possess very little of it. Prophecies concerning eventual eminence and worldly success are based very largely upon the existing degree of the presence of this mysterious drive. There is no evidence, however, that such a drive exists. No one has made reported observation of it in any way. The only thing that can be observed is a great variation in the performance of individuals. It is this very fact of variation in degree of performance that suggests, to the casual observer, the presence of some unseen drive to which is given the name of ambition.

We often hear of the food or hunger drive. Very frequently this drive has been described as the most fundamental in all social activity. It has been supposed by some to be responsible for the accumulation of wealth, the building of homes, and for achievement in occupation or profession. The fact that living organisms appear to spend so great a fraction of their

time in activities which seem to lead to nothing but the acquisition of food lends support to the general belief that there is a definite food or hunger drive. It is unlikely, however, that many of the higher animals spend more time in seeking food than they do in sleep, but it has never occurred to anyone that sleep is a driving The probable explanation is that sleep is engaged in too uniformly by most animals. Most of the higher animals sleep approximately the same number of hours per day, and, so far as can be observed, sleep with a fairly uniform degree of depth. But in seeking food, animals vary tremendously in the technique which they use and in the degree of success which they achieve. There is the slovenly eating of food which cannot escape on the part of the cow; there is the sly, creeping-up upon the unsuspecting prey by the fox; the bold, open hunting of the lion; and the complex intrigue and life-planning of the successful human being. Among human beings alone, there is a tremendous range in the complexity and degree of achievement in the acquisition of food. This performance ranges all the way from the individual who is cared for by charity, through the individual who lives from hand to mouth, through the individual who has a competence sufficient for a few days, through the individual who is fairly independent, to the highly successful man whose worldly fortunes have become superior to any misfortune except possible bad judgment on his own part. It is this obvious fact of variation in clear-cut and overwhelming inequality that suggests the idea to the casual observer that there is an unseen driving force which he may speak of as the hunger or food drive.

[194]

THE PROBLEM OF DRIVES

Pain has also very frequently been described as a positive force in social life. In behavior it expresses itself as a reaction to discomfort. Most of the phenomena of social life and of civilization have by some been based upon this elementary reaction-pattern. is supposed that, because it was uncomfortable to be wet and cold, man sought the shelter of caves and began to clothe himself in skins. This primitive response to discomfort is supposed to have become sublimated into the building-up of social communities with their inventions, conveniences, luxuries, and aesthetic expression. It is likely, however, if all men wore the same kind of clothing, lived in the same kind of houses, looked at the same kind of pictures, and traveled in the same kind of conveyances, that the idea of this type of drive would not have arisen. The inequality of distribution of the behavior is what suggests the influence of the unseen force.

Sex is also frequently referred to as a drive. The Freudians have made it the all-important drive in human life. Sex is described extensively in literature, the drama, the cinema, and is present in most of the homes of the civilized world. What is the evidence that sex is a drive? The mere universality of sex would in itself never suggest that it is a force. Breathing is just as universal as is sex but has never been referred to as a force in social life. The thesis is supported that sex seems to be a drive merely because of the great variation in the various behaviors that accompany sex. There is so great a variation in the richness with which women are clothed, in the expense involved in their entertainment, in the degree of magnificance of homes and

methods of amusement, that the idea is suggested that sex itself is a driving force that is responsible for all this achievement. If performance were uniform, it is doubtful that the idea of the drive would arise in connection with sex any more than in connection with the drinking of water, of breathing, or of sleeping.

It has been the thesis of this chapter that drives are logical presuppositions which may seem to be substantiated by experimentation, but which are not even involved in any experimental situation. The thesis has been advanced that these logical presuppositions have been suggested to casual observers by the obvious facts of inequality in social performance. If social performance were uniform, no need would be felt for the explanatory assumption of drive. A description of the mere facts of inequality is all that can be used in support of the assumption of drives, and is in itself all that is necessary for an adequate description of social phenomena.

CHAPTER 24

RADICALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL

It has been quite customary in the occidental world to classify individuals into two groups—radicals and conservatives. There seems to be no uniform standard of measurement by which this classification is done. A radical is in some way opposed to all the political, economic, and social ideas of the conservative, while the conservative is equally opposed to the political, social, and economic ideas of the radical. Very few of these individuals, either radical or conservative, have a clear idea of what it is that distinguishes them.

We can probably get a better idea of the distinction between the two groups if we consider the origin and development of any new community. The United States has been a series of such communities, the frontier being pushed gradually across the entire country over a period of considerably more than a centurv. In Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the same phenomena have occurred to a greater or lesser degree. The same things happen, regardless of the part of the world in which the new community is being built. The migrating individuals come into the new geographical area, by the seashore, river, valley, plain, or in the foothills, and the same phenomena invariably occur. There is a contest to gain possession of the choicest parts of farm land, water front, mining property, or timber land. Soon the choicest parts are exhausted, and only the less desirable property remains for the later comers. Eventually only the least desirable property is left for the latest comers. There follows a readjustment during which some individuals sell their holdings to other individuals who happen to have available money or other negotiable property. As the community becomes organized, it is obvious in the eves of the entire community that there are some individuals in the community who have come into possession of the most desirable properties, while other individuals seem not to have acquired possession of any property worth speaking of. These two economic groups naturally become antagonistic to one another. The fortunate group is desirous of perpetuating the status quo of the community, while the less fortunate group would be greatly interested in a new dealing of the cards. The fortunate group even at this early date can be labeled as conservatives, and the unfortunate group can be labeled as radicals. The two groups can never have a common interest, for whatever is a gain to one is a loss to the other.

As we consider the composition of such a community, we find that there are really three groups, which may be classified as conservatives, neutrals, and radicals. That is, a relatively small proportion of the community will possess the most desirable property, while another small proportion will possess practically no property at all. In between may be found the large neutral group who possesses some property but not enough to guarantee permanent security. The small favored group is completely opposed to any redealing of the economic cards, while the small unfortunate group is in favor of any method of redealing the

RADICALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL

cards, since they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The large neutral group will not favor any redeal that would offer them less then they already have, but might support any move for a readjustment that would guarantee what they already possess, and promise more. As a result, this large neutral group will become subjected to various types of propaganda coming from the conservatives and from the radicals. The conservatives will point out the advantage of letting well-enough alone and of supporting the status quo. The radicals will point out that the conservatives are oppressors and that their property should be divided up among all.

If the conservative group becomes too small, it is in great danger of being wiped out, regardless of country or form of government. If, in addition to being small, it also becomes oppressive, it is almost certain to be wiped out, as was the case in France and more recently in Russia. If small but not oppressive, it may continue indefinitely, as is the case in England. If the conservative group is large enough, it will rule the country fearlessly, as is the case in America at the present time. The economic resources of America are so vast that the conservative group is likely to increase in size rather than decrease for some generations to come.

This analysis of the development of radical and conservative interests finds the fundamental distinction to be one of economic and professional success, the essential condition being one of economic success. Radicals simply are not recruited from the ranks of economic achievement, while conservatives very rarely

come from the midst of economic failure. There is no known reason for supposing that variations in economic success and professional success are not accompanied by variations in possession of measurable characteristics of human nature.

Originally, there is merely the observable inequality in ability to acquire, organize, and secure property. This type of ability must consist of a great variety of simple factors. The maximum combination of such factors is entirely unknown. The variation in possession of such complex ability, however, is observable on all sides. It is only when the inequality in possession of such ability demonstrates itself in the form of inequality in economic achievement that further political results are observable. The variation in economic ability seems to become rationalized into distinct verbal differences in political theory and in the philosophy of life. These differences extend over a wide range and become at the two extremes completely antagonistic, and, in philosophy of life, completely contradictory. The two extremes in variation become symbolic of the entire range of verbal differences, so that radicalism and conservatism are usually represented in terms of these two extremes.

If, in the geographical location of a new community, there are no differences in desirability of property, so that one acre of land is just as valuable as any other acre, then no difference can be observed in terms of fortune and misfortune. The result will be that there will be no one in favor of a redealing of the economic cards, and neither will there be anyone who would fear the result of such a redeal. Consequently, there

RADICALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL

will be no conservative and no radical groups. There will be a dead level of achievement, and political organization will probably never arise. The mere fact of political organization is, in itself, a positive indication of the presence of inequality.

During the lifetime of any given community, it may be controlled by a succession of various types of economic groups. The first group will likely be those who own the land. Later on, a more powerful economic group may consist of those who own the systems of transportation. Still later, a still stronger group may consist of those who own fundamental industries. Still later, certain inventor groups may control the economic life of the community. It matters not how rapidly these various groups may succeed one another; more fundamental groups for the type of life that the community lives will prove to be the stronger groups and the ruling groups.

In recent years, the idea has been entertained seriously in some quarters that strong economic groups are a menace to humanity, and that they must be done away with. It is assumed by such exponents that there are forces in the world which can be utilized for this destruction. This naïve idea is on a par with similar ideas among charlatan physicists to the effect that friction can be done away with and that perpetual motion embodied in a machine may be materialized. The one idea is based upon as complete a misconception of the nature of social behavior as the other is based upon a complete misconception of the conditions under which motion takes place. So far as can be observed, organized social behavior is the direct result of an unequal

distribution of human characteristics. If one group becomes organized sufficiently to overcome another group not so powerful, there will result a displacement of economic groups, and in no respect will there be a change in the conditions or in the inevitability of economic behavior. It is as absurd to hate economic achievement as to hate gravitation or mountain ranges.

There is not the slightest question concerning the certainty with which stronger interests in the community will rule the entire community. No verbal technique of government will ever change the inevitability of such phenomena. As surely as water runs down hill, the stronger interests will rule the weaker interests. The fact of revolution and overthrow of government is not the slightest argument against the inevitability of such phenomena. In revolution, one group that has ruled up to that time is overthrown by a group of interests which are, for the time being, stronger. There is a sudden displacement of economic groups, but the fact of a stronger group and a weaker group is in no wise changed. The individuals comprising the groups may change markedly in a period of a few weeks. But, in the long run, there will always be a ruling interest over against the interest of those who are less fortunate.

CHAPTER 25

SOCIAL COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION

We now come fact to face with the problem of trying to understand certain historical phenomena usually classified as social cohesion and its opposite, social disintegration. These two conflicting types of phenomena are especially responsible for suggesting a group-mind interpretation of social behavior.

1. The Phenomena of Social Cohesion. The most elementary example of social cohesion is that exhibited in the organization and behavior of the ordinary family. Whatever the daily duties may be, the members of the family return to a common home and a common organization. Though they may be scattered for days or even years, they usually come together again in the traditional form and with traditional recognition of a common organization. What better example of social cohesion could one imagine?

The above description of a social structure does not include within it, in any respect whatever, a description of any cohesive force. The cohesion is merely an idea suggested by a contemplation of the hypothetical or real situation, a mere verbal reaction on the part of the observer. All that is observed is a certain propinquity in the behavior of certain individuals, these individuals uniformly differing in ability, in economic possessions, and in knowledge of the world. These individual differences are the only real characteristics responsible for the continuation of the family structure and are all that the social cohesion consists of.

Another example of social cohesion is exhibited in the behavior of the average school or college com-This behavior consists of gathering together in small crowds for lectures or for study, or of meeting together in a single mass for the purpose of observing athletic contests. Such behavior is usually explained in terms of school spirit. The greater the concentration, the more terrific the noise, the larger the total mass gathered together, the more voluminous and deep-seated is the school spirit supposed to be. We have here, also, an example of the observer's fallacy. The school-spirit stuff exists nowhere except in the mind of the observer. All that is observed consists of individuals gathered together in crowds, engaged in doing certain things. In every such crowd, the essential characteristics are the great differences existing between one or more members and the remainder. The crowd in the classroom would fall apart immediately if the instructor were not present; the crowd on the athletic field would quickly disband if the team were removed from the field.

A third example of social cohesion might consist of the behavior of a well-organized city, for example, Los Angeles. Here we have civic pride developed to the highest degree. Civic enterprises of a gigantic nature are undertaken easily. The citizens of such a city are known to discuss the virtues of their homeland in glowing colors at every opportunity. Surely it is an example of social cohesion. Here again, however, the observer is merely experiencing an illusion. Remove the influence of those with land to sell, and the entire machinery of civic pride rumbles to a standstill.

SOCIAL COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION

The two great political parties in the United States possess certain characteristics which cause the casual observer to think of these parties as political units possessing personality, organization, and cohesion. chapter is being written the day after Alfred Smith's notification and acceptance speech. The two great political parties are this day organized for a battle which will last till election day. For the next few weeks, these two great parties will take on more and more the characteristics of great social units, different in principle and in personality, struggling for domination one over the other. Each individual citizen will express an allegiance in membership in one of these great units. All the adult members of the nation seem sucked together in two great crowds, each crowd being held together by some strange power of party allegiance and loyalty. Try, however, to visualize what would happen to these two great organizations if tomorrow's morning papers were to bring the news that Herbert Hoover and Alfred Smith had both committed suicide. The two great organizations would immediately disintegrate, and it would be necessary to build them up again through conferences, newspaper propaganda, and other media. It would seem that the personalities of Herbert Hoover and Alfred Smith, with those characteristics either real or imaginary which have made them different and set them apart from all the other citizens of the country, were responsible for the appearance of cohesion in these two great parties. To get such phenomena, it is just as essential that the rest of us be different from them, as it is that they be different from us.

Any organized state or nation exhibits the general phenomena of cohesion so long as such state or nation continues to exist successfully. Such cohesion is usually explained in terms of patriotism, of loyalty to the flag, or in other more or less poetic terms. In every such nation, however, we always find an unusual ruler, an unusual possession of destructive weapons of warfare, or an unusual amount of potential or real wealth. Usually all three characteristics are present. No nation can become great or, having become so, remain so for any length of time, if there is a lack of wealth, of military power, or of leadership. There is no mysterious power of social cohesion responsible for the development and world-expansion of a great nation. All such mysterious stuff exists only in the mind of the observer, who is unacquainted with most of the individual factors present, or who at least is not mentally intrigued by their presence.

Stated briefly, social cohesion is an illusory characteristic of any winning side or of any continuing organization of individuals. Cohesion is not in itself any part of the winning side nor of the organization of individuals, but is merely a name conferred by an observer. It is no more real than is the blueness of the landscape when observed through blue spectacles. It only seems that way and is much better explained by the psychology of individual differences than it is by the introduction of such concepts as instinct, social force, and so forth.

2. The Phenomena of Social Disintegration. The phenomena of social disintegration are not fundamentally different from the phenomena of organic dis-

SOCIAL COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION

integration. The latter phenomena are well known to The discontinuance of circulation and respiration, the breaking-down of cell walls, the chaos resulting from the elimination of specialization in function and structure, the falling-apart into fragments, and the ever growing shrinkage and oblivion might suggest to the poetic mind the presence of some peculiar force that could be called by the name of organic disintegration; but the poetry is merely a delusion and is the result of defective end-organs and a limited understanding on the part of the observer. What is being observed are partial glimpses of battle phenomena of two opposing sides, consisting of certain organic functions and structures on the one hand and of bacteria functions and structures on the other hand. One side wins a victory and the other side is forcibly wiped out. The losing side contributes nothing to the battle except an opportunity to the winning side. The winning side is more competent for the given situation than the losing side, and there is no further mystery about it as far as observational phenomena might be concerned. If the observer had end-organs that could see the bacteria, hear the bacteria, and in general observe the bacteria as clearly and as easily as the disintegrating organism is seen, smelled, tasted, or otherwise obtrusively comprehended, the behavior of the bacteria would be the center of the field of observation, and the idea of disintegration would not be obviously present. Only the physical and mental limitations of the observer introduce into the situation the mystical idea of disintegration. If those limitations were removed, the situation would be as naïve and simple as that of wooden soldiers being knocked over by a club in the hands of a small boy.

Social disintegration is in no way different. historian who specializes in describing for us the dying struggle of some great empire that is obviously falling apart usually develops in the mind of the reader a vision of social disintegration even though the historian himself may or may not experience the same delusion. Most of us learned in our early school-days that some terrible internal spirit of corruption brought about the decline of the Roman Empire and the gradual dismemberment of the great Spanish Empire. The delusion is caused by the fact that the Roman and the Spanish Empires had been in history for so many centuries that they had become familiar entities of a sort and had come to be thought of as occupying the world stage in a form of solitary grandeur that could never terminate except through self-collapse. The other peoples of the world, the social, national, and racial bacteria that after many centuries of gnawing had finally gained the victory, came upon the stage so suddenly that they were thought of as being the result of the disintegration rather than as its cause. If the histories of these less well-known bacteria forms of national and racial life were equally well known to our limited understandings and observational capacities as are the histories of Rome and Spain, the idea of social disintegration would scarcely occur. It is not likely that the people who demolished the Roman Empire thought of themselves as observers of a social disintegration. They simply annihilated the other side.

Briefly, the phenomena of social disintegration are

SOCIAL COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION

the observational delusions brought about by excluding the activities of the winning side from the field of observation. If both sides are equally observed and equally habitual to observation, the observer will probably alternate in observing cohesion on one side and disintegration on the other side. Both observations are illusory, however, and the only real elements in the situation consist of the fact that one side is beating the other side because more competent to live in that situation.

As one observes the history of China during the last few hundred years, there is a strange lack of either cohesion or disintegration. Certainly one would never exhibit China as an example of either phenomenon. The explanation is that nothing has been happening in China. There have been no victories and no defeats. This sort of existence has been made possible because of the simple lack of transportation and communication. When the Chinese find it possible to travel and to learn what is going on in all parts of China, there will be plenty of opportunity for outside observers to witness cohesion and disintegration on a large scale and with rapidity. The introduction of European and American civilization into China will result in civil wars and other wars in which millions of Chinese will perish. It will not be easy for the isolated provinces to become trained to national forms of behavior. The radio, the airplane, the automobile, the telephone, the telegraph, the steamship, and the railroad guarantee that the civilization of the Occident and the civilization of the Orient cannot continue to exist indefinitely on the same earth. One or the other is certain to be defeated.

It is a matter of only a few short generations till the technique of occidental life dominates the earth. Whether occidental nations will continue as masters to administer this technique remains for history to reveal. It is not difficult to visualize China a thousand years from now ruling Europe and America with the weapons that Europe and America have placed in the hands of China.